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This thes is explores the methodologi es employed by the unckrground 
rcsistar.ce movements of World War II to manage the inheren t d ifficu lties 
a-,soci,ltcd wi th o;Jerating in a clandcstice ecvironmcnt. Specifically, it examines 
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unde~groufld and discusses the manage ment proceuures implemented by ihe 
cia [J(.':est ine organizat ions to address the topics of recruit ment, interna l securi ty, 
kadership and command and control. The underground organ izations arc 
exarnincG generically, recognizing that t~ere are fUTldamenta l operat ing 
pr incip les, manageme nt reljuin:ments and security dictates arc universally 
applicable .- whe~hcr discussicg World War IT resistance movements or 
contemporary guerrilla grOl':ps. 
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EXECUTIVE S,;",MMARY 
eventua; ly played a prolluc<"!1t rol e .L r. 
fOl!g~. _ i: s 
wel l Es:abl::.shed operating procedures, a pre - organi::: Gd 
ch::li!1 - of cOTwan d and :nany o f :he assets t.a ke n fO T granted by 
organ .L za t .Lons opeyaled against a :1 e:",e~y ,."no 
v·, ot '-y superior ':' .:1 mart.La l terms, i n an e!":v i::-or.ment fra u ght 
·",·i ::r. unr e:r: :t i ng, deadly :hreats To survive, t he 
und erg r O'.lnd '4as ccmp<" l led to dev<" l op c:niqc:e and adclf::l .L ve 
opecating me thods T h i s paper explores t.he me:hods emp lc yed 
by the underground to manage the critical operat. i o n al 
r e q uire :ne:,.::o; a ssociZi: e d \,·i th r e cruitment, inter:-;al 
leadersh i p and command a n d co:-;':: r ol 
Operat lng ;. n a underground env ironment offered the 
clal'.destine orgcmiza::ion bo:h advan t ages and disadvantages. 
The underground ' s abil i ty 0.0 st r i k e unexpe cLed l y, fro;:) the 
very mids: o f It:S ene my ' " camp, to d i ssipat:e back into the 
indigeno'..leJ p opu::'at lon between actiens and :.he r elative ease 
wi:h '-"h i ch it cou l d inf il :l':"a:e :.he Ge l':"'a n ln fras :n:c:ures 
' .... ere precJ.ous toels to the g;:-ossly ~ismatched f orces of o.he 
undergro u nd . Cor.ve r se l y, t.he inor d in,3 te amount of L ime and 
ef f or t expende ri by the underground meyely :0 insu r e 
',I ll. 
haza;:-ds served :8 si3n~fi cCln tly 
The successful orgallizat:-on 
adap t'-- ng his ac:::iV l;: ~e" 
exp l o~t his c~andes:i nf> advantage , .... h :- le m~n'--miZ L1g tns 
e::ec~_" o f t he disadvan :::a g es 
TO understand the uti~ity ar.d '--mpact of :he underground 
oyganizat ions of occupif'd Europe it i s instruct i ve to reV l e',,' 
:he activi:ies and mlssions which t_hf'y CO:1Guct e d T::e 
unCerg rOUl'.d p'~-o·,ridC'd the Allies with ~n·v'aluabl e ::-e J. ~- :: ime 
i :1tel ligence, aSSlsted in the e"cape of downed airmen , 
conducted o:ubve !:sive a:.:tiofls against German mateyial and 
p e rsonne l targets , diver te d i mmense numbers of Axis t roops 
f Y8m t heir point of mai:l ef:ort and C8nducted a wi d e range 
of special :::at:k i r.g at che request of All l eG force" . 
Col l ectively, these u n dergrou:ld ac t ivities h ad a profound 
effect upon t'1e war-f ighting capab~lit l es 0: both the Ai l l es 
and Ax i s forces. 
The diveyse and constant: t_hre at" to t he secur it y of :he 
c l andest i ne orga.n i zat lonS dictaced t. he organiza:ional and 
operaciona~ 'Tlanagement of the llndergroun d. Threat.s to the 
sUl:vival 8f the underground oyganization had to be addressed 
before any operation could be planned a:1d conduc ted The 
ir.~e r :13.1 s'-'!<:L.rio::y :) f '::-:e '..Ir.dergr::> ... r:d was t.he es s~:-: : :a ':' 
prov1.dir.g re s :, s:J:::::e 
c rga:1:' za : ~ o ns t !ie t::i n ::lca -( 8f secre c y a l l 
t hat s t OG ,'; be::. we en it.o,,,,: f a :1d cer: a: .~. destru ct.:c:1 a t 
::a ::::ls of a vas t':'y "'lor e [)owecJ1 opr; ::>ne nt 
~ihet ::er deve l oping a cc-:--:-and and c ontrol st.r·.1ct-..;re , 
de 1 _r.eati:", g the role ::: its leadersh i p or d evisi r.g 
r e c r uit.ment met. hods, che und e rground was f o:rce d t o adapt 
a t r emendcusl y r e p ressive a:1d hos t ll e env~rcn;ne n t. Suyvi'la ':' 
", t:~ c p e ::-at:onal effic i.e n:::y were continge nt u?on t.he 
dev e lopmen t. o f adap t.lve , flexible and often 1:":".ag :':13. r.ive 
..:,.dergrc.::1d proced;.!res To va r y':'ng de g r ees , u t i l i z ing a 
d lverse asso r t me n t of met ho dologies, the resi stance 
movemen t s o f occupied Europ e adapted to t.he peri l ous wor ld 
of :: he underground, p rovid:..ng ':' nvaluabl e se r v ice r.o tile 
Al l i.e d '<Jar effo r t and t heir own st::-uggles :or :' ibe::-at.::.on 

INTRODUCTION 
":':'le u ndergrO"Comd res i stance mCvene:1 ':: s of World \,'ar : : 
r e p c es e nteo. a un ..l que mc;. lt -=-- :ac eted f o r m o f vial' f are 
which event:ll ally played a ,JJ:ominent r o l e in t he Al l:'~d 
V..l ctory T:.eir rolee; ranged frcm highly pub l ici7ed a::d 
dril matic s a b otage operat i o:1s to more Jud i cious b '-.lt e q u a l l y 
da mag :L ng c:ollecLion ilnd t1:ansmissiO:1 of i r. ionndtior. concer n l ::9 
tr.e German orde ::: of batt le The und e r g couno. resis:ar,ce [ :)l~", ,--; ~ 
its '..Ja r not i n p:::e -forrr.ed u n i t s, with ' ... e ll es:;ab ~ is ::ec 
proc e dures , experience and tactics to govern their a c r ::' ons 
bu t in cove :::t organizat..lcns , ... ·hich were forced t o organile 
rec ru it, ccmmunica~e, f?lan and operaLe in a n extraOl:'d:Lr.arily 
oppre s s..l.ve a:1d rest ri c t i v e env i ronme n t . Eow the underg r oc;.:'.o. 
no v em e :1rs of World War II acco:11p l ished :hi to is tr.e sub ~ ect o t 
this paf?e r . 
Re fore e xpl oring t he met:-.ods employed by t h e undel:'g "Co '.ln li 
to manag e t:"1ese inherent obstac l e", ..I. t ..I.e; ..I. :lstruc t .lve 
ex~m:..ne some b~ckg;:ou:1d i nformat::'on that 'Joll. ll 
u nde rstand i ng "the big p i c t ure" and p :: ace underground, 
Th e :e:::IT "UT~ c.er g round" has bee" app l i ~d tc :> J ch a diver-52 
and frequent l y co:""_':usi ng of p eop " e . ''''hom are 
tog eLhe:::- only by their comrr,cn :1eed or d esi-::-e LC disappear. 
that ~_he '""o l'd h a s losr. muc h its expl i cat l ve capac :.t y 
,To r qen Ha e str~JP expla :.r.ed t he s l t ua tion '..n Europe dur'..',g the 
Second 'tJor l d '/'Jel r l " t he followi ng ways: 
fo r l.r.e purposes of th i s par;er , the " \.md"yground" refers o n l y 
to those pet'SQr.s actively engaqe d 1n the struggle ag3:'nst the 
occupylng a:1d because ot these ac t10ns <,Jer e : orced t o 
operat e i n a c l<indestine mar,ner. Th is d ef inition, hO'N2ver , 
:a il s to c,lpture t he wany di. fferent var i ants of underground 
1'l39 - J94 5 A 
1 981) p. 358. 
t::~rd groL;p , that ot partisan un i t s, i 5 o u ts ide 
o f :be pu rvie'.v 0: t h i s p";Jer Wl!i l e certai n ly ''''crLhy o f 
;:~ r : her t.he dynamics. operationa: Lcqu~rements and 
daily managemer:t of part=-sar. u nits are d is t inc t ~ y d i f f e r'en t 
t:: C:cl tbos e 0: the "undergrcur:d" KomorCIoo'll'<;i's f =-r s t t '.-.'o 
groups. In adcii.ti o n : 0 Komoro ..... 'skl·S tn c ee categories , there 
e Xl.st ed a. tr0 menc.o"..lS numbc :: of s u pporters on t he frlng es o f 
(Ba r) Kcmorowski, ':'he Secret Armv, (Ne·.v York , Th.e 
Com;Ja ny , 1 95:.. ) pp . l43 - 144 
_c,p r e s i Sl2n:;:e f"' cve :T,enLs Liley jo no L ql:a~=-fy o. S 
a c tu 2 1 me['1De~ !.l of "under9rQunc. As d e :ined by 
paper, the " l.u:dcrgrQund " of thos e persQns 
a (: li.v~.!. y part=-cipa t e d '-n re s iS t ance u nits, ,-"hich c ecause 
avendle ~ ::-, ::' ngly .::- e pre SSlve, s e c u r=- t y appaL-atus 
forced to a l l ac tlv:.t ie s in a co[~plet el y clandest=-;-,e 
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE UNDERGROUND 
3e:ore a ca:1plete unders t anding Qf the activitles of t h e 
ur.derg r ound :T,ovemen t s c an be obta i ned, i t is necessary t c l ook 
at the env i ronment. =- n '"hich t:1RY '" e re forced by the occupy l ng 
powe r s t.O operate. The fornat i on and mar:.ager,en r. of ,lny 
o:::ganizatlon, in Lhe most perf:1issi ve envircn:nent, 
i nvar i a::, l y faces d l ffic u lt i es and ob"tac l es to These 
organlzations have the ~enefit of unobstructed advertisement 
of lts a l ms and opinicns, ope:1 and unres c :--ictec. chan:1els Qr 
com:nu:1icat.io:1 for disseminat.~:1S' and acquiring info:::-mat:'o: , tne 
use of a pre - esta:O l ::,s hed nel~,ork of trar,s!=,ortat i on and 
C O I~\[T,l:nicat i on, d:1d an environf:1ent i n which educa t i on, tra i n i ng 
and ;;upplies are readi l y accessib l e The undergr?ur.d 
moveme:1ts o f Eu rope possessed none of these assets wh:' l e 
:;:-.::e1' s ue ;' c c::d i::'OllS , i:: s seer:1S l. ;;> ~. a l:'<: ao l e t;:;;t t 
,:",-narkab::'-:o st~l l tha:: :::hey ,,;ere able :::0 ope ra:::e 0:1 a 
:::-:-. ::::. :-.·..1 :.1':3 c J. sis for r:-.a "y yed r ~ To r", Gj elsvii<: aesc :- i c ec 
s;::ec i f ic c o;:c it~or'.s as t !".e y Jpp l i e d t u oCC'-lp ied NC ::-;.Jay 
In add~tion :::0 the denia~ 0: :: he of t ree no rma l in:o;:::ru :r e n t s 
0: organ i zatio:l, t~le Germ2.n s e curity apparat-lses impos"':d 
varying degrees of o=: e ns i ve eount er - !'",eJsures designed t.O -nd ke 
:::-esistance ac;tlvit i es as di:ficult as [)oss i:Ole Eve[1 
Denmark _ a country v:lllcr. the drast~c; measures 
jy the Germans i n other less fortunate re2clrns, undcrgr8und 
operations were haTf,pered restric t i'.le security c;ounte~' -
In De!llnark , as exp l ai. ne d by Irving 'l'IerSle l. ll , "fer 
NClZ i s '.lsee. vel ve t gloves in tak ing 
a. foreign 7here had been a mi~im\lm 0: bn;.talit y , an 
(Montr e al, ~<\cG~ l l -
Qc.een's 
C::;r.;p'J!t2 lack of 
toC:: a nd d:ploma·:::y 
l nt_e:lded 
J d l J Y 
:'- plemented 0 1: 28 AL:g us t ~ 9 4 3 , conti nu i ng, ' .... idespread Ll~l res t 
,'ld th e b l owing u p of t he Fo rurr, Cope n hagen 's la r gO's : 
by t he ",alger Dansk - a Da n i s h res'-- st_ar, c e 
compelled t he Gern~ans to proclai m a Sta te of Erne.::'ge ncy. 
provisions o f t h e State o f Emerg ency we:::e 
mee ti n gs of more thdn five 
support of 




15 ) T:Jere wi ll De censorsh i p of ~ he P re s s unde r German 
control . 
'I:rving 
Macrae Smi eh CO'llpany, 
::0 de a l wi t h cases 
are violated t o the 
( Ph i l adel ',h ia, 
to cl! ~tail res:- s~ance a.c :: :. v.:.. t~es 
::~'::- :J:..l3hQut Eu r ope !(e :1f'; E t :' ;'lacksey deser i t es :: ;-.='- me asures 
t olk ell by tr.e German in J une of 19,,1 .!.TI t ~"le 3alkans tc ct. !.-:::; 
!.-es istance activ.!.ty; i n an ef(o :::- l the Ce r r1'rln S LO q '..: ~: _ 
~a n:: i5an ac t i vit y i n tl:e !3 a l k'Oms 
arb.:.. trcny rate Eor the e xecut ion of r_ostages at ~hree " -.dred 
fOl each k il le d Si mi l arly , ill O::::: toce r 1 942, Ei t ~e:::-
issue d , .... h2.t k::1cwn as t he " Corr,mande 
I ~; Jul y of 1 942 , t he Ge:::- i:la n occupy.!.ng pO',le:::-s in Franc e 
a u;); ished t he pena l ties f or invol v emen t i n an'::i-Ge:::-rnan 
activ.!. t l es in tr.e newspaper Pcl.1:iser - ZeitLing. The r:utice 
:New York, Tap l ingiCr 
p. 
' l';ac k sey. p . 87. 
trclII hid1ny r2~ 1 0: t. 3.:-,,:-:<> 
:l:e L.In, :a::hing eq-lipme :1t, supplyiLJ llater:'.a_ 
~ lnl,ell1'F' !1:::s. An n:::: lhs 
thc:,: 
f,~i l",d t.C "'ppo:::-t., r",si 
McGEI''''-c!ill 
",,,,nera ':' a list =- n Lo::d on 0: 
t hese w;--,o co u i c. oe ::::u s::e c. - t:: conceal some of th", eq~i p':-.2T.,:: 
15 ::: ::1e co u rag e De -; aTe very fr=-ghtened at the p:::-c s p ect ::: 
assisti ng any IJnde :-grC-': :1Ci act :;.v :!.ty and dccllned to h e l p. Tr.'.!! 
camma::dos in formed r.i::: that h€ ' .. as res arce d ClS a re l.ic;l: l~ 
~~-;.tr iot and ,_ot ·.: -.de rstand h ~s J:efusal " 7 >.e man t c:d 
them he o n ly been run:1 '.. 119 t he shop :or i1 few mOf.t:'s I t s 
pncv~oU5 owner had :: ~ e d Hi s n ilme same, so t he re bad 
been no need t:o chan']e the name of :::he bus'..ness." 
h a v ing J:cvealed their i dent i t y, 
r et urned their fishing tral-l ler aft e r r epedted , d:"re 
warnings never to speak o f the in c ident. The Clpp.::-ehensive 
shopk.eeper, reali z ing the GCl:'mdnS had imposed a dea:::h p ena lty 
:or any contact · .. i t h the ' e ne:r.y,' was t erriL_ed . He was soon 
Dav~d (New Yo~k. The t-lacMill i al' 
Company, New 
: hat : :--.e th,e~ 
ag e nts Ole'l: 
in :he i s l ar.ds, d J:esse d 
::-:e ~." 0 After hO\les of agon iz "-:-.g , the shc ,? keeper 20n : ac t;:e d 
~:-. acq·Ja i ntance in an of :1.cial the 
who p assed :he in fo.::-~a t ion the 
authoe .l. ties. The resu:'t ·.,·as tha t the ::..shing tral-.;l e r 
a~bc:shed, ·,.; i ,.h the ca p t ·.ne Oe dea t h o f elll of i ts cr-=I,' and a 1:.. 
bc: t of t h e u'- nge comrtandos, ':"he environ~ent of d :.. s: 
and fear wh i c h : he German h ad care fully nurt·J.::-ed '.-las 
recom[)e nsed in fu l l. 
Fror:1 a n ob j e ctive po int_ of v'-ew, the nea s·..;res i mplCr:1entea 
by r.he German s e cueity faeces seemec. extremely well designed 
to make : he envieonmen: 1. 11 wh ich t he u!lderground had to 
f\!nct i on as dema:ld::ng as possible. I n t :,e [ace of :hese 
ir,c red.l bly b rutal de te rrents which frequent~y me an t. 
l.mpr i s o n ment, torture a nd deat h, not only to t:,e paeticipants 
b ,..;t tc theie ir,med i ate and e x tended famili es , the exeCut i on o f 
as many as hundreds of his fello '.-I cQ,mtrYr:le n and o::hee 
ho :: r ifying consequences - - it '--s exteaoedinaey cha t r e sis t anc e 
movements continued to opeeate. ':'h<> p ot entially ho :: ri=ic 
aC :::' 8 :1S, bala:1cing : he rot f''" ia l L::-:cf i t ~ _ any op~ :~a::l:; :-: 
a ;?'3.:';'.s~ th~ agc n Lzing price 
;~ ~ ::n r'13ck sey e x p la:'.. :--.s· 
Tr,e Germa n at:emp: s d 1 scour age act :L v i t y 
through massive I ~prisalJ:.; certainly r;-,ade t . . "le r:ost o f. 
cperat ::' :--.g extremely :: ig r. and mllst ~avc de t f'r r ed ma ny h .-:;m 
supo;cr: ':'r: g t:-:te llndergrCll:1d organi.zations, bu: t he effec :c; we:-e 
no t al ·.-Jays ·,,·ha: the Germdn intend"o'd At times , t:-.e Ge r :na :1s 
indescrim:..na:1t '.lse of rf'pr .. s als served no~ to fr i g h te!l t he 
occupled p e op l e into subrr,ission but tc l eave t hem fee ling as 
~ they ',Jere ddmned l [ L ""ley resis t ed dnd damned l f t :-.e y 
didn't. Faced with suc~ ,1 choice, many to take t r.eir 
in t r.e unde rgrcund. Bar Komorcwski explal;ls :r ... 
resu l ts of t r.e massi ve and indiscrimi:ldte deterre nt tec:-:tn1.q '..les 
e mp loyed by t:-:te Germans in Fo l and. Terror r.e notes, 1 S a 
" dangerous weapcn. ,. 
: mpcss :c ble to exact l y to ',.:hat :ieg~=e t :c::e 
enCO'Jrag"lf"_g and disco'Jraging par tic i ra t i:x'. i:1 
' ''''enno",," res:cstance activi t y . Potential German ret.--.l:'3.t ory 
IT,e asur-e s ',.:e r e 'c nvariab1y Ll major cO-:1siderLltio-:1 i n tr.e dec ~ sio:1 
c;:; <::onduct or :orego opera t i ons The de n ial of the 3.ssel"" 
norma l ly available to " above - ground" organiza c ioClS a l s o 
profo .. md e ff ec t on underground ac(iv"lty The German abi lity 
to eliT:linale the f'-lndamental imp l ements of corroT:lun i catic n 
transportat:con , ecu<::d tion, training, req\lJ rea a 
complete restruc turi ng o f methods of operating 
Final l y, .... ·hat is most l,rrporta:1t rea l i ?c is tt.at t'1e 1:8s ti :'e 
and e xtreme l y da!1ger-ouS environment, inte:1t i onall y fo,,::: erC'd 
l~e Ge .::-n;an security forces t hroughout :o:uro(le, dee(lly effec ':e d 
the underg round 1l0vements and necessitated the de'lelop,""e:1t o f 
lTI "l que Cl.Cld d i stinct ive met hods o f operation. 
" Komoro· .... ski, p. 39. 
ROLES OF THE 'UNDERGROUND 
~:: 'Je:~.;::r,o(, Nor"'ay , :0 the l ess vis i b l e, da=-ly ef:or: s ~::: 
::;::- C8?S a :".c asse:s '::::J : he All ies T he 3r~.ti sh re C8::;.'_ ized '.'2 ry 
"", :::ly ~r_ tr.;" war the sigl1if icont ro:'e an · i:1dige :-.c:.;a 
r es i stanc e :erc ~ c c> u ld play . :he St.rr,mer of 1940, 
o::ic:'al 13:c:':~sh \~ar Cabi:let ' .... as cre al.ed 
In Ju l y 1940 , the 3riLish eSLablished the Ss>ec=-a l 
OperaC10:1s Executiv e (SOE), designe d specifical:'y to e nco~rase 
an d a \,~Sl r, e nt inc~p ie :1r resistanc e Ol:ganizaLJ.ons =-:1 ~ heir 
struggle aga i ns'.:: the Ax i s' eccupy:'og forces Churchi l l's 
dir~ctlve to Lord Calten, the first Lead of SC;:;: , v"as sllccinct 
, :-,_'=1 t.o t.he po: :-. t., :::-.::::-:>pe abl a ze. 
~ :,_ c SO::: a:ld enderground ..:-e.3l.st.ance rr,O\lemen-s 
performed net cnly r-o l e s envisioned by C:hu.::-cr.l. l l c'..;t many 
ot.hers as ·,,·ell. r-;, .R. :l . Foot d l.v:' d8c resistance act i Vl.t i es 
tr,re 2 b::oad fl:nctionLll ca:::egories o f. intell iger~ce, 
.:I nd subvecsio n I-:jtn sl:bversion subdivided into SdD8tdge , 
attack o n troops dnd indi viduals, po l itic and i ns'_rrc ct: :' on 
Borrm·;ing :rom Prof. Foot's classi f icat i ons, toe division of 




Fac t , SOE in F~Clnce, (London, ner l-la jesty's Stationary 
p . 10 . 
seE in fcanc e , pp U - 12 . 
"M.R.iJ f oot, P<"s:'stance, (Ne'", York, l-1cGra',,-'-I-! .il l Book Compi> n y, 
1977) p. 1 0. 
I :-.d':'v i dual ly, e3.cr. ~_ ":0. ': 5e CiC":l\':: :i es 
ev", :"". : c...a1 A:': ied v ':':: ::o::-y Co lle ct Lre.iy, act':'ons 
1. Intelligen~ e Gath e ring and Dissemina tion 
c: friend ly force s '.. n t ~ :'s 
dct::vit ie s of e:-.e nl y '::"e p;e s e:lts a n ex t reme l y va:' '.l 3.:C : e 
: :-- :elligence pot e nt~Cll 
e:--<> my's , ty!='es of ".T.its, mo r ale, 
of e:lel:1.y .S h l pS , anti. - ai;:-craft emr:'aCe r:1e::ts , 
-lheir c los e , dJ~ly i. :-:t eract~on wiU'_ s c l d i ers, ~ ::.e v ~ taD _ V 
y~ e l ds cLle" f l<::-c1 re operatio::s. 
r esistanc e orga.n:'zO-tions in E"-.:.r~pe prc v ided al l and mO J:: C 
The l oca l rail\~O-y work ers supplied d0"C. a ~ led reporCs o n 
mov,:men t s of troops a.nd 5e n s i t~ve cqu~p nl ent, p rovid ':' :-lg 
inva :" JCiD :' e ~ndicators abou t: the intentions o f Germdn 
'; -. a mor e mundane ~)ut ecual ly irnp0.ctant level , :hey provided 
" up t.O t he mi n u te " meteoro:!.cqical reports on the we a t her 
~ond ~ t l. o:: in Eucope , g reat l y tac:' l i,t.ating the AL_ i e d a ~r 
r h e a::quis i :::~on and ti n el y c. i sse r:1inati:m 
inte ll igenc e by undergrol:na forces cC'-l :' d ha v e drama ti c 
c cnseaue n ces . hr. exce:'l c nl exampl e o f th i s ~s ?rcv ~ de ci by tr.e 
cClse ot Lhe Gern an battleship, T'i!:'pitz The Tirpi t z , lr.e 
German's last a n d most :orm ido':l :'e batt:'esh , p , ha d b ee n sent. to 
" 
Olav ?is te Ci:"_d Be!:":!.t Nok l eby e xplain, 
,",it le:::: , 5 pre[)aration against 
p 3. r::.ly t o 
Tirp i t z. desc :: ibed by Davi.d Howarth, made attac:.: cy 
conv e n tional meane; :..m?ractl.ca_ 
The Allies hest oppcrtU:1ity at sink i ng the s r.l.? 
\·ir.en i t ",'as at sea a nd f or de tai ls of her movement.-s 
rell.ed o n t he u:",derground. As Rl.ste a n d Nok leby exp li:;i,., 
"Abu..!t 1 6 SIS .::adio stations, sit"..!a t ed a l ong t!1e coast fr o m 
Oslo t o 1'ro:nso, sent inva. ~ uab l e :laval i ntelligence, givinq t :.e 
alli ed naviec:; G. day - to-day picLure the Ge::ma.n na.va. " 
positions _ ,.2; The :inal rf: c:;u lt ' ... ·ao.: the ues c ru ct.- ion o f c c.c 
Tirp _i tz, · .... h i ch i n t u rn f re e d numerous Br ~ tish ships f or duties 
i n ot :'ler vita l c;ectoro.: and e l iminated a maj or threa t t ol\. :" iFOd 
5nipp i :lg tc Russ i a. . 
;)avid :-to v..·ar th . Acros s ~9 Nn r' ... ·ay, (New York, I-ii ll iam S l o a ne 
Associates. 1952) p . 173 . 
""Riste and Nok l eby, p . 48 . 
~J p~epa ~e for an ri8 :"': g and, 
=- n-·cd.:.a t~;'y, co s t.; ?por t t h e Al lied eff .;:: r t by sabQtag~ a nd 
:;,_·,·erS1.~nary a<:::ivi :..y and aeove all by "a .lnta.ln 1.r. ~ a:-. 
:::o'..:.nt rymen' 5 rea.l.i.z,1 t.i.or. 0 : the c~L:cia l r o .!.e 
:"nte:: i gen.,-:" Flayed J..Il the ov~ra l l ',ar effort resulted in 
of these was the acquio:;it:"on of the top se c ret 
Gerrna:-. encQc ing IlIa.chine "En:'gma Stefan KorOonsk :' ae s;;:;r· i.be s 
the circu:ns t ances surrou:-,d :" ng the "Enigma" machl.r.e· 
Recer.ely cevea l ed secre ts of the i nte ll igence serv:"ces 0 : 
and Great Br :" t,un orought t c light the most ccuc i al 
?oJ...lsh eonlr l. but ion: In .TuJ..y 1939. t he Po l es g ave to the 
AJ.. l ies a duplicate the Germar. ccdl.ng ma cO"l inc '2r.i g m2 ' 
const.ructed by t:he Pcl i sh intell.lge:J:::e servi:::e; th :"s ma de it 
poss':'D l e fe r the AlJ..ies to read t he disratches of HitJ..er u",.c 
his eomma:-.der throughcut the 
A "econ d r:1ajor i:Jte ll i ger.ce coup 0: the I'o ,l Lsh 
underground was its d i scovel"Y of d new, SeCl:et Gerr:1a :l ' .... eapo:l, 
" KOr:1crows k J.., p. 30 
The PC '!, sh l;nd prcro~, 
Press, '...978) p . 62. 
The ;::::ecedir.g paragra.;Jns ment ion o:lly a :8"; of ':". :--:2 
Gany e xc::aordi!lal'y S1lccesses achieved by the illtel 2.':'ger:ce 
serv~ces of the undergrou:1d organizations of Europe 
tney focus , pe:-haps unfairly, on d:::-amatl.C dnd merr.orable sing:e 
l.t is n ot intended any 'liay t o Ii · inimize t :1e 
sig:1ificance of t ne daily and no ::: so sensationOl l intelli.ge:1c:e 
activi t ies. Indeec., it 'lias the underground 's unrelllittl.ng, 
deper.dab l e f l ow o f dal.ly i nte l ligence , l.den tifying German 
troop s t reng:::r.s, llIovemen:::s, l ocatjo:1s, gun emp l aceme:1ts , 
curre:1t activlty and meteoro l cgical repor ts t.nat made tnem a 
inuing valuable asset. 
2. Assistance in Escape 
The European ret;lstance movemen l S prov l ded assista:1ce 
escape, primarily to t' .... o groups; Allied sec.nce men 
"Ko r:t: onski, ? 6':" . 
l i: they were Sn a t acw:l o ';e ::: 
·~ ~-'an':. the re :·..: r n c: a va ~ ua ole, -,vart;''''.e assel - tra l:"! e j p-=- ~ c t s 
;'n: c .::mat-=- on fa l l ing it, ':: o enemy hands thloug h 1n:2::-::09'"t i o :1 c : 
ca~tured ::,.embers. 't.'::i l e a:;c: i sting i n the esc.:lpe 0:: J e ws 
rnay no,. have se !"ved any i mmcciate s t rat ,~ g ic goa l s, 
c on tributed gl-e;:1[: l y to:: . .3.ti::::'.a l py:..de, s e r ved as an e ;<;"l. r:'.pl e 0 : 
d e fi ance to t r~e ;;·~::-:an ucc--,-paL i o u and of course saved 
thousands of i~. ".() cPc nt :: ",1 la-,,- c '::)U[ltryme n 
Cenmar;<; provides an excellent examp~e af tr.e 
acca mDl i shments a cou n try of only four and a t:alf mi =- ' 
peop le can mCl i<;e tcwards an escape servic e Altogether 
18, 000 .s:Pcrscns we !"e t ca,)sport ed out of DewOl ari..:: to Sweden 
:):l~y 450 o f tLe appyoximate l y 7 , 500 Da nls h -,vere arrestee 
Gl:l -:l. '.aken tc Ge rrnany " t h e rema i nder beir:g succe5s f ..::"~y 
evacuated out of the c()untry u nder t he eyes 0: the GerDa n 
occupying forces. Cenrr,ark was nul alone in its assis t ance to 
downed a irmen. Throughout E urope, members of t Le unde r] yound 
resistance, !::..sked brutal repercussions to aid Al:ied a:'nne n 
3. Direct Subversion 
del~::Jer3.:iGn prior e:nbarking upon an a':ta:::>:: agaicst 
o~era:i,:)-:l. ve r se", tC12 ?r~ce ':::) be paid in bo:h l.iveb 
ar_d ~;-jc r ea"ed 5cr.ltiny and additicnal :::-epres5~ve rneaseres 
:~lenera~ly 
Actions Against Material Targets 
t acks j,Ja~nst matc ":: i al .:CJ e :s 
t hos e dee med to be v:tCl. ~ : 0 t h =' 3e::: ;"1 :1:1 
imme 3. s>.,:l"ab l e i c>:C " ys, d i s t :::a c :ions and :ce d'-!c !:: ion :'- ll ::e~"':'a:: 
ef : ic ~ency Not al~ were as spec t acula :c as t .h e demol ~: ~ c P. 0 : 
ra ilways aga ~ nst ma:eri a l t a ::: ge t s co -.:.~d be as s :.;cc!Jle 
as t h e s l as h i ng o f :i .::-"s o n German vehicle" o r as ~ n s=--d i0U s as 
the use SOE p.::-ov~ded " d:::: t y ~::: : cks " :0 d amage f act~ ry 
eq·.:=-- p::1en ~ . M .R . D . Poo: d e sc r i bes the u se of "Abra,-, '--ve greaO'e , 
W~'1::.ch wears out , ::e pe.r t s i t appears ~. o l u b::: l. c a te 
spec:ca l ty of 30!': ' s p "::ovide s an ODV~OCl3 exai:1ple; [1'\ : :l 
discret i on t he ope"::a t o r 's par t ',,'as a l l that 'was :leec.ej 
pro t e ct h :'m ' ... ·hi l e he ' ... ·re a ke d pl e n t :' f u l damage . 
d e scribes an More subtle met:'lod e mployed e.g-ai ns: Ge rman 
ma t e r i a l s; 
" Foot, Resis=an~e , p. 4 3. 
al so ? r oved Sl]CCes3i'..::' 
Denmar'-;: " _3:::,g2S>:: ex h~ bit i o :1 
i>-:cccr,e a GerMan l>.rrry 
:":n je: ::-.ea th a :;:rate of '=:leer ::::ott123, 
of ? - 3 exp :'o"ives was placed i r. 
e nougl! damage tc p re vent it [ ~' 8tn b ecom u-.g a barrack". : In 
:' '14 4 , the :JC"Jt"'Ne gian FJPpet gevernment. afte :: years of threats, 
ag.::eed to :nobi lize young 'iorwegiii.ns for a " l abo:: d:: af<:" ::' :..; t 
' .... ith i n slnuat l ons that they may al so have b ee n u sed as tr88 [) S 
en the Eas t ern Front. The Nocwegian resista n :;:e n,ac t ed by 
fi r s t b lowing u? t he r egistering mac hines used 1n prepar i n 'J 
the d r aft cards and then, t h e day befcre registrat i on ' .... as to 
occur , "laced a bomo the ::"abor Of f ice \>,'hich destrcy·'O'd bo th 
the draf t paper ~, and the Labo r office. resu l t \>" a 8 an 
indefinite postponemer, t of t he :'abor draft ." -::- :"lrou g hou t 
Eurc?e, inr.urr.e rab l e charges we::-e detonated , des tr oY 1:1g 
thousand s 0: miles cf ra i lway lines ar.d causin g inestimable 
de l ays in the move me nt of German troops and material The 
' Foot, ~, pp. 43-44 . 
Lampe , ~~, (London, Casse :' l & Company 
Lt d pp. 3 4 - 35 
Sonsteby, !<.e:;)o.;-t from NQ 2 4 , (Kew Yo r:~, Lyle Stau rt, 
I nc pp. :C 7 -1:1. 
:: :-.'.'; G~I'mar. i s :' <"";:> oss i l;J :"'.'; 
I'~SC'.J!"c: s 3.:"lei e:f:'c i ency 'l1US: h<J.ve been er: ,, !"mous. 
D. Attacks Against Individuals or Trocps 
.:' :: ,:;a ::;': s a g ai:Js: i ndividu al or ':;rcops car. hp 
~'jr~!1e::: d::' vided i :< t c at tacks on Gpr ma n j::: ("!t" scn:1e l a nd a:: : ac~ s 
::1:1 :-:on-Ger:~3.n co llaborators Attacks 8n Germans ',,'ere s U!;JJec,:; 
~a [sher pena. l :ies , frequpntly res u l t::' ng :..:-. ::-:.-,,; 
Qxe c:J ':; ion 0 : l arge :l"J:~ b(' rs c f t"a r: dor:-,l y .'Select e d host a g e s ::.:-:. 
retaliat .. on for death The execution of n c r.-
co l laooraLors by the r ",sistance organ:' zaLions 1.:su31 ~ y 
e li cited very I l t: l e l"es j:::onse from G",rman forces. Tnus, t r.e 
[jat :'onals requ i red ml<.ch 
considera t i on arJl wa s embarked u~on on l y 'when no other opt ::' or. s 
wer e cons ::'dered practical. 
Di r ec t " t tack s '-'pon Germans g ive n the ::' r 
and continuing contact '.-l l th the occupi2c coun t ry's 
population, re l at i ve l y rare. In this tr.e b r utal 
dcte:::rents aprl i ed by the Germdn fcrc2s appear fai r l y 
effective T:'e inCldents 'w hen Germa ns were :r.e targe:: ts of 
se l ect ed execution lnvariably involved extenuat:-ng 
clrcumstances An examp :" e of such ci.::cumstances is p rovlded 
by ::he assassination of SS ObergruppenEuhce.:: Relnharc. 
Heydric~"l [!'S Ca l l um :-1cConald exp l ains, Eeyc.yi c:h was selected 
for execut i o n becaus e he was; 
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ti:!:'i~ i sh - C zec h endeavor- was wor-::h the hor~l[~c r::enu.lt~es ::he 
ext::acted [:!:'Cl!L :: he popuLJc e ::he or 
t ~oUS<l:-;ds o f Czechs i s l m?osslb l e to ans ',.;er ? e:!:'haps, 
final a.na 1ysls, ~. he :!:'enova::' of Eeydric h fror:\ a ::Jo,n::lon 
wh i ch he wlllingly and litera l ::' y exer-cised c :e authcr::''::y '~O 
order- the deaths a:-:d to;:-t:lires of so m,. ny, saved _ =-- ves 
Per':1aps the dssumpt i on of Reichsprcte~ tor of Czec:"1os10vJ.k i 3 
a i:iGln less ab le tr.an Eeydrich :!:'esulted in d l eSS p::ofic ient 
Geu':\an secu::ity :oyce in Czechos l ovaki" ~,'r.atever t he dlls',,'er 
t.o thecoe questions nay be, they grdphica::' l y i 1 1 u8tr;;J_t e t: he 
a g onizing options whi ch t1'.08 (, d e cid i ng t o conduc t at t ac~s 
German personnel nust ::esolve. 
'tJr.i le t.he ~i l l i n9 o f Heydrich was ;Je~haps t:-:e most 
dr-amatic exallple cf a t tu. cks on Ge r-mans, tr.ere we';;e n2lny others 
t h r-ougllOc:. t Eur-ope. In Pola:ld, the undcr-gr-ound kil ::'ed Ger.-nan 
sold~er-s me ~e::'y t o acqu i r-e the i r- ar-ms A.-:' thou gh itO other-
atcacks e::'lcl ted such massive German r-ep:;:"lsals as the kllling 
l'"lacDonald, pp. 174 -1 90. 
spee·:;:h, and ~c-1~d prcvide in:, 
L~[r'ely 
The eliml nat 1. Cn of coL.ahorators COLlld oecome a 
maJor func c ion of t:~.e resistance . J orgen Keeler, 
under'-j rou nd participant and author of se'Jera l puolications 0,: 
the Danish Resistance, eX;Jlained that in the later stages of 
the war as mu ch ClS f i fty 9crcent of the Holger :::Jans:.;:' s 
dedicat e d the elimination of 
coll~borators. H The amount of effort exerted to exterminaLe 
collaboraLors is noc surprising conSidering the threat they 
representee to underground organ i zations In i nterv~.:;ws wlth 
mulL~ple underground participallLs - severa l cf , .... hom I:ave s inc e: 
cecome expert s on the topic of undcrground r esistance groups. 
they unanimO Cls l y stated the thr.-ea t s posce by collaborators was 
Ja n Karski, T t-, e Story 0" a S<" cre "- StaLe , IBoston, i-{ollghtor. 
Miffll. n Comp imy, 194 .. ) p. 235. 
" Jorgen Kee l er, In t ervie,,' with the author, 
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the greate8: ::: 0 t he i ~- ol:ga n~z a.t~o:1 " -::' h 18 coupl ,~d .",~ : :: 
c :-.e re ::' ati v e i mp l.! r.~r:y W ~: ll aC ~l on s cou ::' :::: c e 
'J;.:;ie r :01 r:e:1, resul ted i n a ~arge operat i ons aga~:-:"c 
Diversion of Main Effort 
3 y L: .'.e ,lr ex i ;; te:1c e a::' Crle, u:-lde rgrOLr:d !'esi 3 t 3. :-::;:~ 
rr.O'l e r;>.C :1ts se.::vcd as a d i version of German troops from :: :-.e ~ a ~n 
b a tt le : ron'. The gr ea!::er the po t ent :.a1 [or l> n rcst a110ng :[-.e 
occupied t: :-:e grea ter t he n umb er of German !::roops 
f o rced to be deployed a',,'ay fr o m Le fror. t ~=-:1es 
v i o::'e n l and deb l 1 i tiltir,g t he ac !::ivlties of 
undergro.;:.3, the more troops the Germa:1s '''e re f orced 
alL:; ca!::e t o a distrac t H HJ sice 3hC'",'s Th e lotal c: 
German lroor ', comm i tted t o keepi n g order i n the 
countries '",'dS treme:1dous , It i s d ifficu lt to i.m"Y l. ne th <J.~_ 
fn~e ing these t roop s r:o contribClte to the ma in '",ar - : ight~ng 
e::OL' t wou l d n ot have made a significant differer:ce, 
3ut beyon d t his l arsely coincidenta l diversion of 
German force"" ln tentional, planEed campaigns, t he 
primary o tjecti'les of wh ich were t o d l. vert or dela~1 Ger'Tlan 
f rom reac h ing a criticill point at il cer t a in t i. me 
lrvi n9 It.'e r s tei n r.::-ov ide s an excellent e xamr l e of a concerted 
e: Eo r l Lo d i vert Genr.an force s from a crucial point: 
:\Grv,'~g:ii:1 e!:fort 'Suspend t::e Ge:::-rnan ef : oct. to re3. c '1 a 
front 
As with the ot:,e:::- f unct :.. cns of t~e unde::-g::-ounc', it 
extremely difficult to ec:;timate the sign: f i c ance t >ey had 
che tocal effort. "hile theee have been skeptics --
r egarding the actua l i T,pact t he resistance has had on 
d ivertlng German forces fro:ll :::r i tical areas a ;. cri tical times , 
i. t 1 5 difficult to imagi n e t)-,at a rai l road being severed 
multip l e places and the (iestruction o[ nU[f,erOClS l ocomotives 
i'erstein, That Denmark "j'..aht Llve , p . 10U . 
Gjc l svik, ;Jp. 200-20 1. 
:;: :" '1"O n poi :~t i::L a timely fash:..en 
Special Tasks as Required 
accas i or. the Alll.ed forces rec;:u.:.r e spec :'. :ic 
:;:a s .'<: s r.c be couiucted for wh :.. ;; :-_ t:-'J:y lacked c<J\l:~try 
3ecause of !=,ositio,_ dod ca pdbi i t~ 12 S of 
:r equcntly deleJated tc the indiJenO'.L' re sistance 
r !1ese need s e rve t !1e pa r ti c~=-ar i n ter est5 o ~ 
l:-)d l ge n ous resisr.ance crganl.zat l.c:1s. 'out 'were accepted b e cause 
of thei r paten'::ial Lo suppo r t the cverell '. '~]ar ef:crt:: T:lC 
ac tions reqclested by the All i es :night incLlde the 
of specified targets, eli minatlon of key 1nciividuals ar 
t he acq'clisitioll of precisely defir.ed intel ligence Ke:-)n 2,::il 
t>\a.cksey provides a n example of a highly spec1fic RAt' requ F'st 
t o Lh e SO£ to "amDus h the pi lots of Kampf ge5c hwader 1 00 at 
they t ravelled by bus to the airf i eld. ,,'a Jorgen 
Hapst_ru:p prcvides ar. e X"Imple of the u t l. li za t loll 0: tr:e Dan ish 
underground 1:'". a s pecial tatl king r o le 'when he n c t_es tha'::. 
Ju tl a n d f i xed E'.lrecd-stations were estab l is h e d ac<:;ordir,g-
Alll.ec. ·",·l. sr.es l'he l.r f '.lnc':: i cn was to glve radio bcc;m5 
All ied aircraft ave)C Weste r n Eclrope 7hat 'wQ,k ed as occaSl.on 
h f.<ac\.;: sey, p . 53. 
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s:s 
G~sen ar.d h i s compa)~ i o" ',,"ere t 8 remove t ho d.!.rec :: icn f1. .:::ng 
apparatl.", a nd :::ake p hc:tographs and sketo~es of t h o:=, for 
c ve'. tua l con veyance to England 
Per :<aps the mos t f amoll~; Cc t il '.. zilt.ior. c : '.mde::gr~ l nd 
re si s c ance organizatiol~s to special tas k s was t :-:'at 
t h e SOE' S -ls e of NOr''''egian L l. nge co .n:n0.ndos t o destroy 
Ge r man heavy ' .... 0.t e r p l a nt: in Vemork, Norway As eXl) lained in 
Norway's Res l stance Museum guidebook : "Dur l ng the I'jar he avy 
water was considered indispensable as an aid to the ::;rod-lot iO:1 
of atomic: drms . T;,e o nly pla:ll in t.he world where heavy wa l er 
was p r ::,j uc ed continuu",sly was sit uated a~_ Vemork nigh 
::;r1.o r .!.ty tr.ere f ore glve n the destruction 0: the 
Diant. -, ; Af t er composed of Bri t .l.sh 
"Expose" in Eurouean Resis t )nc e t~Qvp:nents 
" OLuf Ree d Olsen, 'hm Ec g s on 71y Plate. (London. George Al l e n 
& lJn~lin Lt d 1';152 ) p. 29. 
(guidebo o k ) Pu!:J::'':'sber· Norges 
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Ec gineers / c c mmandos fa.!. l e :i to d e stroy - or eve n ce3.cr - t ~~ i~ 
WIt_r. t :. e ind i ger.o'.:s U:-1Gf'rg t"oG.nd 
e ~,~-::ed l~-.e.!.r ?rospects for I n 
gcecitly 
1943, a 
u:_, ~·.!.ng condl.cted by n i ne Norweg .!. ii.n commandos, b i e,,' IlD 
vital portions elf the h eavy water .ulant A yea.c later, c:-. 
Febr uary, '-94';:, " t_r.e Hydro ferry, carry.!.ng 9raCt.!.cdl ly a ':' l t :-. -:: 
remaining sU9plies of ~leavy '.vC'.te.c concentra te was SI.! :1 k on Lake 
T i :ms j o, ' ;. by Linge commandos , by ther~ fu l ly I n tegrated i n t o 
the NOr"~Je g ian ;;.ndergrou n d resistanc e 
i l lustrated, the undergrou n d resista :lce 
organ izat io:1s of wo r l d War I I participated 
assort ment of act.!.vities. Their acr.ie\rements rangec. fro m r_ !':e 
spe ctacular c.es'::ruc t ion of t [le German ileavy water plant in 
Norway to the more mundane ou t e Xlr e mely crItical prov i sion cf 
accurate and "up to the m lnute" repor t s on 10 :;", 1 ",·eather 
CO:1d.!. t l.ons The contribution th~s vast arrilY of services 
on the eventl.a l de f e at of the Nazi regimf' inestimaDle. 
unde rground orga n i zat .!. ons sente to draw badly 
needed comba t troops from t l:e batt l e leont "laximal l y, the y 
cont ributec. d i r ectly and s i gnificantly to the defeat of the 
Genna:: Army i. n battle. \~'hateve ~ lhe case may be, the 
" NoY'",ay'~ Re.sjs tanr:e Musellm, i tem ItJO. 
_ h ~ ',."ar e t tort, t hey ~,id sc at. cc~s ~ je rab:'e r is% 
0pera t~ Jna l cons t raints a r,d be:1ef i ts . t ne,-mde.'::"grC ".l::d was 
f o rce ·j ':: 0 c onstant l y ar,a :' yze t J-, e se inn e rs :1 t advantages and 
t;·_~ e vent ual d e feat Ot t ~e Nazi regi me ine:;t ~ mable h t a 
underground organiza t.l ons to dr aw bad l y 
ne i sadvantages, s eeking to rl:inim ize the d e lr:i;;:er1.ts and 
~,axirr~ze the benefits. The t ol l o·,.;ing section disc1..:sses t he 
adva n tag e s a:1d d i sadvantage s i nherent to :::he u :ldergrcl:.nd 
ope rating envi.ronr1'.en t. 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE UNDERGROUND 
rhe "l:.nd·::>rgrou nd" un~que a nd frequ2n t 1 y 
misunderstood ',.;orld cne which ,:: resents t he cl 21nd e stine 
c,::eracor wi th a ',."id .. range of l i f e -chreac e n ~ ng i rr.!Jed.imen t.s 
',."hi l e ;; lmul tanecus l y ofEering him invaluable advant ages Tt".e 
ciegree to which these adva!1cages and d i sadvan t ages cculd 1J'~ 
ca,:: ita l ized u!Jo!1 was di rect l y r e la ted to the capabJ.l itie s of 
their adve r sar i es and c he natu:: e o f the e nV"~ronment i n ',.;h~ch 
t hey 8::;eLdted. :-:"1e paramOllnt determinant Ot s ucc e ss [u l 
unde -::- g r ound ore ra tions :' ies .in c he ability c o identity these 
advant.a g es and disadvantages ',.;~ ic h are inherent t o t he 
u!1derground \\lerl d and tai l or t he ir actiol'. s accordingly This 
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C: :;o.e a dVa n t 3g2s a:-.:i ci !. sa civar.:. a;:.;-s 
8;:ec ' : i:; 3.11,/ ::]-. ~ r-es':'S t arice moverr e r.::s of S ::::;oe 
Advantages to Operati,.g ~nderground 
--::' r-3. d itlona ::'ly, t he '..:n d ergr-o u n d ha.s 0 2 2n v 1.ev'ed 
;::; sses s ::" !1 g more a civa ;-.tages d io;adva r: : a g es in : (8 f :.. g b.:: 
d e s c r ibe d t h is conven: io::a l p~r-c=p~.i on of the '--l :~d e:::gruu n d 3.S 
a ~lO:::ld in W Leh i ts i n ~lab i ta,,:s can str-~;;:e, 
r h e ab' ::':ty to strike unexpe c ted l y, H i unant. i cipa t ed 
',,' s ys 1.8, 1.n fact, ::Jne o f t he L i 9 geo:; t advant a ges dvai l Jble to 
'..: nderground organi z at1.ons A r elat i ve l y sr.1Cl.ll IlUr.1Le r of 
operative s und ~r-taking a r-e ::' at1.ve::'y moderate level of act l V1.ty 
c an f orce t he defendi zlg Ecr-ce, in tr.is c ase the occu py i ng 
Ge r-r.1an Army, to exer t S!1 '-nord i nate e:fer-t in defe n ding i t s 
acqu i r-e d ilsse::.s. ,his is wr.at Lei t.es ilnd T."'-olf cal l impos i ng 
" '-\ir :Je[ense " requi~en:ent" on the forces in comT,a.nd. The 
", :'1 t':'me s over" t he of: the o<::<::L!~: ie j 
d::tack t!ldL cOl:ld ar_y :: -
a manner ;::hat o9t:mized the'..r ad 'Jan::c, 
a smd ll 
troo;Js fr or(', mo re olroduc:::ive a r-e 3.S ,:;~ 
operat ion. 
t he unde .::grou nd o rg an'..zat'..cn co nc l uce s 
operation they hu.ve the ab'..lity , to cache c:::- discaci any 
"cr:minatir,g weapor,s and eq-lipll'ent , anc'. t o d'..sger s e i:1 t o trei:: 
l nd'.. se nous po?ulation rather t han rema ining to ccmbat d 'las :: :'y 
supe r-ic r force. The occ -lpying pO'. .. er- is n ot faced -,ncr', 
opposing a.:::"my eas l ly ':'dentif led by ':' ts unifur-ms or- ever: by 
the ).r vis i bl e possession of arms but by u. routinely s i lent ar.d 
hostile p8pu l ation wh ich -,'o'it t lngly or um.: it:: ingly r!3.:::-bors an 
i ndist i nguis h able u.rmy ir, its midst . The biggest challenge to 
the occup y i ng pm'Je:::- is not to de f ent thE" under-ground dr-my 1. n 
ba ttle b u:: mer-el y t o jde nti fy ':' ~.5 me rr,bers As 10:19 as t ;',e 
population remains , at a min'.. n um, un commit ted b,.;.t 5.1. 1 e n t the 
undergrou:1d possesses s a nctua ::-y wi t h in the very con f:. n e s 
'..ts enemy's ca1:\p . 
I rcnical ly. (f,embe:cshi? in u nde:cq r o u :1d ol'ga.n i zat 
could, at t'--mes, o f ff' r- :.tc; me rr,ber-s security advantages not 
av " i'--a::'le to the genera l ?- u6l ic . Bor Ko:":'.orm,·s .... i ~1:":.lS::!:"Q:",,3 
.~,:;c; ",f Karski p:c-::)Vides an actual deEJictio:1 of the add e d 
s e curic:y adva:-_:3.ges :r.eTTlbe::-s:lip i n the unde::-g r o,-<nd G:ferec.. 
Althcugh the unde rground o f fered securi.ty :Oe nefits WhlCh 
pro t ected its melr,bers [rom certain random actions o f the 
enemy's security for c es. t_he be:1 p fits J.cc.:::ucd did not offset: 
KClllcrowsk i . p. 39. 
":Ca r ski. p. 
incl:.'.:r~c. by ;:;arti c ':';::: a t 
The 'JndergroJ..;na organl zaL lor.S a:'so poo;sessei Lho; 
a eva : :: ':;',, "" operating i n an envi r onment that prc:v;jed ar,p:' -= 
ooport u ni tleS fcr its r:lembers to inf l:' tra t= vit a l sec to rs ::: 
the Germa n s"C'-_~rity, lrans;Jortation, 
estab:'lsr_ments. As Jorgen Eae"t_ :t"" P expla l ns: 
:)t;.e n ot only to t~e realitieio> of t~le lack of German manpo' .... er 
in an e f forl t o encourage inciigenouio> ccoperation an::! 
exp l oi t the knowledge and intelligence that could only 
prov i ried by the leca l popl:lat i cn, the Gernan cnploye d nume :C:O 'JS 
:lative cili ze:ls in pOlentia l ly sensitive posi t ions. Th e 
' .. m derground djd not hes itate to t ake adva ntage of th i s Germa " 
diler:lma, a nd rapidl y fi l led pcsit;io:-:s within t he pu:c:'pet 
reglmes' pol i ce forces, government cf:ice", l ocal NaZ l 
partie s, Among other s e rvice s, th~se c:nce rground 
age._ts were able to prov i d e v<:llc.able, ins i de infcrnatio:l on 
t he a<::tivities of the German seC'.lrity f~r c es. 
"E3.€strup, Euro'Oean Res s l ance MovemeQ ~ s 1939 -:"945' 
CODp1e te Eisto;,:-y, p. ]C3 . 
:;::i:.:-.c:.i"" nta l b er.e flt 
::::-. addi:~=>n :0 SeCur l t y :::onsiderat.ions, 
less tCln,?~D~e, adva:".:agcs Ul~der'~rcund possessed by operatives 
':n '?o:" a nd: 
CY:13 11UCS : The Inherent 
2 . Disadvantages to Operating Underground 
~f f se- Ln by 
t he : :;!:' ~ic.3b 1e d i S3dVaf!tage.o; =:te y mus = : ace. J. 30' .... y e!:' pC : :' 
p::cvided ,,", xce:':'e n t :'ns ~ ghts i nt o t ;:-
"!. R.v Foo t :::eemphasi ze s 3e ll 's descrip tio n <"":f :h", 
lmderground , ::e ite ratltlg t:~.e ~ardships· 
;,h at Foot :a~ ls La de;Hc: is L~.at even during L:-.a: ..,ercent 
pe::iod of boredom, L~e underground o;Jcrative is cOllstiln=ly :' n 
d".nge:::, al· .... ays be i ng :~.un ted by t:'1e enemy's security 
ap~a::aLuses - never abl e to re lilx. Unl i ke th c convent i onal 
DyniJ. mi cs; The Ini:erent 
· -Foot:, Cl.esist:ance, p. 150. 
s o: d i er, :r.a t ex? e :::·i er,ces freque r.,: :'ul ~ s 
? ech:lps t:-_=, gra ve s t d i sadv ant a ge '~h: :.:; :-_ f a ::: e::i 
::pe ra : : c n s d i re c t ly ag,linst t he 
Li :-ldergrour:d was c omp~ll e d to d i l u te its e : forts sear ~ r.':'ng ~:> ~-
cover t sa:e :"ouses, :or'1 1:-.g ar. .infin ite n·.; :nher o f offic1il :' 
doc '-,~en!:s, e stablis h :-ng unqu estionable a l i ases f o r :: s 
opera t l.V"'s and conduct : ng .:::~ 1 the l r.d~v i dual s""C' .. r ~tl 
~r e cautions L~at ' .... or e r.ec e ssary [ or surviva: 
KorDonski cap tures the degree , .... i t h v.'hic h sec1.l r ~ ty 
inter f e r ed ',.; it h the e:ficlency of lmdery ::-ound ope r at:' :::,.c; , 
saying the indiv i dual operator s: 
" Zorbcnski, p . 11 . 
Cn ::..;. ke C' >'.ven::. i cna2. 
but all times befo::-e, d~ri. ng "'-Ed afte::- ''0: 
']::1 ,/ ;::he s?eci f ics of t he i r op e .c-a t i OL.-d p:'an:-.i:-:g . 
C8::l:rl"cln.:. ca.:-,-o ns, 8rgan ~ za t l on, :::::. e :!. l igenee gathering a,.e. 
::'r-ai'~::.:-_ g need be conducted Ivith t.r.e u t. mo :o; t ~u t t:-_e 
seer2 t 0: ::. h e ir v ery eXls t e :1C i." v<'as a matte::- of l .fe " nd c.e a:h 
-::-hus, not o nl y di d an u nderground operator have t o r c f rai:l 
[rom revealing the s ecre t s r.e possessed out ',<,as compe 1 ::'", d 
s ecre t h is pec:session or secrets 
The underg round re :'ied ne t 
pro t-eet itsel f from t. he o verwhe:!.mi ng mar t ia l s UfJ er l o rity of 
it.s enemy, but. ufJor. i ts a6i l it y to remalr. anon}'T11ous. The 
po i nt at ',.;hic h the German sC'c u rlty forces dlscovcred t ; , 
identity or locat ion o f a mem6er of the u nderground usua l ly 
s igna:!. led t.he mome nt of German victory all that c(je n 
y.c mai n ed ',<'as the r e l at ively dntic l i ma c tic se lzure of the 
unde r ground me mD er . In add i t i.on e xpla i n il'.g t he 
un derground's ex.tens l ve seeu:- i ty exsrtions , th i s also 
illus trates Lhe u ttsr n e cess it y of maln~_a i ning d cove r t 
ident i ty and address . '"T h e tremer.dou s disadvantage U: i s 
rep::esented to the underground wac; that t he arre :sL of on e 
me m.te r, whu des ? ite sec u r ity ?recaut i onti (of varying degre e s 
of s :ri ngenCji ) invar l aD:!.y knew t.ne i.de:1tit y and/or l ocatio:l o f: 
othe r rel i o , .... undergroun d ::;o n titit u ents. '"The Get'man security 
CC-llJl :_,~ad to add.:..:::ic:':0-1 arJ:"'5 ~S 
::':1 ar: e ve:::- e xpaC'lding circle. ~he arres: 0: a sinq~", 
..::Jderg:::-ound a.nd at best, Eo rc"", a l l ~ndergr:Jc;nd asso :i::l~. e~ 
:.<;: C'lc· ... 'n :::0 t h e capt c; red 
identit ies, addresses, e.i : her :lce the cour.try or 
cease all. ac t_ivit y a::d 90 iC'lto hid ing ''''hereve ::- the arres t 
re;Jresenteci an enormous disc..:.p::: 
to con'::.lr:ui:lg ope r a:::ions and were ;1 protound disadvan c cige 
opera t inS-l:1C.er g r01~nd 
Other disadvantage" to u ndergrot.;nd operations er e 
symptomat.ic of the nature at the e:.viromnent and ',,'e re 
ciiscussed in cietail .in t he on t he operational 
enViron'TLent o f t he unc.erground. 1'0 r ei t.e r 3.:::e. the operational 
environment i'Tlposed by the German securit y services d e n i ed c he 
und e r9ro~nd preesc"b l ished netwo r ks o f t.ransportalion, ::: he 
benefit a t unohst:::-ucted advertisement of it_s al:ns and 
or:ll n .lO nS, open c'l:".ci f r ee channels o f communi calion and an 
environment ·,.,.hich was cond\lc.lve to tne education, t :.:a i n ing and 
SUppl.y of i t.s force s Ir. t h e case of the Europcan :::- es i s:::ance 
organizat ions , t r.ese environmen t al disadvClntages 
fo::::ces. 
O,-:c::::a:.ing unde;rgI"o·~nc. offers : l:e 
part ;. ci;:a:'. l. n calculab:'e acivantages, 
ut:1.lized, 
su,:;e:riority of h i s ene my S'..mu:ta ne aus:'y, t he L.;r.dergr-:o ·.:C""".d 
o~e ratcr ;. s :aced ', .. i t!! ",rofound, inl-.erent. d'..sadvantage s, · .... h':.ch 
eVen to the mos t d i scrim:.nat:ng a nd cau tious, can re31.: 1 , 
s).;dden dod dire consequences. Ho· .... the u nderground opere>.tor 
addresses i nherent advantages and d~sadvantages 
deter:01.nes not only or fai. 1:..:r e 
death 
E . CONCLUSIONS 
'rhis chapter has pro?ided a g:'i::-:[15e at the e nv'..ronments 
wh1.ch t.hO' und2rg:round o rga: lizations fur.ctioned, de5cr :c hed 
~l-.eir roles a nd e xamined t.he ~nhe rent advantages and 
disadvantages 'II-.e underground resistance rrD?ements of ~Iorlj 
I>lar I I , d e spite ope::::ating in a tremendcusly rept"ess ~ ve 
er"!v;.ron men: . faced ,dtn all the disadvantages i.nherent to 
und2 rgrour.d organizations, con t inuously provided '..nvalual:; ~ e 
serv i ces to botl-. the Allied war effort and their own strugg::'~ 
for freedo1L. Reccgn i zi.ng that the operational er.'!iron;nents 
changed app::::eciably over t ime and could ce significan t l y 
dif:erent cetween count;,:-ies and even 'eJichin d i fferent ::::egicr.s 
of the same coun tr,:'. there are stlll "llnive~sal" or "generic " 
cc" .:: l ·..1sio ns t ha:.: ray b e draw:-. :r::11 t;"e e :<,:::e r ie:-.ce s 0: E -.;. r2~e's 
Cl::derg ro ..1r.d organiza t ions. Any undergrot.:nci r:-,ove:r.e:-. t. . 3:-1y~i "".-= , 
3.:-.y-,\' ::ere, :eust idenLi fy the oppor:':'.lni:ies and lillit aticns 
e:-.vironr:-,ent. The morc~ successful organiza:io:-.s wer-e !"lOt o:::'y 
correct 1 y ident i Ey opportun::: l es a:-.", 
li rr.l.ta t ions, t hey wer-e ab:'e to tailor ~heir a:;~ lvi:i 7s 
accordingly n O W tr:ey mar.aged to adapt :':0 :: ·:'.cse conditi8ns i:1 
t:.~ vica of leader-snip, commLl nd and co:_:r-::'" 
and:;' ·.::ernal security wi ll be addressed in the 
follow i ng chapters . 
II. RECRUITMSNT 
INTRODUCTION 
d~sc'..lsses tile role ::l E r'o'cru itment 
u :\derg:::-cur.d orga:l~zat~ons, us~r.g the Eurupear. res i stance 
t:'Lov e-nents as a pro t otype. Speci:~cally,':' t addresses ""'-l 
r e cru l tmer. t was ':'mportant to tr.e unde r grour.c!., W!10 t he 
'..::-.de rground part ':' c ':'pant s, tr.ey j o~r.ed ar.d, tree 
recru i t ment proress fur.ctio:1ed i:1clud~r.g ti1e secllr~ty 
cor.s ':' d erat':' cns assoc ':' at c d '.l i t h under-ground r-ecrultme r:t 
Rec r u':'tmer.t ':'1'. ar. u r.derground f''1vi r or,me r. t reql. ':' .::.es a 
dra nil tical1y diff e rent set of g uice l ines and p r ocedures than 
those ut':'lized by above - ground organizations S~'~ce 
meT:l~ership i:1 underground crgan':'za tions is alT:lust invariably 
a criT:le pUniS[lable by dEo _, :!:, recrui t T:lent poses an extr·", me 
hazard t o b oth t !'.e established membe rs of t he o:-ganization ar.d 
t J-:e potential recruit. The acceptance of unqua l ified or 
indiscrete individuals, or wors e st i ll, age n ts cf the eneTY's 
security :orces, cou::,c. resu l t i n devastating consequences for 
the unde:::-g:::-cund group . Those seeking r:1e mbecsh l p i:1 ;::he 
unde rground freque:<t1y face t he d l sJ-:eartening predicame:",c of 
wantir.g to J oin cut nct i::nowing who tel cont act I f, i n theic 
frustrat:i.o:l, they app:rcilc:--t che wrong perscn or pronounce their 
;:; ::e1' s desi~ah l e persona l ac::-_rio'..; ~_ es, pro~ess~ o'la l kr.o~I ~"! 6.:gC'- , 
s~e~ :.,,_ ).c: cesses, anc. , cr specia:"ilcd experi once 
are o f 
s :'9ni: J.ca r:c e ~_ 8 t [:'0 s c:r v ~ va:' o f i :' ::' ic: i :: c ~·sar. :z a t .:. cr; s + 
f 3i :" .;re to :!:' e c cc,i t means a ,,10-,,' death by a Lt:::- ition, a ::'o. c:-: ot 
ir.e ff<2ctiv e ness, a l ac k ot 
2ve n ULil i z ~ng the mos t i n g eniOUS met!1od s avall aDl e to t:-.e 
u n de r ground, oosed Dotr. t r o ub l e sof:'.e 
crgani7at i o na :' and secur:ty dilemma 
Rec!"u i tmen:: erit i ea l to r ~e unc.c cg rcund for L:le 
!:"€.1sons i t is impor ta nt t o a ny organ i z a t i o n -w' i tr.o ut 
cecru i cment tr.ere are nc members and ',. .. it:: co me mbe r s t:'1ere can 
De nc organ iza t ion, But recruitmen t i n t:le u n d erg :::- oL:nd 
beco me s a more essentia :' t as k cr.an i n aDolie - g :::cund grCU95 
because cf t!-'.e CO:1s~a:1t a~tI:iticn of it s members due t o 
arre sts, deatJ-:5, and b l o wn covers neee ssitat~ng the co n s t ant 
rep l enishment c :' ~::.s c o n s c ituency _ w:-.. i,le t~e absolu te size 0: 
an ur'.der1ro unci organization is an ililOJerfeet indicCl~. cr of its 
v it a l it y and capab il ic l es , an o cgan i za ticn c hat lU Be s members 
fas ter t ':Ja n the y recrui t is i nvariab l y on :::e dec::'i n e 
sU2c e s3 :10: cn::'y che t 2tal o f 
t...: t b y the cve~'al l red:...:ction 1 :', h 1 8 force size. 'T~c:s, 'A' ,- ~le 
::: ::e ;;:-.::: ~~-g~oLf'_ d · .. 'i l l no t succeed me!'"e l y by r~ C!':.li~lLg L,ster 
- han i::: :'cses m", ;nbe:::s. it ... d :'..l cO:lsistef'.tl y fail ~f 
una b le to re~<_ ace lt S losses 
Recr'.utme:-: t 1-'.3.S pivotal impliCiltion s beycnd the ~- udi:ce ~jt :; 
of sc:rvival The clandeS L ine nature of a n 
organ i zat~on fu r n ishes a!:',: reCY'.l i t a destc.lct ive [Jo:entia l 
\~ell beyc:ld tha t l Y1trl:-:sic --::.0 T:1embe :::ship i:-1 non-cove r '-_ grO'JPS 
.n,l l acc_on s , inc L.lding ti'.e con t inuing e xistence" 0;: :;;2 
'J:lde.:::g::c.lnd, a:ce by their very nature. high l y secretive 
Thus, al l mem):)ers of the organizatio:l are p:civy to highl y 
sens itive in f or:na:i::m" ranging from. at a rll n lm".lm. Cr." 
k nowledge o f how tc contact his u!lderg!-ound associates t o. at 
;nost, - timate know ledge of the idcnt lt ics and w:"1ere il!:lOuts 
of d significant sec t ion cf his chai;] of corr,ma:ld lI'hether 
lhro1l3h i:ldisc::-eLion and "loese l ips" or active ene my 
infiltration, the wreng recruit ca:1 cause irre parable c a rnage 
t e t he underground orgar.ization. Rec r uitment. p rope:::- l y 
executed. se:::-ves to iden t ify and ensu:-e only those capable, 
a nd qualified assurr,e p:'ace s i n the rrecarious '",'orl d c:: t~"12 
undergrou!1d. 
WHO WERE THE UNDERGROUND PARTICIPA..'{TS 
'. n-.8 t:::-:e :.J :-.dergrou :lc parcic:q::a :;t- s were ar.d '::' <2 .:::t"i.:: e !'i.'3. 
wh ich ,::-:ey \>"ere rec!:"uiteu vs.r'i.es · .. ade l l' :rom case to e3.52 
;r8:J..: e ot an undergro~;".8. me mber, based c;. ~o:-. p r 8 :'~ssi c :·. 
.:::l ass . age ur po ':'i :::ieal lea.:-.in93 . 
a part:icL:. ar type o [ p e rso:l - l~ '-1 t at : rac~.ed all t y pe s cf 
o f l i fe Joined :).t ',:as Ll perso :-1a l q '.les :::ion, r.ot o r.e c: 
::lroressicnal 0::- social background . '. The:--e ' ... ·ere, h :l'.· .. ever, 
eel t a in c h aracte r is ::: ie s i.:1ci v i cua 1 is~. i e 
t h at li:c gh l y sui'~able fo!:" par: ic i patio:1 : he 
u;1derqrou;".c secL ion , ... ·1..11 discuss :h8se :.r.dlv :'dua1.i s::: i c 
and protessi o:~al at:ribute s ·,,'hleh ',lere prized by ~_ he 
undergyour.d 
Al :hcugh bo~h the i::tdividua lis tic a:--.o proresc:io:-1a l 
<ltt ::: ib ll ~es for recruiLrr.er.::: , .... i1. 1. be dJ..scussed equal l y . :::he y did 
nc: p lay equivale:-. t ::oLes . As repeaLed in:::er'l·ie' ... ·s '",it':"! 
u:-:dergroun d p,n t lci ,!an::: s reveCl. l ed, the ind i vidua l ::. stie 
J I~terv i ew ' '' ith the a u :hor 
" Tcre G ~ e l svik , I :1 t e -:;vie i<.' wit h the autho r, 14 JAN 199 t". 
\';as r ecru:.'::ea Th e vast Il'd]Cr :;.ty of the ::ecn~~' s ',,;ere Ctla s ;:. ". 
0 : the '-:: p::ofes .'Hor,al capaci:ies 
: ''.ei1' pers::xlal :1'a'-:s of ::el iab il ~t:y. discre:io." 
'- ,. telligence, :f :he undcrgrou;:d 
::ec,,-' ui: a Illember in a pa::ticula1' profe ss i on f::r imari ly oeca .J se 
the Lr.'Jaluab l e service they cou l d rende.::- as a res ;..:: : c: 
standard of personal qL:a li flcations. 
1. Individual Attributes 
A 1 0:1g l ist of des:lrab l e characteristics r.ave bee •. 
.J sed t o desc::ibE: an e XE:r:lplary rec::uit. Thes e cr,a.::-acterlstics 
include; cO'.;.ra ge , resourcefulness , disc::e t ion , pa:le;'!ce, 
common sense, re l iabi l it y, l oyal t y, intellige.:ce, avai l abiiity 
and OJ higr. level of physi::al condit ioning. 
cc~p i led h l S own catalog of desirab l e \.;:1derground al t:ributcs, 
,,,'h:cch in0 1 -.;.de: 
" Foot , Reo;is~ance . p. 
"Foot , Res ist Clnce, p. 15. 
a pa"agon 0: :: r. :O' virt '_e s of an L<nderg round age:lt Jan 
a :ne"1be r c : ::he ?olish underground, descr i bes ' .. 'hat the Po L .. s i-
l,I r. ae :.-gr o :..l:-,d looked to.':" i:-. .Lts pOler.t ial re c ru its ; 
.Jozef Garlins k i , ar. off i cer in t he Po l ish Army, depicleri 
",,'hat h e conside:::-e d imp o rtant at ~r.Lbu tes r ecr ,""it; 
Resis tance, p . 
Foc t , Resic;~, OJ . 
;c Karski, p . 73 . 
~:::: : nccn !. ng bct at least ha ~ : cf 
::- -= c ~ :::ced a.s ur.s ~lit~ble. 
iJ. :u ;:;::: :,-E;,te the individudlist~c: 3ttr i butes · .... hie h 
"';'aracteyisti.c::; 3cpe r- seded class dis t i nctions , 
a ge , and ill seme 
As d :'esulr., the undergrou.--,d cor.si5ted :; [ e : er;-e:-.t3 
[rot', vir t ual l y all segments of society, ·",.ere selected 
l.arge : y on the basis of their persor.a: mer lt . 
A prerequisite to recruit:T'.eEL was the ex;)]::-ess~on 
the potent~a : ~ember of a desi:;, __ e to vo: u :ltec r h~s senllces LO 
the ur.de-rground . The underground recruit 
not only by the nUl".eruus cha.:-acterist i. cs men tio lled prevJ.ous:'y. 
but also by a willingness co vo l'.1 nteer \\'hat e~erqes as a 
result of tllesc t"'·o ceiteria , is a very approximate 9rof ~le or 
the u nderground cecr u it . The !:'ecC'.lit · .... as [1',uch :noce likely to 
be [1',a l 1'" than fema l e, a lt hough iema. les performed vita l 
undergrour-d se!'vices throughout Su rope, usual:"y as couriers. 
The average age was betwee n 18 25 years, but wit.h 
i:111umecable exar:1ples of buth older and younger partiCipants 
They '",e re typ i cal l y ~ingle - prcbably due t o both theiy age 
~nd secuL-i ty conside rations. While t he u:1derground recruit 
'Joz",t Ga::-l i nski, T IcR Sllrv~ya c f lo',e ' M~"'o j rs c: 
Re si stance Of f i cer, (Oxford, Bas l l Blackwel:" Ltd . 199 1 .) p. 43 
If.':' c larH:esl i ne organlzat::.ons '>'las e pi: o rnized by -=- :5 
e:n~ l cying -=-:-'.dividllals o f a l l ages, p c o fe s s i o :-l s 
2 , Professional At tributes 
Tn addition :he convent i onal 
d'~ ~',",~ound sou gh:.. the ~;ervices of those occ.r:y i ng sensl.t :" . e 
usefu l pos i tlcns, Among ot:.,er p!'o:essions , 
include6 L -.ose employed in t he tJostal serv i ces, 
.;-ai.: c oads, Hl the po lice forces and in 'Ilta l s e ctors G: 
l!,dus t ry T:1e fundamental d iffere nce be~." ieen the s e 
" p r oEessicna l " recru.i.ts Clnd the conventional recrUlt '>'la s ::~. [' 
under l Yl.ng mot ivat ion for his recrultment Not on l y d i d the 
"p r ofessional' not nece ssari l y have to volunteer be l ore ~ei n g 
approach:=d ~u t nis sC!rvices we re sol i clt e d for very speciElc 
puq::oses J o hn Oram 'lhomas, the a uthor of The Giant K i l l en;, 
describe s a n example of an undergrou,.d agQnt o f Ho l ger ;)ansk, 
:JUliS Hansen , recruiting members bao;ed upo:--, professional 
s k i lls; 
Foot 1 ists IF.:~crous exa~ples :he ty;:e s c: :: 
consequen:ly the target of unc.erground cecc-".:ct::,e n t. 
SOU ]!"". : a ft er recru.:cts 
~·zec;la .. : Stankei ..... .:cc z. a veteran ;)f the Pol is h un der'g r o u nd, 
emp hasized the i:n!=,ortanc:e ar.d ..... orth of the recruitment o f 
railroad ..... or k ers . " The inc.uction of .:; rai lway wo r'<er c c ul d 
si311if i cantly 
uncon~roll e c., un censored. trans!=,or ta t io n 0: comm'-" ; ,icatiorls and 
mater~als . The r ecru itment c : me mbers cf the po l ice f orce 
Re sistancf", 9 . 1. 2 
°Ib i d . p . 13 
' <Ibid . p . 14 . 
oOCzes la ... · Stankie ..... icz. I nte!"Vl.e',,", with the '::lUt hor. 4-5 DEC 199 3. 
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y.':::':::!': : 3.c':' :;' ':'ta:ed che :::es;'s ta :1Ce 'S O?eratlo~~s. 
'1 -=~. c ers of many di ffere n t p ::-o f ess~ons , fro m doc t ors t o 
P::0s t :..::;.; :es, offe::::ed '...r.valuab l e po:e!1t ':'al serv i c e t o :::'1e 
L:n-:ie ::-grc '..;n d movements. Because of che i r profesS '...::lnal 
actri G",': es, che y be carr.:"'! t:,e ob ject of undergrou nd recruit::".e::: 
Al: r:ough t hose r ecruited on t he basis of t heir profes sic ::. a l 
p os:' :::icns constituted o n ly a sma ~ l portion of t he t otal 
,r.jergrour.d forces, the y prov", d thei ::- wo rt h by p ::-ovid :..r? 
~nest l mat : e co n t ::- lbu t lons c hac <",au l d no t have been ava ~ -_able 
WHY THEY J OI NED 
The exp l ana t ion of why indiv i dua l s join undergu,. :"". : 
organiz at i ons is extreme l y comp l ex, varying from ind i vid u a l to 
i nd iv i dual A single i nd iv Ldua l may and f requently is 
mo ti vated by multi p l e fac:.or s. To unders:.and wha t i nfl 1.!enced 
i nd i v i d ua.ls :'0 jo i n the Eu r opea n underground resist;.a n ce 
movements 0: \'o'or ld War II i t is necessary to e xamine rnulti ? l e 
mot ~ vators Those mos t freq u en t ly mentioned are: (1. ) 
Patriot ism, 12 . ) Ba c k l ash, (3 . ) Group ?artic i paticn, (4) 
Rol e )l.lode l ing and (5 .) Pe rsonal motiva tor s But before these 
indiv i duaL mot i vators could have s.;.gnif ':'cant impact , cer t ai n 
recru i. trr,ent pre::-equ isites ' .... ere r equ i red . 
1. Recruitment Prereq-..l is ites 
3 ef o:::-e 0.:1 und;,,:cg::-ound c::-ga.r:iza::: i 2 n ca n eX;)2C~ 
aLt rac': a;-::y sem61ance o f a. popular :ol l owJ..:1g , 
to mot::'vate an individl:Jl La ac tively S~ppO:::-l a" CC.C<eQ<HCCCG 
D:..ll \,'11 1 p ::-ovide the c ond lt i cms ·..:.nde:c 
i ndivlc.".: 3.1 motlvators may be appeale d ~o. These 
c.iscriTll :1atory recruit T,e :1t pre':cquislt e s se.::ve d S a mi nuna l 
p:ce-co:1d ir:i o:1 ',.;hieh mus t he satis f i e d befo!"e signl f icant 
S UPpO!·~ fo:::- t :"1e und2!"ground i s engendere d '::'he tr: r-ee 
p n~ requ i sites an~ · 
1. A dissa t isfied society. 
, . 
:net hods 
3 . Some expectation of suc c ess. 
900.ls and 
The first c f these pr<" requ i s l te~; is wha:. Cha l l1ers 
.::-ohn500 c :;.11 s :.he "diseguil i br ia'::e d socia l Johnson 
s t a tes, 
b e s uos:: tu ted f o:::- t h~ 
st:::-uggl e aga i~I S[ an T:-:'e 
::-:::l':' :=- : t he ::" :::- 5t 
;:~·e::e::r.1':' s :' ::; e !' or '~nc erg::ound supDor t we r e easi l y Ire t i:: : n~ 
.8 f t::c leg i t iTa t e fonrs of indigenous go '.'ern :ne nt a n d the i r 
es t abli s hment o f ·,,'eak l y d.1s? u .1 sed puppet regJ.rr.es, .::e slli t ed .1;-; 
·· .i :::ua ~ly u ;-; i ve::-sal dis~on ~ ent with the es t abli s i",ed a 'u :hor i t y 
~he secc r,ci prereq uJ.si i s t haL pote nt. -:'a':' ( ecru i ts 
J. n agrO'ement '" ith t h e goa l s and r'let nc ds advanced oy t ,' .,; 
undergro u !'.d g ::-011 9S and t he organization mus t possess a :-. J.s :'.s 
o f l egit i,-r,acy . 1\5 long as the goa l rerr"ir,cd an a p o l it :' ca l 
":'.beration of the occup ied cou ntry , it was u n l ike l y ':0 
·:-.gender anYLhing b ut , .... idesprcad popular sL:p port T:le r .e thod s 
6'~ ?loyed by t he> undery::-ound I .. ere mo::-e like ly t8 be a subject 
of r he p ercept i on of an i napp::-cpr i ate Level 0: 
vioLenc e e~ ther too mucb or n o t enough could a nd did 
di sc o u J.-a'je poLent i al l"e mb er s f r OM s eeki r:g Me :Tlbe::-ship 
Th e tr.i r d p rereq'.!i5 ~te is th .-,t there mu st be some 
~·ea l istic e x pecta t ion 0: succe ss The a nt i cip,::;.ted success 
r.ee d not L~ i !":)r,ed::.ate no r ccmplete bUL t~e ,,",ust o fter 
S:an [ord 
Ze!'.ne: h 
2:'ecr' . .::I. t r ~r.t, S<1Y1.:19, 
T he expe' t <1tio:'":. of success '.;Jas 51.gr. ifiCaTIt.iy e:1~aTIc e d the 
s::nulta!'.eous thE: GF' rman occupying pO'.;Jers '",e:::e fi g- hti ,-." 
Doth ' .... :.t h t:"1e All ies and the resis:anc e I n an i.nadvertent 
fashl.on, an Al l ied v:' ctory '.;Jas a ~ so seen as a victory fo r the 
ur.derg,::·ounci. As \-;orl:1 ~iar II prog:::essed, and a:1 .11.:1 ~2U 
V1.ctory appearec mo:ce certa~n, tne:c e were more and more 
volunteers '",'--11 ing to jOln the u :1cergrounci. 
2. Recruitment Motivators 
I n virtually all of occt.:pieJ Surope, the t !1 ree 
recru i tment p:cerequisi:es ex i sted for a significant pcrt;'on of 
tl:e popu:ation. Yet, sume people e l ected t o join 
revol ut i onary org-an i zat lons '.;Jr.i 10 a grear. rna j o~' i: y of others 
cheose not t o Martha Crensba-.v discusses tbis l.ssue , whic:, 
l aDels the "free rider prob l em, " asking, 
"Macksey, p . 21. 
~ l-.e C3'-.:se ,,; '.. ::.1 :::: e:-: e i 1.t. ... .'he ::. :...,.,. .::-
" r "ot , . 
ge:leral ly : C:r a l:' po:::en:: 3 J.. 
~.e'T. !:J~ r s c : ::: ~€ und e :cgro u n d t he d iffere r:c es i n b ehav 1. 0':: 
are expla ':" ::e d b y 
f '..ve i nd~vid u al F. c ':: vato rs :0 be d iscusse d belo'..; 
Patriotism 
?a ;; r~ot ~ 8m ~ n c egral 0' 
S : n ce the llnderground \-ias crea t_ ed '.. n r e s tJOnse to 
a : -:-: relgn L\ 'as i an, resi",:ance was g enera l l y def i:-J.ed w'.. t hi :1 a 
ResisLl:1Ce ,,"'as o;y:-.onymo u s ''''i t r. 
patriotism I t was unthinka::,le t hat a "good )atriot" ' ... 'o ul d 
'.oJ i l l : ng t. o assist t h e underground's strug,}le a nd , 
consequ ent.ly, t h ose with r cpu t ati::ms f or pa t r i ot i SM '" e re 
mar~ed f or re c r uitl1e rlt ::rom the "eg inn i ng of the wa r. I n 
mul t iple cor.ducted '.Iit h u r_de r g roucc p5.rticipa n to;, 
i nvar i ably "patrioti sm " \·;as at. t ri::'uted as the 8 l: :91e , most 
prcm1.ne nt. i r:,pe t us ' .... h i ch cornpe l l ed people to volunteer f o r 
underground ::ll:ganizations Simply p u t, tho"e people 
poss e ssing a great e r predio;[Jos iti o :l t. moJards ratr:oti.sm , \-.;ere 





al::-eady hostlle tc :~:"" GerIT'.ans ;:;resence !.'::' equently 
,;erv"d ';:0 f C! ::-t he:::- p01a::-1z,," :::e inciger,ous pCF_::'a~_ion, ofte:-_ :.c 
s u er: a deg!"e~ t hat tl'.e nu:nbers vo.Luntee.::- .;. ng fo.::- meT:lbership in 
the u;"'.de~-grou nd wou l d increase drascJ.cal l y =n !":',any cases 
'.oIas tr:.e comp l ete ra ndoIT'.ness of t he Ge.::-man ('Ic t ions t~a: set: v.=. ) 
encourage voluntee.::-s. =f t'":e general population fe :: _: 
at as much r.isk o f German rep':: J.. sa l s as :"_ose conducting 
unde-rg:::-ou!1d c-.~tiv it J.. es they haC. nothlng to lose and 
everything t o gain ny membership in the underground Kenneth 
deser-ines the situatlcn :' n France 1341; 
The :orced lanor p!'ogram, an i nstruction tro11 
Hiller to assemble a (o-rce o f 6 mj 1l i on f orei gn 'w'o-rke -:: s to 
a u g men t_ Ger'T,any's industrial secto!', perhaps mo re than any 
other sing l e German action, resul ted i n a tremendous ar,t 1-
Germar. back l ash. l'lacks e y describes the .::-esul ts; 
"'l<1acksey, p . 116 . 
56 
'.:a :nl. :,.g 
s~ r \r l v a ':' 
h a d a r-eas c :-; : 0 f ig ,, : :~ r 
c :: r: ::::~ i , ' e d, unpr8duC::' t 1 VP. a n d r-e Dress ~ v e 
mat te r- In ::-.e ::rs",- week o f 
::::e:: e:'.be r 19<',0 ~ t beca rr.e fas h ionable 
one's ::' ap Ed signi:ying thaL the Norweg ians s tuck : oget hc;r 
~::e Na sjo~al the No rwegian NaZl Par:y, decided 
:0 ,; : op U :i3 prac:ice and ordenod tile ~r lackeys t o tt'ar t'"." 
papercl i ps of: of ,,, 1 1 l .'i.pels the r e st.;lt t hat eve:::.-yone 
them Th is p:::-ogressed :..nto t rle 'wearing 8 f mo netar-y t~ ' 1 .'0 
as syrr.bO :' 3 o f Norway. .r..gain , the N . S. or:-dered the b .i l l s 
fo::-cib 1y relf\8ved. Th ls d eteri8ra : ed i n tc St r e e t fight:. ;-.g 
tet 'wee n members c f th e NS a.nd the patr :'ot l c NOr'Y'iegi ans 8 11 t he 
13th of Oe c em8e:::-' .:. llust r ating ho' ... ' 8ver- - rea c tion:o; a. n d ':' •• ck 
of policies b y t h e occupying power, i n th i s ::::ase 
their puppets, even ove r such an inc8nsequential matter as the 
, ... ·t'd:::-ing of paperclip8 in l apels, may pola"::lze a pop l,.llat l on an d 
creale an env i ronment favorable f o r "::ec: r- Ul::mell~ 
Hackse y , [) . A5 
" IIlClgrle skodve n, Inter-view w'.. t h '~he author, 13 Jk'\ 19 93. 
Group Particip ation 
Gver the cuurse 0:: : he first two years of Ce:::~, 3:-. 
ocC'_pat i on of NoY' ... 'a y, t.he 1f'ade::.-s of the Noywegian :;--,e 
',a:ion,"1 f\. .3scc iaticn for Spor t . :he Farmer 's Uni on. )"orwegi ar: 
vLed :.ca 1 Assoc~a::. i on, t ;,e ".'yade :)n~or. Organization. t :-:~ 
COI< I:nunist Par t y, ar:J s t LlC,=,_:S al l der.ou.nced 
ar;d essence suppo::tec the caU.se cf 
Tile star:ce ~a l(e n by t he If'?.ders of these 
organizatior-,s tm'/ards underg~·our.d activit.y had a r<1ajor impac: 
on thf' cO-l.::' se its ful lu ... 'ers wou. ld pu.::'sue. Thus, instead 0: 
a1iena:::ir.g ir.di'l i dua l s. e r:ti re crgar.izatior:s . w~th their 
constitue" t s largely i.,tac: · .... ere induced t o participa:e in 
unde~'g rou;ld activity. Magnus Jense:l describes : h e resul:s ci 
:he illif'nat ion of entire crgar.iza t ions; 
Tore 8j elsvik descy ibes meddl i ng in t~e 
af.fairs of t he Ncy' .... egian :~edical Assuciation - lncluding 
-<GJe l svik. Norweoian Resist5.nce, quot e from Magr. e Je nsen , pro 
60 
Ey :! i e;; e. a::d po li t l- cize t~e Associati o n, r€su~t~d 
a l a !:"ge po :::t l-on of the Norwegia r. iTlc dical 
p:Qfes sio:1. 
The Korwe g ian ~ledical !\.o;scciat.io:1 is or:ly one of 
r he examples 0 : ;'10 W group allegl-ances proved tc be a 
Dj,,"erful recrui t ment catalysr SLetan Kortlons,::j descric~s 
s i mi lar deve l opmCf'. r s i n Poland ; 
A"sociations tro~ as small as footba1 1 to dO; large 
:1at i o:1wl-de scouting orga:: iza t io ;-:.s provided ferti l e groul~ds for 
u r.dergrour.c. ma:lpower . \'l he ther due t o the eas e with which p re -
e x i sting oLganizilt l or.s, wl-c h t.heir estah l Lshed int rast::-ucture 
and i e adershl-p, could ma ke tne LranS lt io:1 Lo illic it act.lv i t.y 
'GJelsvik , Nor. ... egia:--. Re s istance 1340- 1 945, p. 37 
p. l4. 
because of the f ee l :'ngs Qf scl i ja r~ty t he y :'ns!:=''..re d '01:-7, 
me:nbers, they often p:cov':'ded :r.e backb::me or u nc'en,ccc LU 
organ~zat~o:ls " 
d" Role: Modeling 
friends, fam~ ly membe rs or other fe llow coun t :"ymen ",~er e .:tcti."·le 
~:1 the strugg l e aga::.ns t t r.e Gcrrr,a:l occupatien, f" .. lr,, :' sherl C -.-=: 
pcte-=-'.tial recruiL a precedent '01ILLCr. il lus tra t ei t:-,a.t 
resistance was betr. poss i!:Jle and a l egit i mate 
People frequent l. y vo l :lntee n "d tr.eir se:-vices to toe 
under(Jround based lar gely upon what t hey k l'.ew of tho' 
organizatlc·n's membership . ':'ore Gj e l svik addresses tDe :"Dpact 
that respec t ec. figures c ould bwe on r e crui t ment if the'/ 
p -:. ometerl objectives corr.patible \,"i th the underground 
explains that w;"1en lhe Norwegian S upreme Court res1.gned on 
December 1940 due to actions ef the occupatio,l governme:lt , 
:or the nation as a 
Supreme 
the move r:",ent "k ne'N 
orgcmiza cion had 
The arlva.n cement of the i c.eaL:; and c:bJec t i ves 
fos t:.e r-ed by the underg::-ound by \~ idely admired and esteel:led 
membe r s 0: soc~ety either in woyd or by deed could 
" Gje lsvLk, :1'ohrwegial' Res js tanre 1 940 ' 945, p. 
La"" =-llegal. 
Personal Motivators 
~ :--.ii.t compe" 3. ?ote:,tial 
pe r s on 's particUlal.- h i story and psycho! cgicdl-'T,a t.er:al ne e ds 
I f one 's part lcu:'3.r h=-slory inc l uded inc i denls '..n ' .... hic~ 
Ger L1'.an or.cupying fcrce kil l ed or tortured friends aT: ~a :lI ily 
-'embers, destroyed property or other,,-ise abused t.he person in 
question, the t r. J.. rst fo r Vel'.geClnce a:-,d could act CIS a 
pm·;e r fu l :0 volunteer fcr a n organizat i o n that 
aC:lve l y cCClfron:::i"g lhe scurce cf ':heir g r:evance. 
psycho l ogica l attractlons of pres:::ige and exciterr.e"t ';,;h~ch C'" ~ 
uCldergrou:1d of f ered, a :' so encouraged SOlle to '"c lunteer :::heir 
:i'he prestige mo~iva'~ion probably p l ayed a lesser 
ro l e o;ince O:1e's partlcip3tlon.in t he cla:1destine organizat~on 
could no t be adverr.iscrl Exc l.. :emc>nt, the crlve partlclpate 
in exhi:''-:J.:cat.~ng, dangerous ac:::ivi::: ies while under th", 
ausp i ces of t he s~rug91e for freedom, indClced many, stlmu l us -
hU:19ry in ciilJidua l s :0 of:er their services to the underg-::-cund 
Mate-::-ial consideratiuns , such as :::he pro~er 
dccu~en'~at i on, safe hOllses a:1d even the basics of -:cod and 
she1 ter, '"hieh the unuerS:::,oulld could ;=>rovide for a ~erson 
the run" induced to seek membe r-ship i n the unuergroullu. 
j'Jst s ... ch a s~: :": 3.t1.:):1. He .... ·as a l '. eu t er.ant t. :.e 
,",f:er t:'12 
the Army, et:cape::l a!lj Ge ::::r<a r. 
captiv ~ ty and made his ""ay to W,)r5a';,·. there , l acf: ,,; d 
: 1":e cor.:::-ect paEJers, had r.O lodgH"~ , means 0: su r viva l 
pu::-poBe. :--Ie ccntacted a tr~end. , ..... ho uf'.bekno·wns t.. to 
discer:1i:1g his si t uat ion, a:cranged h is recruitment in~. o the 
undergrour.d . Karsk~ d escribed it, 
five recruitment. motivato::-s ~isted above a'!::2 
n o t, nor a re tney i n ter.ded to b e, a c cmprer.e:1s : ve catalog :)t 
the reasons peo9le jo : ned Lhe underg.::ound . They do, 
ho ..... ever, repreS2:1t f'.-ve of t he ma j or mut~valo ~'s whic~ 
c:) m!=,e lled [Feml:::ers to volunteer for service Addit=--onal~y , an 
ir.::ii vidual need not I:::e compe ll ed to volunteer on the basis of 
a single motivator and may volur.teer as t h e resu l t of mu l tiple 
cO:1s~derCltio._s. W;-,ether I:::ecause of patriotism, back !' Clsh, 
g':::-8 U!=' part.i cipation, ro le models, perso •. al motivc;. tors or scme 
-':.zarski, p. 63. 
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HOW ':'HE UNDERGROUND RECRUITED 
by t he u r,G.e':grounj !:02 cru :,:~ ci 
::Jy ;~ec~sslty, drOimatical:y dlffere Et t-r.- ~- aoove-g:: 
crgani z at i cr.s T~e r e strietio::s i'llposed UpOE t :>o. ur,je ':' s r~. _~ 
:--,odi f lcat ior.s -:recru it!T,c n t ?roced\1r~s. 
unde ::-grou:ld did not r. a ve a.ccess to an open for u m i~l wI'. - :h tC 
:id vertise i ts objectives Clnei functio:-" 
pOSs e SS i o n r1",a t eri a l s :: __ el ating to t~e :~dcrgro·_::-,. ::::! 
frequ e ntly p u :u s hab le by death It did not poss e ss 
::'ecruitm~n t o!:fices, i n perTT,anently estab l i s!led lo::ations to 
which those i nte r est e d in join i:,g the undergr.-ounei rf"sis ta r.c e 
cOl., l d pre:;ent t hemse 1 'les insteaj those interest ing i n 
jOining t:he organizat ion frequently faced :r'.ls trating 
p rospect of being wi l li :lg t o join but. no t KnUwlnc 
Thev lacked th e :ae i l i t ies to ce ndl<ct thoroug:l 
bacicg r ou nd checks on their pI'ospect::'ve [rembers , checks that 
cou l d mea:1 r. he di;:f~I'ence bet · ... ·een ll_f e ilnd deat h. Ho,;,' 
t.: n de::::-g:::-olir:d managed the ,i.ssue 0: ::ecru ltme n t- , specif i cal l y; 
the recr-':' J.. tment. met hodol o,)y employed cy the \,ndecg-::ou!ld, 
co nc",ct ed l<ndergro",nd recr--lit ment and security considerations 
asso c iat ed ~lith undergrc'-lnd recruit me nt will be e xa mi n ed 
b ela''' 
Recruitment Methodology 
Tr.e met !--.o:::is by W;"1 .:. c: nc:nderground orgar.::.za,. ::. cns 
tsd :l. ts members ',ie-re l argely le ft r.o the local u r.::.ts 
':'nstruct:"on to unc..e-rground o?erat.c r- s Of' 
e ver-yr.h in] fr-om the use of the l a::.est exploslve c.ev:"ces 
pr-opt'r- secu.::ity ~coc e c..ur-es, no ce:llrally d.lrecte~ methoci 
recruitment \o,'do; ever d:"ssemindted. As an interv.lew ''''':''~;'_ 
5l.obe:::t Bdrron, a SOF. traine r and agent, CO!l: l rr~1s, very lit t l e 
gu i da:1ce. rre t hodclogy or ins truction '.<las p;.cvideJ e ::. :her 
operdt.:.onally or iCl Lhe trdi lLng envi':::'onner_t as tc ho'"" C __ 1e 
resistance groups shou :"... d Clddress the top.l: of .:: t'cru':'t:':".e:tt. 
The u ndecground recruitment p.:::-ocess i ncluded two p':'votal 
;:Jrocedures ident .l f ication and confirmation. Since 
me:nbe:::"sh i p in the Clndergro'..lr.d ',,-'as volunta:::-y, lhe :irst tas:.;: 
',,:a s s i mply to ident i fy t hose will i ng to participate in lhe 
orgilnizat i on. In a r. envi;.onmf>nt in which :ne:nbe-rs of :::!1e 
unde-rground zealously guar-ded ::'heir clandf>stil:e role, the 
petent i al r ecn:it. might ha ve a very difficu l t time ,:'laking his 
:'ntent ions known t r.e right persons . Second 1 y, once the 
volunteer'S i ntent i_o:ls we":"!" conveyed to the underground, 
confirmat i on was require:::i that t he vo l untee;. ' .... as who he sdia 
he was a.nd tha t he was s 'J.itable for t he demands 0: u nde rground 
life 7he melhcdolog ies emp l oyed by lhe under9rou l:.d mOVCT:ie :1ts 
"Robert Barror., Ir.tcrview with t:he author, 9 JAN ,994 
<.;: Wor-,-d \.~ar I I :0 add r ess t !1 ese twO c rt.ic l-a l proced :...: r ~s 
vi:::- t ua l l y un i 'le:::-sal . 
Iden tification 
T~e d ~ l em:":".a 0: hO'N :0 CO!"1tact those ·,.;i ~ l :' ng to 
volu:;.tee~ f or the un :::lergroc:nd ' .... as generally lef :: ': a t he 
ind i v i du a l ra the r tha:-, the o rganlza t i o n - the e xce pt l- cn b e ing 
t hose re c ru i ted far spec lfic skl l i s or professions The 
potent i a l r ec r ul t, not know~:1g who to con t act, r"-de :1.:.5 
o p i nions k now t o as many as discree t l y as [Joss i b l e . JOrgen 
Kee l er . a par: icipan t i n the Da.-:ish unde rgro und and a·.:~:tor 0: 
several publ :. :::a tion s 0:1 Dan i s h resistance , e X[Je rier,ced f ::'~·s: ­
h and t he di fficu l t i es assoc iated wl :h seeking membe r ship in 
t he undergrou:1d He was eager Lo j oin the underground f rem 
the beginning of the Germa r. occupa tl.on and s[Jent a coup ) e c : 
years trying :0 make the righ~ con Lacts . He bega n to ta l k 
loud l y about h~ s opin i ons a !"1d '"as even~ ua l ::'y con::ac ted oy 
me mo!:'rs 0: ::he unde rground and of fered a pos i t l o n ln t h e 
underground p:::-ess." 
:f a volun:.eer : or:.u na:e e:1ough : 0 have 
know ledge 0: :he identity o f an underground participant, hi s 
aspirations for enlis:ment could b e great l y facilitat ed. As 
Czeslaw Stank iewicz, a 9art i c ipan t i n : he Po l ish underground 
relate s, rumo rs about who '"as act i ve in t he undergr ound 
-'Keeler , I n :e rv~e'" wi:: h ~he author, 1 9 J AN. 199 4. 
aboc~!lded < ... 'antec tc contact 5. , .e::'.ce:- of 
" yo ~! t:ad t () 
l'lagne Skodven , a part ~ c~pa:lt 
ree r. try i r.::.c to :!-.e u!'".cerg,:ounci, acco;nplis r:ed r,is 
croppi :'S h i :1ts al:;o l~ t his \,· i l l i ngr.ess enll.st h is set:'V1C","" to a 
fr ie:1d h e suspected "kne' .... abou t such ln i :-.gs 
b. Confirmation 
O:lce a volun t eer 'lias identified, the o r gan i z,lt i cn 
haa to decide i f volu:lt ee r mer. the indivldual attributes 
extensi'~'e vetting capab l liL i es !lorma ~ ly ava ilahle to sec::-r=t, 
a b ove-qrouJ'd organlZJt l ons were not avai l able to the 
underground, t~-_ey had to re ly solely on the c;ndergr:O\lnd 
members' jc;dge o f character and on recommendations freom 
acquaintances of the volunteer trus Led by t h e underground . 
The U:1cp:r-grounc 's reliance on i ndividua l jc;dge of 
character Lo delermine t.Le acceptabilit,,, of a potential 
r-ec r uit was a peri l ous but cften relied 'JPon practice Jcr.n 
Or am Thomas, pr-ovidp:s an excellent example of the Te11Clnc e on 
cha::-act,=r judgement in his d,"scr ip t i on o f the recr-c;itmen':: 
methods used :Oy Jo h annes Johannesen, the Danis:") harror master 
" SLankiw .... icz. Inte~view with the autr::JL , 
~ O Skodve n, Interview wit.h t he author , 
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su;",nt t:o estaD ~ ' sh J cL:c~e o f re liab l e Doa t cre '<ls t o assi s t: 
oDe C t Ll on:o. The pro cess emp l oyed ~ " s 
In addi t: ion tc ;L t '3 re l iance J ucge ment of 
c:: .;t yacter, the und eyg r ound 30ug:'1 t ::'0 conf i rm ::.he su i :abi lit: y 
cf it s putentia l me mbe r s by seeki ng affirmation 0: t ;- ~ i r 
G-Iali:ications fyom trust e d person s who had :::ies ;.,'.L :. h 
vo l unteer Tr.e accep::'''nce of ne'..: me mbe rs overwhe lm:-:--.] 1 y 
ba.sed not · .... ho you kne'.-I, b ut wh o k ne'",' you I f tl~e 
vo l L;nteer ';o/as known by memb ers o f the unde r g rou nd o t ~ ,"r 
respect a bl e me'nbers o f toe cO'Tlmun.Lty to have a r epu t at io n f or 
being a good patriot poss e s sing discretion, cO'..lrage ar.d 
i n t e l l.L gence t he l i k e l i hood of h i s r ec rui t IT ler. t · .... as v l r t ual l y 
aso;L;red . o l u E Reed Ol sen prov i des a descr'..p tion 0 : h l S 
c rr.p loyme:1t o f u n derground r.ecru i trr:ent tec hnique s ',.;hen 
approached by a vol u nt e ,~ c , Ro:" f Gabr iel s e n . i n t he ~orweg ian 
:::own of ."la n del; 
f~o;n a n c..ndividua l hlghly ~egarjed 
c;. ;: -=<ergrou:~'J., 'wa s , ';,'lthout questio;l, t hE suresc: [:lethod of er-.try 
undergYQu n d orga ni zat.lor.s 
2 . Who Conducted Underg round Recrui tment. 
T':1e u n derground authori ze d and en<:;:ourage::i a 
dECS!l tral izac ion of the recruitme n t pr-oe'~ss, auLJ-.oy'-zing tile 
~ecru i ~~ent. of members ::iuwn t o the 10'."'Est LT.nss l:: thE 
chain of - com;na nd Dielc Rubenst.e i n, a l::Jng tlme so;:: 
Fra Ylce and Burma, states, reeruit ;nent wa s i r.i tia ted 
0 '''[1 '' c.mvn to the ce l l/circult l eve p · the ce l l l E'a j e r 
coulc. make t':1e decis ion about who \vas brough t :..nto the 
organizat .l o n. " Tore Gje l svik describes t;--,e ~yocess in Norway 
as, reco mmendations were made to t h e leaderil that [ h is was a 
good man who , .... ou l d serve the resistance wel l - it based 
personal in it i at i ve a n yor:e C::lUld ·( F.cruit but all 
;'Ric h ard Rubenstei n , Interv ':" e',,' ·,.;ir. h the a u thor , 7 JA.:; 
of t~ c<ol1 ,d 
' .. ,ti'.e t:-: er d c:e the unde::-ground l eadersh i p' S F ".ability 
as s ;; :~_e :: he add l_tional respons i cilities r e 1ui r e d :::0 
s-~oerv i se local recruit~ent or- because they de t e rmin e d ~ ha :.. 
~-~-=ru i t (rent was b~B t - 8 " ':: tc those with ar. intH:lilt e kn:::Jv.;led g e 
of the l oca l conditions, v~rtually every unit /cell recrl1i::ed 
its .11e:f:bers wi t h no central ized d~rection The leadershi:;J ',;/as 
apparent l y, lit tle conce rned vlit h the unde rgrounrl becoTlln" too 
l arge a nd u n:nanageable, and enco u raged the recru~ t ment :: f 
'_~ha::ever n u mbers \-o'ere req\:ired to conduct regiona ':" cperatL:ons. 
'dhile th~s great l y en hanced the e ff i. c~ency and speed o f :: :--.e 
rec::-uit me nt process, it entruBted an awesome :es;::onslb i. l ity ': 0 
an inc r ed lble n umber of people with a ',nde range or 
compe t e!lcy . 
3 . secur ity Considerati ons 
Underground recruitment mu~t st~ike a balance be:::ween 
the unc.ergrol:nd organizat i on's basic need to :::-eplace its 
me:nbers lost L- hrOl.:gh attrition C'.nd additional menbers 
veCSl:S rhe security th:::-ea t posed by the introduct i on of new 
rec:ruits. As d i scussed previclls l y, recruitment of :ne mbers is 
an absolute nece'-lsity to the surviva l of the l:nde~-gr:oun::i 
Yet, t o rec:::-u i t in a non -j udicio1..:s manner could 
" Gj elsv1 <, ~orweg i i1n Res i stan~e 1910 - 1945 
,:: ~ c:r ,H~ represents an unknu"'n, '-" np roven elem;o;-;: :ha c 
p0te0tial dange .::- s t o 
potent ~ al infi l ';:.::-at o n;, ~. l~os e :aCK ~ n3 
d:' 3 ",; .ce t;: ion and ope r atlon a l sense must ce identificc' a Cld 
j :, scci:ded if the g r oup's se cLl .::-ity - and t~us lCS Sl! !" 'l.lval -
co ce r;'la LnL ai ned.J. Bov,'y er Bell d i scusses l h e U:1Ce r t3.J..,.:~es, 
and ;::o t entla l t rxcat_s lnherent in u ndergrou nd rec:::uit Tie nt; 
Toe primary r:1ethoc. the undergrou nd emp l oyee to r e euce 
t he l ike l ihood o f i n::i ll .::-ation the r:1ost significant trxe3. t 
to t he orga n ization's securit y ''''as Lo rely on references 
f r om re l iable sources abo u L Lhe i dent ity and past o[ Lhe 
poten ti ') :' reen!it. A second prcc;;J.ut i on was LO r ecr u lt " by 
invitat~on or. ly' Di ::k Ruoenstein sums up the undergrou nd 
procedure . saying, "Genc rOllly spe ak i n3 - one v .. as eUb :'ous of 
those req u esting membership . This approach was v~ewec. ',.,it h 
!'Be ll Rp:volllt_ ionsny Dyna mi c rhe Inher p:!1t_ Inefficienc~es o[ 
the U:v-JerarQlln d , pp. 205 - 206. 
L:.nders.iroc:.nd ',<=-::r_ the 
lnrl" d!ld reLr-aya.l. 
ry truo:t'worthy to ::he undergrOll:1d, 
, for accepts.:1ce 
<'Rubf'no:tein, lr. erview w:'::h tr.e aut'".cr. 
e n cou n:. <>r Frenc~ collahorators, so :ac \, .. ere the i nd:ge:'.cc;s 
;r,e :":1 iJers of [ ne r e sis tanc e . :-Ic sta'::es; 
b . Clandestine Collaboration 
Cld:·.:;.~ stine co l l.a.bora t ion p:!:: lmdT l ly i nvo l 'lps scme 
:::">1:":': of i :1: It.rat i un of underground orc;anizat::'ons by hosti l e, 
:-:::iige ~,ouo; agenLs Rut it may encompasses anyth i ng from the 
acL . .: J. :. :nduction 0: a collabo rator lnto an underground gro u p 
tc reldt i ng conversations and Yumors of undergro\Jnd acL ';' v::':y 
cverheard as the result of i mproper security a ' .... areness 
Eecaus e o f t he encrmous damage and horrif :. c conseqlF~nces 
associa:::ed 'N'i Lh the ln f i lt ration and penetration of an 
underground organ -,- za t ion, clandestine co l L:lbcrators 'e,e:!::e 
considered by m05t to be the most signi: cant securlLy :hrea [ 
to the survival of tr.e orga:lization . As ?aul Werge l and, a 
long time part i ci:oant i n the Norwegian underground relates; 
.Jorgen ~e~ler concurs with Wergeland' s ass e ssment s ea t ing t ha t. 
i n De:1IT,arK. " the t: iggest threaL to the security of h is 
'i,,-ubenstein, Interview wit h the auehor 
J' ?aul 'lI'ergeland. In terview with the autilor, 1 2 JAN . 1994. 
c:::e d ange: [losed by t hese c l andest:-:-,e collabora to:::s i ~qu:'ia t ei 
350 informer" and ir.filtrators dc~ri:lg the cOI)r.se of the ' .... ar. 
T)-.e pe:ten t i a l damage which cou l d be , .... : cugh~ 
l:1 f l tra tio n of a co~l ajo ratcr ','Jas t rer:1er.dous 
i :1 Eorme r withir. the ra:l :<;;; of an l:ndergrour: C: ci -cl: it 
Qrov':'de, at a tr,ln ll~u;n, a d esc r i;J t io:l of a l ::' 
wl th whom he came i n ccnt act . t he i r COdE:lame S , 
a:ld add resses oE meeti:lg p ~aces , p rocedu r e s fo r contac t in g 
other r:lemoe:cs, l ocatio:-:s of safshouses d:~d descr ::. pt ion o f to" 
group's ope r atir,g procedures ThlS i nformalion ",a"i1 y 
re su l t 1 n the a rres t a:ld of al l me mbers o f the 
i:1d i v idt;.a::' g r.ou\=, ''''h i ch in tu r :l, could lead to add:'t~o!~al 
a r rests and tor t ures of other ur,dergro\':l'.d membe rs whi cn cou ::' c 
CO:ltir:ue in an ever expandl ng and destruct iVE circle '::"he 
damage whic:, cculd be l nfl ~ cted by an infiltra to:::- was d i rectly 
proportional to t:"1e sec u r lt y consciousness of the ind~vidua l 
u nderground un~ts. The potential damage to t he un de rgrol:nd 
cou::'d be min ~mized if met ic'..ll ou s security measures 'we re 
adhe:::-e d to, s'..lcn as no,: revealing :::-eal names and addre sses , 
constantly c:'1anging me et. ing ~:"aces. compartmentalizat ior. and 
d is c losi ng i nforma t. ion s o l ely on a "need to kno 'w" basis 
" Keeler, :i:nt:erview wi t. h the author. 
"Ibid . 
; :-!de r grc:.: nd to expe nd an ::' ~,orci;: "l".:: <:! 
;':-::::' I t a::: ,:)r5 ar.c e:l<;?' e:lde .ce c. a f ~a ::- of 
0 etrayal 
f or cc l ~ 3.bo ra ti ng ' .. :it'1 t:-!~ 
mo t i vat i ocs for c o l laDo':::' a t i:lg, say.lnc:;; 
A l e ss reprehen3it~ e motivatio:-: for cclLd:::crat i on ' .... ac; t_ 
comp l ia:1Ce due to coe rc i v e me <J.Sl..:.::-es. Carl ured me lT,b e .::-s of the 
'.1ndergro'Jnd t hat f a ced c:ontin'-.:. ed to :c tu : e, cer-Lai:-! d eath and 
frequent l y the deatl~ and to.rl'_re cf faD i ly 
occasion, offere d an a lte r::lat.lVe Lo thei.:: ctherv:ise lne'Ji t ab l y 
la rr, ent;:;b l e fate . An a'Jree ment to contin'J e t heir a Efil iation 
'.~ lt h t he underground in order to supply German s e curity fo r c(,s 
',,:i t !"! info r mation cou ld e xc han'Jed Ear the pe:::-sonal ',,'e ll 
' <['oa t , Re :; i stance, p. 20 
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b e l ng a nd the saf~ty of o ne' s :arn :. ly . ';org>"=n Kef' l er a ddresse o; 
th i s ~ssue, s t at ins; 
\·ihet h e t· operat ing clande s t i nely or openly, 
'1o:"u nta ":"i l y or due to coercive me asu res . col laj·::na t io:-! "H:;-
th e ene".y forc e s by ir.embers of the i.nd i g e nous popula t io n 
p roved to be th e sinqle gl-ea test t hreat to t he security c: 
u nd e rground orgcln i 7. a t i ons Th e col l aborato r 's lntLnate 
know l pdge of loca l a ff ai rs and ab i l~ty to i r. f i ltrate i nto 
re s~ st ance organlzalions capabilities r.arely possesseu ;)y 
Gcrma.r,s, s e rve d as i n va l uab l e assets In lhe Germa:1 endeavor to 
comta t under:ground ac t iv i ty . 
3 . 
Whil e t h e l a r gely und i rec t ed clct l on,-, of 3t-Tee t 
patro l s, che ck pojnts and rLmdc m pat-_rols co nd u cted ty German 
poll ce forces ".!ere not cons i dered a n e xtr e me t :--, reat to the 
und ergro u nd's spc:urity, t h e danger posed by their use of 
torture to extract damaging info rmation du r i ng intcrrogat i.o n 
of captured underground age nts was rcga -::- d ed as a tremendous 
t~real Differe nt '..lnde<:ground uni ts had different procedures 
La a dd ress the hazards ar i si'1g fro:n the a<:rest or ':'ts mem8ers, 
but a l l operated 0:1 t h e a ssump ::: ion that, under to r ::: u ce, 
';~ :<:eeler. I:1terview with t he aut h or. 
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~ ;~~ r e'.·e~a. '- ~:;):'. ::: f cr.:.. : ca l : c.formation concer'l .:. ::g : -:ler.::':;.:.. e s 
l o c ation3 and ope 'ca t i ons 0 : the underg::ound. neceS3itated t: i'."'-
r apid and thorougj~ reorgan.Lzalicn c: al l elerr.e:'. ts a t 
Like c ~e threats presen t ed by undirected a ctions of the 
host.L l e security services ar.d col l abora'..ors, the ,ncspect of 
undergro".;;~d agents captuY."e, tOY."ture anri d ivu :;'-:;ence 
incr~':l~ nating i nrorma tlon requ i :::"ed t he 
dissipate i ts operat.Lor:a l fO CelS and expend time <lnd efrort 0:1 
bas ic survived requireTMo'nt s . 
4. Indiv idual Fac tors 
I n ac.ci.iticn to the threa.ts posed by tr.e conce~"teci. 
error:s of the host.Lle security fo::ces, under g :::"ou:ld agents 
could su f fer :rom large l y sel f - i nduced ~ hreats . ':'he i na::nlil y 
to keep quiet abOc.l o ne ' s participation and kno'wl edge of 
underground act.Lvity proved to b e a recurrent a nd destructive 
shortcom.Lng The r eguirem.ent to ceaselessly mainta in the 
highest levels of security consciousness, even when conductir.g 
"~ KolT,orC"wsk i , p. 54 . 
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jif!' l C'~lt t o sustai n IJnde~'grcund ope r at ive s f :- eq lj.~r. :~y 
las sed l:l ~ '':: Ot se mi - relaxe d sec u rity posture , lul l ed 1: ~ '::0 a 
fal se S2:;s e of sa fe ty as t he r-i"s Lllt of past 
;::OCl t i nlz a ::-=--o r.. Even 'when u;.dergrounC agents maint a i :"_ec. 
hlg ~lesl le\'e ls of security awa rene ss they could De p lagued oy 
sim:? l e bad l uck 
Operacing in a n ern"ironment of Hl t rigue, betrayal ,, :cd 
fea r. a non- j udic:.ou s s l ir of tongue. an ove t' heard 
c onversa:::lon or aOClas t i n t r.e wr or.g company couid r::ro'le to 82 
a fatal e::::ror. Oesp lt. e t:"le r:)tentl a l deatl: rena l ty f:)y 
l ndlscre tion, " l oose lips" p l agued many un derg:'ol!ui 
organl zat l ons M.R.D Feot d e scribe s t:1is SC~letlmes fa tal 
propensity, stiit.ing; 
Paul 'tJergeland conf irms tr. at la c~ 0: discretion wa s a maJor 
rroblem, esrec ial. l y in the in:'ti a l stages of t.r_e Non/egia:'. 
resis t iince, attributing this weakness not jus t. to t~e actuiil 
u nc.ergrou:1d participants, but to the pearle outside o f tr.e 
o rg an ization, who eagi"cl y p,:; ssed on t!-lei:::: knowledge and X"l lm:)r,; 
Foot Reslstance,::J 1. 5 
' .... as :":5'~a l ly passed a :or.g as sou rce o f ~ r .lde of t he :-,,:' ::-0 : ,:::: 
a c: '.. o :-.s ot t ~e '..nd J. genc ·~ s fO T:"ce s, t:--.e re", ·~.i.:s, nonetheless, 
:1'.. 5 u r. i : ' s secur: ty ",'as "people t alk t o e much 
The d,mger of an '.l::der9round parti c '.. pant becemi :lq 
cOIll:) l s ce n t abeut affairs, desp :'te :)oten t :'a ll y 
C_,':;:astrophic co,coe,'c e ncc c . 
7he repetit i o n o f \;n d e r grot;.nd activ: c y, c8nduc t ed 
enco·~-.':: er -.:-: g discern lble cppos it'..o:1 from the host'..le se-::urity 
f o rces, l e ad to a :::- outi n l. zat i o n ef oEJeratio:-. procedures, o r ten 
res '~ l ting In t ne unde r e c;timatio:1 e r lack of p rO:)'2 r regard f or 
trw c;nrerr,i t Ling tineats cc ns tant 1y me nac i ng \;ndpr.ground 
o p erations. 2 irger RJSSC1 I1; sser. re l ates l'.ow r out in l zatic r. 
ef fe<": t.ed h :. s qrcup s ec t:.rity consc i ousness, t e l l '..ns l'.o· .... as tIle 
org a:t ization p r ogressed and b ecame successfu l in condt;.ct l. n9 
un dergroc.nd operatlons tn.c membe:::- s se l f-conf ide nce rose. 
persenally ::;'Jrt i cipa t e d i n 2 0 25 s abo tJg e operations a nd 
witr, success they had a Le"dency to i r.crease the i!: '.;Il.l lingnes s 
LO take c;'.ance 3 and min im iz e tr.e:'r r e qard for adhe!:ence to 
'v..' e c g e l a nd , I n terv i ew wi th t he a u thor . 
" '·Stank .1.e wi cz i Intervi ew · .... i L '1 the auther . 
escape -0 Engla:1d, the tact was soon l<nO\,T. to his extendec: 
fJ.::Li:"y. frlcnds 0nci C'j2n acquair.;::~~:1ces. Upon r e tur::1, if he 
~.he5"', r.e · ... ,'1. 8 a: the :-lercy of t.he 
meticu:":::us security s::a::1c.ards undergroLnd a::;ent 
2o:npromis.cd J:::y s'.rr.p12 :)011 111c,,;:, Fco"_ l_e1:.s a story::::: 
'-1n(~erg:::-:::und agen: torced J. B-2 ",!irto'lto't:o; "el 
-' Per ha:1GG')Il, TI,., ~-;r"'dt pst :;'=':llble, York, T,,'.\.'. ~:or;::o::--. 
In.:: 19651 pp. lei 188. 
c'l'-1:: Reed C-lser., 1'· .... 0 1::99" en 11'1 Pla;::,.. 
',.;i::.::: ;" :::he age nt ca!'ry~:,.') ·,.,.ClS 0. dist ir:ct s.:cze a::-.d shape a ..."d 
'''::1d'2 rgrour.d operat~ -" e, ye :J.lizin g >:: he precariousnes s 0: 1'. ::'3 
c; 1. tua t io'1, i n i ::: ia ted a c'..l r:;-;i '1S securi ty me a sure r.e pres\;r:'.ec. 
'_.o1.: l d redu ce his r':sks, 
W~"lL .. e the s e types a: threats were generally beyund the :::ontrol 
0 : the und e rground, and cou:"d o:::cur c.espit e the i mplementat.:ton 
0: the [Tost str1.nge:ll security measures, it i _ l~strates 
less tClng ~ tl" bu t equa l ~y ilazardous :::hreats associa t e d 
o;?erating 1'1 an u~lcergroU!:d enviro'1ment 
Th e ?ervas i ve and uEremitti'1g thre ats to t h e ,,<!cl l rity o f 
t he undergr OU '1d :rom so ma'1Y diverse and i nca l cu l ab l e quarter-s 
f orc e d the underground organizations to deve lop u:l1.que and 
cun n i r.g counter-measures, Each a:1c. every act i on conduc ::: ed by 
the underground ililperiled t h e sec urity o f the organ i z a C1. on 
Absolute security Cllld secre cy could unly be assured ::'y 
lO! i" oot, Resistance, p 
~0SJ 1'J::: e ina.c t ivity w~.i ~e a mln mal leve : :::> f 
deter:n ined : ilrge ':' y :ly the e f:iciency of 
hostl l e SeC '-1 r lty fo::ce s i s a fun da ment a l suP/iva :" 
:"::3.CtiVlty prec l ud es the "CaLio::1a l for its e xist ~nce. '~o a 
gyea t er OY lesser degree . the underg ro und 
r 'J~ij':' y iO en tlfl ec. t.he th::eats t o thei r s e curi t y. made l r.e 
dec i sion to p "Coceed l'lith t i-.e '..:: operar. i O:lS despite the ln r.ere!lt 
:: i sk sand t e'll lo::c:ed t he i r act i v i ties in response t o the 
pc::c:ilous ilnd ::c:ep::ess i ve e nv i-.:: onmcnt i n , ... ·h:;.cr. t'~ey '"e re fotTe ci 
t o operate. 
~his sec t i::lrl wi l l dis::uss hal-' unde::ground organizatic r.s 
managed the nUlllerous and ciiverse U ·. ::c: e a t s to i :: s se c urity. 
SpecificalJy, lt wi l l exam ine how the ur.df'rground adilpt ed i ts 
opera~. i.ons an d app:"ied i~.'; ol~n security mf' ''S '..lre s t r.e 
crucia l act. l v lt ies of; commun ications, formulat i on o f its 
command st::c:uct llrc , what to do in :::he even t cf the cap t.llre of 
an agent. , ::ec r uit.ment, indiv dual agef".t 5f'Cur '.. ty, a:ld 
offensive secllrity meaS ll Y."es . 
COIlUl\unicationa 
The undergrou nd's use of conventional channe l s of 
c cmmun l cations, such as the t elephone . te l egraph and p ost. a. l 
syst.ems , as previously discussed . was great. l y inhibit e d due t8 
t .:l.e t.h:::-ea t s pcsed by enemy mo nit.ori ng and in'::e::ceptlon. 
1--1 . R . D. Foo t. exp l ains, f o:::- the b u lk Q: resisters , p8St, 
8 !'gans, t ;':ey were Ear too l ia':)le ~ ntercepc: ic !" . . 
Al t e !:',p t s to es ta b l L;h alternative cOT~_unicat~on sys te[", s, 
Dy 
~'a r:dom a:c::::-ests , check points and pat ro lo; ".hich al l 
p c sse ss ions o f. anyone i::specled, w ~ th the express purpo::;2 
locat i ng any matec.lal relating to unciw,cou ,," ac tlvity «.a cho 
use, u s ual :y restricte :::: t o com;nu n icaticn be t ,,.:e en underg rcu :-.i 
units and Al l ied support commands ( S . O.E.), cou l d be rapi ri ly 
de tected a nd the l ocation of the sou r c e pinpo~nted 
remainder of t hi s sec t ion '/J il l cl i scuo;~ed the sec c:.r i ty 
p ::- ccedure s employe d by the c:ndecgrcund to ao.dres s ::: he 
diffi c ul ties of e l andesti:1e com:nul1l0aLion ut i li z l n g 
conventiona l channels of commun i c a tions , cou r l er s and rad~o s . 
The Use of Conventional Channels 
D~,,?ite the cunst ant monitoring of t :.., ~ 
convention a.l c :'1anflel~; o f communicatiuns, the unde r grc .; nJi . 
emp l oying e nough ounn i ng a.nd ilaagination, cou l d sti :'- l make 
inva l uab l e usc of these comprom i sed n e tworks. Prearranged, 
hi d d en messages co u l d be concea:ed ~[j "eemi ngly ~:-. :lC0 2:-. ::: 
telephon e conversat ior. or r:o rrespondence . 
provi d es a:1 excel l c>nt example of t he Il se of the telephone by 
the un dergrou n d escape ne t ' .... orks Lo cunvey c2-ucia l ~:lformat ion; 
"'coot, :!.esi stance , p. 
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aoot :"E'L- exampl e of tile I;.se o f apparent .i. y 
5tatements, th i s t ':' me 1. 0 w~' _i.t ten ::u rrespol'de nce , to 
evade delect l on, say l :1gs c r.at Cll1e could illic it 
11es~ages uSJ..ng; 
The u nde1:"sround also di scovereo. techniques to use 
Lhe postoll s ervices fo:: t heir own ::l\;.rooses fostal ' .... orke;:-s 
were conside red r:: ri me ca ndi.dates .for :::-ecnl~tme n t -:' nto the 
undergrou nd because of t he assistanc = t.hey could render i n 
facilitating clandestine commu:lications . An agent opeL'ating 
ir:s i de the posta l system could arrange the tra:1sport.ation of 
correspondence ·,..rithout subJecting it to the scrut i ny of 
c[:icial monitori ng . I f the agen t p e rsonally conveyed the 
t:.nderq ('ound corresp:mdence , he COli 1 d do so wi t:"1 1 '- '- t le 
: i.kelihood of being searched. The postman, after a l l, 
Voot , Res i star,~e, p . 
"Foot, Re5istance, p. 
t ~e ,'I :::':: :: : d i st:: i Dt..;.t':':-:? c l aLu"s c i "e cc :n:nU:1::'c ation5, :-:e c O .l~ d 
a ?lY '-"ror.gdoing and c ~aim h e '".'as si rn;lly 
FerfoT.~, ing h~s o : fic ia .l :j-..;.ties 
:-:d ergrol..;. n d agen :: operat :":--.g a:: a 
telephc ne exchang e c ou l d , at times, e ns '..;.re t e 1 8!Jhcne cal~s 
t;, a t shou ':' d h e :-ccn i ~_ cred by r"os ti l e :or ces, were o;cmehow 
.1l 1s.::oute d Clnd escaped th2 reo'-l i site censorsh i. p _ 
b. Couriers 
predominant me t hod of :.lnde rgrc-..;.nd ' "' _8 r:-1a l 
com~iunicat i Ol" wa G the employment 0:: coc:.r-i e rs The c:.se of 
circ u r:lVen ted the c:.nderground's rel i ar:ce on cfficii:r l 
c h annels o f commu n ica t i ons and the i r accomfJar:Ylng s crut iny, 
but add ed ne',,"' sec\: rity concern:] CO'.l1':ier-s '""ere forced t o 
nav i ga te the ha za rds o f cOt;.nt :'ess chec :-< poincs, r andom 
perso r,n el searches and other less random ac t:io ns cond'-lcted by 
German sec;rity f orce ~l Th e di scove ,-y of a co-..;.r1er co u ld 
::::' e s ult not only in :::he ::evela t ion of t he h i g !, l y sensi t ive a nd 
po tE.' n tially des truct i ve H lf o t -mat i on conveyed by t he cour~er , 
t he capture a nd i nterl:'ogati.on o f t he cou riC!r cou l d iJrovide 
add i tion a l i nto;:-ma t io n de l ct e ri O'.ls to t h e Se cu r iLy of ::: he 
undergro und orga n ization fl:ecogrli zing ::: h e t h rea ts associa. te d 
',,; ith the co u rier s yst.em of commun lcat10n , the u n d erground 
uro=-c:;c;e and o~:: en i ngc!1ious 
=- 1'.1:2::-,=,n:: dangers 
tech::iques used by t"e ~ :-:je-::-g ro\.ird 
hide c~3.ndes~:::e in see n '--ng l y i ::nccellt l ett2rs sen;:: 
In :1·.1" C!ff lc..Lal mail , '-,'ere eT:1p l oyed in courip-::- Lrar,st:orl 
~~h l l e :h i o; was pe~·haps :r.e sa E es~ metho d of cO!1vey i r:s a 
message i : was seve :::e l y l'..mi: ed in ltS u se L.:..'..:-. ';' ss. :-; idcen 
message oE~ e!1 ambiguous, could o n ly convey a ,) ex:rp~e ly 
limited amoun t of i!1fo:::ma:ion and '-,'e:::e dependart upor. p rior 
coo:::dinatio:l. Vocal messages, ' .... I'. il e no ~ possess'..ng a!1Y 
i nc -::-im::':-la.ting ma:erial, \,'e-::-e also ~evere l }' l ini:ed in t '"".e 
amuun: and accuracy of infor'ma~ion capalJle of being conveyed. 
The linde r gI"ouna compensa:ed [0::: : hese de fect s by lltll i zl.:1':< 
encodi. ng, .l. nvisib:e lnks and cipher :ech:1 i ques and 
ciphers allcwed the corll1u:1icatlcn of h uch l a::-ge~' quan t ities of 
in f or~'3.tior. in an unambiguous manne:: but if ::he courier was 
searched , no Ol l ausible expla:1at lcn could be concoc~ed foc 
their possess=-on of such ':':1CTlminat.i.ng material 
add r. esses :he pros and cons of the 'Jse of ciphers, sta:ing; 
·-"Foot,~, 
c ::.p::.er s a :-o.d :'r.v .l.. sit:' ""'! 
In adcl.. .. '.::i or. to the mea5l'.reS taken t:: ;::>re v e !"'.[ t he 
!.·e velat1.on of the cont. e:;t of undergro u nc. message s in case o f 
sea.::ch a :: ::1 exam1.nat1.on by hostile for"c e s, e l aboc): ~ c£ :ort.s 
made to prec':" AJe the discovery of unde~grour.d 
co~:::espondence . Hi dden compart me n ts, ana :" 
S -l ppositories CY1tai.ni ng mi.r.rof i l m, concea :'ment of mes sages ~n 
WOlnen's bras and ?an t ies were some of t~e Inethods l..:-s e d t o 
combat t.he t hreat of the discovery of l'.nderg:::Ol..:-nd c;olnmuniql..:-e s 
Tore G)elsv1.k descr" i bes the technLques used l.r. Non.:ay as 
d:verse, using a v a l" i ety of met hods from Oloph i sticated 
In.l croscop i c me ssages t hat requ1.red a microscope to re a d anc. 
was only t~.e s i z e of a matr.hh ead to le ss i. ntricate technic;ues, 
includ 1. C1g hiddC' n cO"1partme" t~ i n cases or.d the ut:..li zat i on of 
h idi r.g the in the i -::- bras and 
pant ie s . He te lls i'lr. amus i l:g s tory of condit:"o:ls a t t. :'le end 
o f l:"1e war - - br<Js and p ant ies were it ems d::fficL;lt tu acquire 
in 'I;a r - t .ime Non .. ·ay, and by the e C1d o ~ the Wi'l l::" t:"1e O:les tha t 
remained ' .... eye qu.i. te wor n. making the conce<Jlment: of message s 
"' ;.1ac k sey, ". 9 0 - 91 
d:s~layiClg admiraDle ope.rat ional :lexibil ity, \ .. ;:-,i=-e 
s~~.·_:taneously serving thel:"te.rests a:1d ~eeds cf t :-.ei:: 
(Jacr10tic CcuCltrywome ll 10 the process" 
,:"]0_", procedu res t aken ~o d i sgu i se and r_ide messa"i'"s 
was lim i t e d cnly by the underground operato:-s ' 1rr,a g i :1at.i o~_. 
John Dram Tho ffi",S p r ovides examp i.e s 0: the Danish ':'esista:-:::e' s 
use of mi crofilm sent. by ccur i ec i n side sho.vir.q br_", nes, 
combs, soa~ tablets. anal coo t al.!lers and even concealed L-: 
small holes dr:'..lled l.llt.O keys and u n der dentUces c-, 
Poot describes a me t hod used to carey I'lc ssages that seet'".s to 
have been wi dely employed in occu~ied E:urope; 
The use of couriers was the singl e ',: 1de 1y 
used met hod of interna l communications <2mployed by the 
underground. Whi l e the system represent e d a 
communication net.work fr e e from cr.e inherent sr.rut iny of 
" 'G j elsvik. Interv i e'N wit.h the author . 
' ::':Thomas, pp. 29, 33 and 34 . 
" "F oor., Res'stancE', p. 99 
d i d tl~ e c:ndergroll n d :>3'.'e to ke ep 
ciphers ex .:. s:,:-r:c e of t e:eJ..::-
rr '2 ssages c o ncea l ed 
':"h e c our iers who roc:t i::el y braved ~lOsti :'", c~.ec .-;: 
P0J.. r: to:;, s t ree t pa trols, randcm searc".es , al":',o::" o tr.e r h azards, 
lransporti. :lg materia l lhat i nevi t ab l y c arr i", d a deat:~. SC:ltence 
if d iscovered, \-;ere a h soh:tely esser.t.:.al t C"J 
O;)era t l ons ':':ce ~ r ac tions , ' .... hile lacking the dramatics 0: 
visihle l:ndergco und o ;Jeralions, 
s ervJ..ce to t he cesi s t ance , fa c ili tat i ng Cl fc.nciamer.:al 
n ecess i t y to any crgilnlza: J..on - commc:nlca t':' O:ls. 
Underground Radio Communications 
The use of the radi o was a cru ci al compon e nt of 
unde r-ground cOl":'dTiun i cations, used pri r:1acily fo r c-nain t aining 
contact wi th Allied assoc i ates outs i.de of th e i r c ountr y 
Allied a5SOC J..a tes u su a l ly meant the S.O . E. wh o :cecc·.; i.r e d seme 
f orm of t wo - way c O!:, r:1 unJ.. ca t i o ns to coordinate the supp l y of 
cquiprr.en t , the insert ion of aduitiona l agent s, t he tHr.e l y 
prov i sJ..on o f inte l l J.. senc:e a:lC:i to request sl:ec i fic nee d s Cl!1d 
tas x. ings. As wi th t he uther Il:e a n s o f corr.melnica t i o ns, t h e 
raciio pos se s sed it.s O' ... m :nerits anci det rirr,ents . The radio 
could tca ns rr,it me ssag es rap idly, over greaL cii5tances, belt 
to tranami,:: and :::'2ceive c landcst::c:-".c. 
me SS5.g -,; s, o:r."Or methocs of \lnde:::-ground co m:n'..l n ications , 
:- ile undergro und and t:h c~r All l ed associil : :;s 
Cladre ssed t he s c curit y t h:::-eClt.s t o their rad l..o cor mu:1~catior 
usi ng ma:1Y of th e same te c Illliques emplcyed i n cO '..t rier 
"essage s, ',.;ith h J.. dden mCan ings, W8:::-C n:ansmiLted, u suCllly by 
l.he Al l ies, provide p compt but u ndetectable i ns t ruct:ccns CY 
i!1 formation Codes, ciphers, a nd i d entity checks ,,'ere u s ed 
protec t the contents and enSClre the autr. ent i catioC"1 of 
tra nsm i tted mes"ages wh ich wou ld, Dy th e nature o f rad io 
communication s, be ?rone to interceptio n by anyone 
i n cluding Ge rman security fo rces -- ,,'no mon ltored tha l 
fre que:1cy r':nde ::-grcund radio communicat iO:1s fac e n the 
additional danger of enemy de tect io:l resulting i n the 
pinlJointing of the t ransm i ssion site and t: le c a;Jture of the 
rJdio or: era!:or . 
The B.R.C. 1:' p:-oviri ed the main conduit for t he 
trclns ml ssion 0 : seemi ng ly nonr.al rad I o b ::-oad c a s::s , i ,. 
fact, c on t ained a cGncea l ed messa.ge decipherah1e o"ly 
members of L:--.e underground . Josef Gar l in src i prGvide5 
Bri,:ish Broadca s ting Cor;Joration 
exce l ~ e r.: descriptl o!', of the of 
2 .B.C.'s ?olis;-. ;:(ol<:: i o to r-ece i ve - ::. t messases 
reCc;pt:: l cn co:-:-,~ itteeo; ot Alliec. air-dr-opo:;. 
T h e insertion of. concealed I:\essages i n~. c ope n br-oadcLists 
a llowed clandesLine l:1essages to be se n t with l ittle 
UPOlcr-:u ni ty f ar the l r true meaning to be garneced by hos t i l e 
forces , and 'I,-as a vailable a ll a k no' .... n Lind consLant frequ,,,ncy to 
anycne even If _istening :0 the BBC was o['::en 
p'..Inishable by deLit;h passessi.n g a ra.dl O receiver . 
The use of codes and ciphe r s to pcotect 
cont(>nt of radio cOr:1DunicaLlc n s and sec u rlty checks 
au then:icate the ide n tity of the sender were employed 8y 
virtuCl.L.y a l l u nderground ocganiza t i8ns . Mu ch like Lhe us", 0: 
Garlinski, Po " a n d so;; and th'" A] " ' es , George 
A::' le n Unwi n L t d ::' 9(9) pp. 7':1 - 80. 
publ ic cn5.nnels 0;: 
Cl)e:!:'atO'd under the ass umpt1.0;l that meSS5.gc trans;n :.. ::::::e j 
0'/'::.::: t:12 rad'--o ' .... auld be i ntercep ted by enemy ::C::C'C2S 
::: o T~-..: r.ic;at 1. O:1 sen.:.r '-- ty ',,-'as t he::c'eforc c;ont i:1ge nt not 
::;c:lcealing the exist e:lce o f trot' rressage Dut mak :'.ng 1.: 
indisc:'.phe r a::Jle. Coces, o:'.pr.ers anc 5eCU:Clt y checks, le 
2.1 :" 0'>: i ng the underS!round the use of ehe rad:'.o 
Creeiy m"n secur '--ty yestrictlons All r e qu i rec prl.::>r 
coorc.i :1ati::m and continual u;Jda:inc, to prese r v e their secyecy 
If a radio operator ',Ias cap tU-:::-f! d befo-:::-e he could destrcy r.1S 
codebooks or divulged his checks under torture, tn"" 
en e my could in f II tra te the u nde -:::-ground ' S communlca lion 1 ink., 
caus i ng tyemendous damage 
S""cur it y, or i de:1tity, checks were intended LO 
p::c-event hostile force" f rom infiltyating t he underg yound's 
rad l o communication net' .... ork in the event of the comprom'--se o[ 
cedes or ciphe r". Hosti l e agents, eve:! i n possession of the 
unde;,:-grounds codes , theoretical l y, cou ld not pose as Tlerrbe::c's 
of t::e unue::c'ground wilhout authenticating theiy identlty 
t hro ugh use of an indi\fidua l c;-,eck system Kenneth Macksey 
illustra t es the p urpcse of tnese identily checks, say .1- ng; 
101 
Desp ite iLs fall ibil :ty, s 2c u r: t y checks did prOV1 :;!8 a ~ ~ 
add : :: ::'. - :-:3. 1 secu!:"lty obstac l e to the :::omprom1s e of underS~' 8·_:~:: 
commur: .'_eat i on net '".or k". 
Even :f the str.-ie t est. :::ommuni cc1L 1on sceu ;:: i::.y 
p rocedure s ,",'ere ,lchered tu, the underground radio ::> p e:r:3.to.::-, as 
SOO :l as he init 1a led il tra:lsmissio~l. '".as 1n consta.n':: danger ~: 
dete:::t.!.c~. and compromise . The l engt h of time an undergro t: ,~d 
.::-acic operator 8e::: 11 re .In t ransmi tt i ng '",' a s cont i ngen t 
a has: ::> f factole; the proxi mity of hostile d ,l ! 'e:::t.lon 
f i nding ' ~ F ) rna' hine r y , the regu l a.::-.l:'y from which the s ite ,,,.as 
used foy .::-adio t::-ansm.lssions and U·,,," p r ofie.lency o f the Dr:' 
opera tor. =n the aosence o[ mi t igating c i rcu m3tac.::= s. 
S:ar. i slaw Komo.r ::>wski s:ates tile gu i de l ines used by the Pol sh 
Horr,e Army ; 
'Hr<aeksey, p . 9'-- . 
"'°Komcrowsk::., p. 
~~ .R . D. Foot ?~ovides .1 
the 
\·<:"1eLr.er ut'.detectab le :or ten r.ours or ten mi:!utes, 
rad i o - :ansmi t ting required an u nco:npromi sing ad:"1erence Cc°':; 
se(:ur i ty s l<1ndarcis. Each minute spen t transmitting brought 
the operator closer to CCl p ture , -:--esu l t i ng t'.ot only ::'1'. tr:e loss 
of at'. i nvaluable o?erator ar:::l. 0. [Jrecious in the 
po " sibl e comprOll 1. se of codes and <:I l l knowledge poc;ses"ecd ry 
the clandest ine operator. The so.vvy operator alte~'ed :-:is 
transmiSS 10 n locat i ons ao; freque n t l y as possible, mini mized 
his air t i me and deployed lookouts to w<:Irn of the approach o t 
t he easily <:Iscertained enemy DF elemen t s. iJespit.e t he 
_Implementation of t:"1e be st securl.ty preca u tions, radlo 
com:nun i catior.s were i:1herent l y dangerous , and 11ke ot~er 
methods o f unde~-ground cO[;1munications, sec u rlty me<:l sures coul.c. 
only reduce the a s sociated hazacds rlot e l iminate t~em. 
2. Command Struc ture 
'"hilA of t~e utrr,ost impo rtance ':.0 t:~,e s u rviva l of .:1:-. 
u ndergrour.d organiza':. i oo , co:nrr.a :1d structure seC'..lrity wi l l o :lly 
"'?cot,~, p. 
0: and co n t r::l 
dema.r,ds . Co:o~and st r uct u re 
~ / '.:! :"". ::: c mpassec t:,ose meas u re S ta:'; ~· ~ by r r.e u:-.c.ergrClI..i !lC 
~ ~r"! i:-:" :' z e the dal~,ag8 :'Ec L.;rre d by elther :::he :::apture of a 
a::-e or .i.ented pr ~:-r,arily to ::'im ltir.s tr.e numbe r 0: 
und~rsround personnel whose =-dent i ty cou :" d be dlvulged 
ir:f ' ::-ma':i:J:1 providec by infi ltratio:-, or tor::: u re 
Tl:e essccce secur i ty is La restr l ct t]--,e 
0: a genL's true identitles, a ddresses and other 
:at l ng l niormatlon [rom anyon e n ot absolute::'y requlred 
to k now Tr.is s hou :. d be il ne n- d i scriman t ory , un lvetsal 
poliey. appLyinS botr. u p ilnC dc .... ·n :::he cbli.n of comma nd, f ro 71 
the mest tn.:stea to the most suspec t . 'J;ithln tDe sma l l.est 
\Jn i ts ar_c bigSest alike Irv i ng 1fIe !;s tein explains t he u t i lity 
0: th lS " r.eec t e know" pel ley, u sing tr.e Danish resistance 
gx-oup . the Helser Dac s k , as a:1 example; 
:~ ' 'tierstei:'... p. 57 
r:Lembe.cs also ?e:!:::a~ned to one group' 5 k nov.' J..'2dge 0 : 
t he '.-::::e:H:i ~ies and activities of ether g rou ps. I f s~parat_e 
mai:1tained intimate ti es 'with on e ano tr.er. :nc:.~.j ':" ng 
Kr.owled'je of the ident it ~es or l oca tie!'.s of thei ::-
u;:c::erground counterp2.rLS, t he penetration o f either u ni : co-_,~ j 
resu l t i n t he dest::-uctic.lO o f ::'o::h. Tore Gjelsvik descr ibe s 
the dc t ions of Knut Moyen, a leader wl Lh in the No::-wes: i an 
r eSistancE , 'who i r:-,pler:-,e nted ccm:nand secur i ty procedures to 
address this threat; 
Com:n ,) nd structure securjt_y stressed the need to 
co:npart"1enta li ze sensitive infor'matien, especi2. 1 1y that 
conce rning a:1Y in t or'Dation .... ,hieh could l ead to the divulgence 
of "!lo th,,,r u nderground IT.emCer's ident i ty. ::: t c h i ef purpose 
was to ITlininize the daf:'\age whic :1- could De in flicted upon the 
unde~-grO\lnd organiza t io:1 in the eve nt o f inf i l t r at_i o n or the 
c ap t ure of an age nt . Without proper cOI -:~,and 
SeCur l ty, entire underground o::-ganizatl.ons and th e i r 
a ffili a Les could c« ident'..fi2d and either o e s tr-oye d or used 
:-)G ~els\Tik, Norwegian Res i sLa:1ce, p. 84. 
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Cap tu r e and To r tu re 
c;: e r a ::.ing in under-groun d f ac~ng 
.. : _~ :".:,rao18 t hreats f r om a PQwerf _:' and this 
e~: e ient, host~le sec'-1rity force, made the p t -3pec: of 
' - 1 __ " dl.vu l ge~ce of i n f orma:ior_ under Lhe of te::: 
CCc.lld nave serious consequences for :!-,e su:::viva l of the 
ca':Jtu:::ed ag~:-.'::' s clandesti ne c:lssociates and i f proper 
"trucLu r e s e c u rl.ty measures -,,'ere n ot heeded. could l. 1~,peril the 
Qntire underground unit:. and theit" associa t .€ s Th e u:"_Jerground 
ma:ktged t:--,e :hre ats prese:1ted i:::y capture l. n s e veral \~ays 
prev i olls 1y discu3OJed, compartme!ltali z at~or: a nd IHniting the 
lc;nowledge of underground age nts to a "need tc kncn., " casi s , 
especia l ly cegarding identifying infOcmation, qreac l y reduced 
l:le da [~1cJge a c aptured operati ve could unwi l l i ng l y ~nfl ic t upon 
~ i o:; compat riot s _'-1any members of t he underground mCl-d e the 
decision to die rCltr,er t :~, ar: be captu~cd. even i f ~ t me an :: 
tak ing t:::e i r own ll v e s , rat~cr. than sucmit to the agonl.2S of 
tor ture a nd r islc; t~e betra yal o f llnderg r.OU:1d s ec rets. All 
undergroun d orga n i zatio r.s operated with the unde r s t andi ng t~at 
i f. a ny of the i r me m6ers were ca~ Lure by hostile secur ity 
f orces they c:l tt.e :n~t ~ o rema ~ n s i l er,t l ong enoug:~, t o 
al l U otl their u nderground co l l eagues Ll. me to es cape . 
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For manY-lndeLg roc;r.d :nembers, especia ~ l y 
possess~ng a greac: dea l of incr iminat ing .lnforrr,ac: 
insta:"ltaneou s death was more atc:ract lve opt io n Lhan 
r lSr.: of 
de::;tr'-lctive ln for:na t. ion, inevitably followed by the i;:-
exec'-ltion for par t ic ipat i ng i n subvers~ve activ it i ec; ~:~us, 
agents v o' ... ·ed never to be t aken alive -- whether this entai ~ ",d 
dyinS in a shoc:ou t: with hostlle forces or tak lng the lr own 
lives The m:Jst wideJy re l ied C:pO:1 de vice to ensu r e that an 
agent ',,",ou l d not be capt:ur ", d was the "poison tJll l 'The 9 l 1 1s , 
which were either "home made" or prov i ded by ~he S02:, could ::;e 
CO!lCea 1 ed in r l:lgS , toe l ape~s of~acr.:ets or a!ly convenient. 
access l ble locations , depending upon t he user's p reference. 
:<omorowski prov i des a description of his cxperie:1cc s wt : h the 
pill, sayin<;; 
3eca use of massive German reta l iat i ons for the death of Ger~',an 
s e cu::ity officers the utility of the pill as a uefens l ve 
nea"c; re ',,",as. at times. the only viai:lle optlons. Komoro·ws:-;:i 
i l lustrat.e s th is poin t , stat inc::; 
"'Komorowsk i, p. 25. 
"':- :-:e ru l e that poiso n and ""at r e',:L · .. ers s ho u: d be '-1 5-::] 
in self - defe nse, I n 51.;. ;:: :-, 
c;. r:;l: r.";star.ces, a man 1S C""'.~ :" 
':l'..lch as t nose of the oc;~~ rs 
own ll fe so 
be t ra y 
!C e sp i. te t he sec u ricy e f:orts ta ke n to < .. ~.':'mize 
~ ~:-: --:r::' T. i na:ing I n:o rrr.a::::o n ;Jossess ,o: d by me :'".bers C""J: 
t he :..:.r:derground and to avold cap ture, underground Cige:1ts, 
p o ssess i ng potentially damag i ng '-:::-:owledge were c ap t ure d 
regul a!:" l y. Re cognizing this ine vit a b i l ity, the ·~:-. dergro ·~ C""'. j 
planned accordingly. As suggested earller, the undergrour.d 
ope r a t ed under the assumption that anyone s..;.;)] ec t ed : 0 the 
b r_:a li ties o f tort u re ' ... ou l d e v e "tually revea l all t h ey <;::e"," . 
Anyor.e knm·,-n to the captu r ed agent ""ie n t in to h id1ng, -; ,- a:-:;ed 
ide ntiti e s, addresses , place s of wor k , etc . Age C""'_ : s we r e 
instructed, tha t i n the case of capture and to rture , 
attempt to refrain from impart i ng critical in:orma t i on :;) r 
e i ther a specif ied amou n t o f time o r simply as l ong 
possib l e . 
Jo hn Or am ':'ho1'1as il l ustrat e s the [:lrocedures a gre ed 
upon within a :Jan ish resistance group , saYlng ; 
had an agreement t ha t i f a man were taken by 
he would try t o ho l d o ut for at leCls t 
o r, better s ti ll , thirty - six hour s . 
stand the to rtu re any longer , he was 
- but the ot her had up to t h irty- s i x 
to get c l ear.'" 
. Ko:norowsk i. , p 39 
'·'ThoT,as, p . 98 
::he value of plac :" r.g a 
l~is silence; 
'..'-r,derground organ :" zations ~ l aced 
duracicr. during the agen t reques l ed to rerr.o. i n 
si :!. ent I:: arrest.ed, the u:1dergrou~ld men·,Der was as:<ed t o t -:::y 
ar.d hol d out as long as pcss i b l e, recognizing that the long e r 
'~,e he l d the greatel· the l ikC'lihooci of h i s asscc ,ia:es 
Recruitment 
Security precedures l. np le n ented hy the underground to 
only the recruitmen~ of reliable cand idates, ',.hi.le a:: 
the utmost J. mportance tc any underground organization , ,.,.ill be 
discussed cnly briefi..y in this s ection, but is exanined in 
detai 1 in the cr.arter en undergrou:1d recruitnent. Recruitment 
security measures ::ocused primarily upon two cor.siderations; 
preve ntl.ng the '-nfL. trat ion of collaborators and ensurir,g tile 
recrul.t possesserl tr.e attribut:.es necessary to he an e::fecti ve 
,,-nd ;:Jrudent underground operati v e. Tr.is was l argely 
accomp l is h ed by the re l iance en tr,e persenal recommenda t ions 
"Ru;:,ens : ein , in tervie\~ wi t h t he autho!:". 
0: t .'- _s t wor t hy and 0 :: :.:- -_ 
uncergrc ,:'\d' s who ", 'ey e fac;'l i liar with the po t e r.t l. ,,':" 
: :: 8 '? no Cn0 L: S s e :::: ur i ty i - ,plications, '"equire c extril.=> r C: l:a ry 
c ac:. ti on a :-d stringe :-,:: secur i t y manageo:lent i t: t :1.0 undergrou:-d 
Qr gani 'l ation Wil3 to rema l. n 
5. I ndividua l Agent Secur ity 
Indiv i d '.laJ a gent seCllr.ity e ncompasseci t hose 
taken by uncie rgrou nd SJa:::' t i cipa ll ts tu enS"clre their o .... n sa f ety 
-::- r>.e major. lty of t ho-se a c tions · .... ere cont i ngen t ufx:Jn ti-]e 
l :1dl.v i d".1a l oper,1t or' s understanding and regard [ or the d l ver s ,=, 
and conslant threats that were an inheren t comoone n t of n l S 
u n d e rground world . These (J r e c ,1u t ions g enera l ly :::'e'1L; i r e d 
litt l e encou rage ment, being mo t i va t ed by t he basic l nst i nc : of 
se l f pre s e rvat i on. Individua ':" age nt sec u rl.ty meas ure s 
include d su ::::h act i ons as; the r ,e moriza cion, in complete deta i l 
of al l e lements u: the i r fa:"se papers, :-eve a':" i ng thei r tru e 
l cien t ity and address to no on e 'liit h i r. the uCldergrO U!'ld , 
rellla i :-d ng as inconspicuous as possl.b : .e, c a refu l ly se:"ec l i ng 
one's compan i ons and r C! mal.n i ng cons t an t :.. y alert tc the dangers 
c e as e :ess l y surrc 'clnd ing t he u""derg rounci. 
L'ndergrcund agenc were frequent.:..y provided wi th a 
false idenL i t y, complete wl.th underg:J:O'.Jnd addre sses, flc t iona l 
fanilial members, bil'lhda t es ilDd professions It was ::::rucial 
th a t the age n t posseS S.lng thes e "doc t ore d " documen ::: s be able 
u ~-.;-;=sitat i r.gly reci.te al l the facts cO:ltai.:-.ed wi~:-_i.:-:: ~ ii3 
~Clpers ana be c apable of answe,:-n} any ~' elated que st. ion3 
>.:: accomp i ish th i s casic task coul::i prove riisas:.rous 
if a t a check pO l nt or worse still, if th e agent 
was a::-~-e"ted. Jan Ka::-s.l(i expla ir. s lhe conte n t s a nd 
~ f false i::::e nt if icat on papers, saylng; 
Th e :nor e secur .ity-minded members of the c:.ndersround ;:-ecognized 
the crit i ca l dlfference rapid a nd con fjde nt a:lswers could make 
DeU·Je.:!n di.scove ry and escape . t.j_ R _D. ?oot illustrates this 
po i nt, saying; 
An obvious indiv i dua l seCU::- l ty measure was simply 
as anonymous as poss i ole 
name, add res s, place of work. 
':" Karski, p. 196. 
-'" Foot, Re s is tance, p. 66. 
not revealing 
3.ny other clues tha t could 
c:bS:Jlu'::ely req'J.ired 
Unde~ground pa:::-ti c irants frequently 
rersoll;:ll secu~ity precaut i ons So~e. 11 ke Jan Ka':-ski 
safe:y in constant ly cha:lsing t heir place of 
i3irger trus'::ed in the of t.he sec ;.;r l t y 
warn1ng; 
ether 'J.llde rgroullci agents devised Lheir O\'J!l indiv idual securi : y 
praCllces, ,::ai lo red tc meet the.:.r part:'cular se c urity 
requi-:::ements aile: tnre a ts. 
' :;' Foo t. ~i~, p. 67. 
"'Karsk i, p . 250 
" ' Rassmussen, intervie' ... · with ':: he author . 
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6. Offensive Security Measures 
71,e c.ndergrcu:ld' s of f ens ~ v e sec u r ~:: y 
c:):',s i s:::ed pr~ ":", ar il y of two preempt:.ve ac t~v it ies; in ~':'t rat::" :::. 
:)f t!'.'O:! G2r:na~1 cO:ltrolled i:l frastr uctures and tr.e el ~ mi:1 atiCl,' 
of T:"1e undergrcund' s ::'n :i l lrat~cn o f t~e 
sponsored secur i ty forces and 
o f fic i al ;:ng:::mi za tions coule. prov i de che re s::'sta!1ce "'l:::h 
inva l uable l ntell l g e nce concern :.. ng host i le, 
underground activity. The elinllnat~on of collaborat.ors 
Clcco:-nplis:"1ed the dua l pu rpose of eradicatiLg an extremely 
menac~ng threat to the unde r grou nd's security and d~sco'-lr3g~ng 
otiler would-be collaborators. 
The i n filtration o f the sponso:::e d 
i n : rast ::: uc::ure could b e of inestimab l e service to the 
undergrcund. Underground agents, posing as loyal servants of 
tne F.lppet regimes, f.::-equently had access not only to Ger11an 
mi l itary i nte l lige:lce bu t to the l oco. l efforts to cOr.1l:::at the 
indigenous resis tance f orces. The secu rity o f the res i stCl:1ce 
crganizaticm could be greatly enhanced by an u ndergrc,md agent 
",ho cou l d pro'vide adva:18e wa rni ng o f Gestapo a8tions, J l ert 
the underground to whom was on th'" Germans "wanted l :':o;t" and 
identify clandes:ine German co l l aborators. I l:v i ng h e:::s:ein 
_l l ustrates the va l uab l e .::-ole underground agents , .... i thln 
offic l al organizaLions could play, sLly~ng; 
aC:E: :,. c i ~ s a:1C t he cegT2e to ",' .. ~ c h Lh2 y eXJ:-'~ o i eed t r: is a dv a~: :age 
· ... ·). s :' a rgely contir.gen C: u?on Lh e in s i ght and C li r.:~ H:g o f tr.e 
various ',-mdergrou:--.:::i o p erat i ve s T :-.ose eha: r eccgniz e d :he 
poeene ~a l bene:i'::s of:ered by ehe pene'::.::-a '::i o n 0: :he oc c upy i:'.g 
[o ;::'ce ' s orgarl.lza~i o ns of te n achieved cemarkable re s:ll ,::s 
:,,::erg r o und ' s i n:ll:ra:ioIl o f the Germ:ln spo ns o ced S .l g'lcL 
ocgan i. zatiQrl had or, '-lnd e rgrou nd cpera:ions Hl ?ol and; 
"Wers :ein. F. 60 
cl ' G:lrlln:o;ki . Pc J aoci SOE an) the Al l'-es. p . 1 07. 
~r. 2 se J.irected agair. ,,~ co l :aborators C:;l l aDo-:::-ato"Cs, -,,' ];o:C :-;2 :: 
j:::,, ~ fC~·:"l:,.g their ::ed it ious act" open l y or infil t rati:19 
i:~ t ::l uncS'rgrOli LJC 2rganlzatio"", 'we ,:e cor'.side::",d, 
b e the "ing l e greates t th:rE'cd t to ~he secu::ity 
surviv3l o t t he underground. Recogn i zinq 
hazar-ds ?osed by colla8orators, the underr;rO'';:ld, in add i c:.::'on 
'_0 in l tiating measures designed to li :11 it t h e da[nage 
could be caused by c o : l aborato r s, took a d i r eet apo ro aeh 
adJ.re5s t h is securit y me n ace - - the execution of tra i te r-s 
The eL_minatio:1 of co l Ltbora:::ors served j::: ,:r ma r y 
it r ODted the Gerrr,an "ecurity forces o f invaLua b l e counte c 
insurgency 'weapons and discouraqed othe r from prov .idi:1g 
assistance to the occupa:::ion forc e s - - both o;:>erat.l:lg to sever 
Germans ties wit h t he i ndigenous populat l or . . 
=:very c ountry in occupieci Europe deve l oped tneir 
procedur.cs ar.d clandestine un i ts to manage t he t ~"1reat pOOle d by 
collaborators. The Norwegian r esistiJ.nce fo r.med a · ' Secur:'~_ y 
Greup , " whose task i t was to s e r\'c as .l.n underg r.ound secur i ty 
uni t and to protect the underg:rounc against secu:rity t hre a:s. 
ConS 15ti:1g la:rgely of patriotic :~Jlicemen and torme r po l ic e;;.en 
expelled from the [Jolice ferce because of the ir. nat ionalist.lc 
sentiment s, t hey maintained contacts i:1 the jails, ~r isons and 
concentraCicn camps us:'ng tr.ese contClcts t o i dentify suspect:2d 
c c, ~la:Oorators The Da:-n sh uC';je:-:-gro ur.d org an i zaticn, ,",c:",=,:: 
Jat.3 k , f 8c..; sed muc h 0: :,.'::: 5 e ffor t s 
Jor-sen Ke e ler e s tima::~s 
rh3.t o f t_he 
c;;",::: a tions were di rected a g ains t col l aborators, reS Lllti ~lg ::..r. 
t;-.e e lim::":-3tion of t:;us?ects. -, ':'he t'o~es deve :cpe ::l. ar'. 
,;::;t1:l:e branch of the u,~dergro '..md dev8ted Cllmos t exc l usi ve ::.y to 
addressi:-_s t he collabord t i on~st threat J an prCV Hles 
a ::l.e t ailed descrip t i on of t h e composit i o n and f i; nc t ~or. of tr.e 
Pol~sh Kame Four t h Branc h , expla i ning; 
Cnd ergrou :1d securIty ma:1age me nt: the mos t bas~ c 
determilla:1t i:1 bo,::h t he sur v ival and success of dll y 
cl andestine movement. 'dit bout adeqCldLe sec'.lrity manage me n t, 
'15G jelsv~k , interv i e ' .... with c he a u t hor . 
;" Keeler, i nte rv iew wit h the author . 
;J Karski. D. :<35 
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t~e '-1 :~de:rsround forfei -:: s i ts ~c:nddmenta l mea n s o f 
ar.d it,; eo;scl1tia l advan t age sec:recy 
c:::dergcJund endeavo r . t:rem commllnica:ion s t o t r_e :::>rmulatlO:l 
0: it ,; command st ruc t '--1re cequi red. a b ove al l else, t::J.t 
dictaties ef sec ur i t y be adhered to a b s o lut e l y The pena L :::ie s 
for deficient secur i ty manageme nt could be d evas t a t ing. 
ranging f I'Olr. the agonizing t::>r::::ure a nd execution of a ca r9 1ess 
undergreund opera ~. ive to t;'1e i nf iltr.ation, compromise and 
destructicn of e nt ire u ndergro und units. S i mp ly t;t3tcd, 
secllrity managemen t i s · .. :ha t a l ]o;.;s t he unde rground to e xi_t; l, 
to ccr:tl n u e operating -- providing the only practlca l g c: arcic.n 
again,;t the mrer\.:helmi ng ly super i or forces inevitably op?osing 
u nd e rg r o u nd organizdt lons. 
SECURITY DILEMMAS 
U:1derg r o u nd organizations '",e re f aced with sevf'r.dl secur i ty 
dilemmii ,; and '",ere forced to ach:'e'le a bal a nce be c -",e en two 
conflicting operationa l considerations . The f irst and mos l 
basic security d i l enma al l undergrou:ld organi.:.::ations faced ","as 
what t !le bal a :lce s houl d be bet''''een Jction a nd e xposure vers us 
i nacti on and a bso l ute o;ecuri t. y. Ot!ler dilemmas f ac e d by the 
underground included that: of kno'",ledge versu s vulnero.b L .. i ty 
and rea l i ty versus securit y .. The ab i lity c!' the d ifterent 
underground groups t o fi:ld the correct comiJrotnise bet'",een the 
contending fact o rs was d crucia l determinant in their success 
a ne f ailure .. 
uo 
1. Action and Exposure versus Inact.ion and security 
h 3ving spent. t he ma j ori t y of t_ h i s :: :---.ap t c r descrioinS 
the u :L::'e:n l t ti ng t :,rea t. s to t]-:e survival of t h e u ndergrounc. and 
'-; ':: ::'·:=55 ing ~_!ce aosolut e necessity for l!1e el1pLoyr:ent 
s t r'-- r. :;r~~t SeCUYlty ;~anagement. i s also true that 
e x agge r Cl ted secur i ty precau t icno; may res u lt in t he paralysis 
a t U -:e orgcLlzat 101'.. 1 f a c l a ndest i n e organization 
co:--.c ernec. exclusivel y aDou t ""ai:".ta i n ing abso l u :e se c u r ity 
wi ':: h in t helr moveme:-. t they ""ould not_ eare to :::-lsk t he dar.sers 
of i n fi l tration by :--ecru i ti:-.g ne ''' members, t hey \,'ou l d :--.o t. 
c o:-:-,:-n·cI:" icatio:--. for fear of hostile i nt e rCeptlor. o f the ir secrcl 
com:rt '.1n lques a nd t hey h'ou l d not embark upo:-. a:-. opera t:'.. :;':1 
because action en t ai l s eX:~JOsure ar.d t h e cor respo:~ding 
degradation of s e cu1:" i ty. Ad h e rence t o absolute securi t y 
r e neero; t!1e orgd:1izdtio::t l:".operab l e and prec l udlng the very 
grounds fo:::- i t s exist e nce . Conversely . the ris k s posed as 
c hi" r~o;\l l t of a lack ::>f r e gard for OJecu:::-ity usually are, as 
ciiscusseci 1. 1'. Lh e prece ding pages, equa l ly d e t:-i ment"l to t h e 
undergrou nd's cause. The u nde:::-ground r.1us t cons Lant l y see k to 
find a nd maintai:1 the cie l icate balance betwee::t security and 
ac:tion, r:leti c ulously wei':;lh ing the t hreats agai:1st th e value a t 
each operation The u nderground move rne:l t s Lhat mastere~ th e ,se 
d e ad l y balancing acts '",ere able to op e rate effective ::' y wi t h 
l nev1.table but min i ma l l esses . In t he worcis of one SOE iige:--.t 
who recog:l i z ed t h e i:lhe rent unde r grou nd di l e mma o[ ac t. ion a :ld 
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sx:=: osure vecsus i :1act i v-=--:::y Ole:! absolL:.te 
but over - caut~on H'o;ults ir-: not tl ~r.g don'2 
2. Knowledge versus Vulnerability 
A:10L~2r securit y di le "', ~3. di r ect ly ~ mpacted upon 
:.:v' ab i l l ty of the ur.de r sround to o[J2rate succe ssful l y was the 
c':n f l ict cet ... "een :.:.: n owledge and vulnerab l li ty ~~e agents w~:!1 
t:-!e 1~,OSt k :1owledge a!1d exper ~ence ilre t he O:1e bes t capao ':'e c E 
serv~n9 [ l,e '-1:1de rground. ~hey k new whon to t,'..lst, ,,,,hom 
trus t., u:1derstocd the proper operat i onal rrocedure s a na in tra-
''''Orkl:-1gs of their o rga n l z 0.tions 0. :1d k.ne' ... ' "..·i1o and hO"", 
contact vital eler:1ents ''''ith i:1 the '-1:1de::::-src u nd movement. Ye t , 
precisely because 0: these va luab le a ttributes, they 
~ lmult aneou s l y ,JOse c. the biggesl threa t to the organization if 
capt ure d. Eac h day an age:l t spent i n the underqro u:-1d, evecy 
operat i on he ,,·as a pac: of increased his u t ility :0 t h e 
cla:-1dF'stin e movemen~ .. Concurrently, it b roug ht h un 0:".E' day 
elEd O:-1 e op e rat ion c l oser to disccvery and c"'-pt ure CJ.nd the 
a ssoc ia ted t h~eat o f t~e divulsenc e of al l the .1:1c r i m; ni'l. ti ng 
i r,-O: ot'ma r.i o:1 the seasoned operative had garnered over ;"1is 
career i :-1 the underground. J o h n Oram Thcma s i l lust::::-ates t. n e 
ha 7ards associat.,d witr. the continued operation o f veteran, 
blOwledgeable agents, u3ing t h e case o [ a:", exper ienced fe:nale 
Da:1is h age:ll t o make h i s poi n t; 
"'from ~££, p. 63 
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T;;e ·-1ori0rgrO'.;.::'.0 was fo::-ce d to ba:"ance the ·-.l til i Ly 
kn0"1 :" 2cigeable opera t ive bro ughr. t o t~",e OI"gJIl.lD1C .i0:1 
a ga inst the signiE l. c ant. secu r.!..ty th~'eats they ;:epT 8 se:. ~ed if 
capt'J red As ", it h so many ot h er contentious issl:es :ac ~ ::,.g t he 
underground, the 601ut ioll ~ay HI achievir.g t r.e r i g r. : 
ba l ance between t ' .... o equa ll y consequent i al b u t contending 
factors 
4. Economic Reality versus Securi ty 
Very oEte n :.i sc a l fll:ec~uded the 
.imp lementation of s e c uri ty tJrocedures I::no\om to be ~le cessary 
f or the safety o f individuals and t h e underg ro '~!:d 
organ i zation. Opera t.ing underground, observing e ve n a 
fraction of [ h e .lnnumecable security precautlcns, 
e no rmous e xrens e I deally, memDers of the u ndergrounc. wou l d 
never meet Jt the reside nce cf one 0 : its operJtives, but 
would, i ns tead, arrange rendez\rouseS in locations thal , .... ould 
not rev-ea l "Le i r addresses or risk the cap tuee of 11ul ti>Jle 
underground mer1bers in a reside n ce conceivab::'y under hcstile 
observation . fhis often required t h e procurer1ent of a neut:cal 
"safcl:ouse. " Ma inta l ning a secure r.idden identity frequent l y 
p. '19. 
more tr.ar. one r SSl8.enCe, 
regular l y cha ng i:1g "ddresses Ager.ts 
i d=n'~ i::y \~cJ S sus!=lected of iJei:19 compromiSF'd ' .... eeC : o eced C) 
r""t:-eat in to h iding, f orfe l ting their j CD5 and the a ssociot t e d 
wa ges A";. l :_nese secu:rity con s l c e rations , ''''hi l e ;:-ecogni zed as 
b ei.n g v i tcJl to the safe t y of Lhe unde:rgrou:lG., in\"~lve C: 
signl f ican:: :oersonCll expense Fo;:- t he poore r meMbers 
un d erground, especial l y t hos e wi th :amilies t o SUPPO!- ::: . 
1 nto hid .u--.g cou l c: be a economic disaster. Jorgen Kee le r 
d'~ sc ri be s how the eco nomic realities of u nderground life 
c c;uld in t er:ere \-.;i th the implementa t ioJ"". of even the mose. bas ic 
ur it y precaut ions, say .Lng; 
[ h e underground \-Ias confronted wi.th tne inescrtpaD l e compromise 
of lts security stClnda:::-ds owir.g to :o; i mple econo'ni c :reali ti e '3 
""ere l y recognl z i ng what security ,,-,easures should bF' takF'n ~!as 
of no p r actical utility without t he : i r.ancial means t o 
implemer.t them . 
The unde:rgc)una cc sistance moveme nt :o; of occ u pied :;:u:rope , 
confronted wit;, an unreCll.i t t ing and dive~se arr ay o f threats, 
\>o'ere requ ired to deve l op adaptive and lmagin~ t ive s ecurity 
l<8Keele r , in t erview w::. t h the author. 
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::la nJgener. t oJrocedu :::-es ':'h e un cerg:::-ollnd was protec t e d :-.0:: by 
i:::s ~_a rtlil:' superiority btl t by t h e p:::-eca:::-io'_;s 
by ltS h i dden ident it y . JI. :' l security measures , the:::-efo!'e , had 
t :..., e s a' ~,e u : ::ima te intent to sa fe gua:::-d t_he c :ande st,:, :",e 
c h ilrac te r of the ::nqan i z ati o n . The s uc:;ess flll ll t'.de r g::: o '.;nd 
o,qa;;ization recogni ze d t he l nt e:::-mlnab l e th rea ts t o i t s 
secu!'it y and incortJo :::a t ed s t r i nge n t se c u r i.t y po l ic ie s 
every endeavor. 
s ec u r ity t hre a ts came from T:la ny d i (:::erent sources, 
readil y apparent and others mOJ::e insidlouS T he unde:::-grO'..l:-.d 
·,,'as faced the daunting task of operating 
env j ronT:le nt domi nated by host"-le force s 
e n j oy i ng vlrt ually cOr:-1p l et e :"\'.i li ta ry cor.tro l .cou l ::i 
expansive counter - lnsurg ency t echnique ~he establishmen l o f 
vddesp:::-ea::i check points, st:::ee t p a trols and random ar:::- e sts 
impactec signitlCLlnt l y upon the abi :ity ot the underground to 
cond uc t operations. T h e threato; posed to the security at ~he 
u nde rg ;,:-ound b y col l aborCltQrs, repre s e nted the o;i ngle grea test 
haz a rd Co l l abo-:::-ators, becaus e of the ir intlmate k nov: l f"jge of 
l ocal acllvit les, accents, dress, and c llstnms p :::ov ided '-1 n 
inv a luable servi c e LO the German sec u r:"ty fo ;,:-ces. On ly a 
member of the lnd igenous popula t ion offered the pOSSi~lll .i ty ot 
infil t r-ating into the :::-anks of t he underground. Sec'c!;':- l ty 
th;,:-eatB cou ld a l so emanate from wi,::hl:1 the underg:::-our.d 
lack o f d iscretion , poor l nd ividual j udqelllent and t::e 
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r~~::.ir.',zcilio:1 of c 13 r:cies::i ::", aC':lv :t y 
u:-.derg::8und secur i ty sl.<re:'y as t:-.e Gestapo 
':'~e 'Jnclergro und, becau~e of tr.e ~el'J:;etua:' threats ::0 :'::~ 
st.:.rvival, fc rced to devel o p ar.c a~ply secu ri.t y r:ro:.:eC'..:::-es 
governlng every ac tiv l cy. C8mmLl n icaticr:s, the stn.:c t l.:re 0: 
the o-::-ganiza t i on , the thrcGlt o f ca[?tc:.re, recr ' . .ll t '1le::':, 
indiv i d ual agent secur i ty a:'::' ',,"cre wilh a reg"rd t o 
danyeys inhe::ent in the wor:'d cf the u:1ce r gYound. 
e ffort to i mprove its awareness cf specific threats 
enha:1ce i t s interna::' SeCUYlty, the uncerg-::-ound ir .. :.tiated 
o ~(e nsive secuYity measures, infi l trating the vilal enemy 
agencies . The o '::'ganizati8ns that rap i rl ly ident i f ied the s2cpe 
of. the threa.t, were a.c :'e to exploit t he enemy's ·..,eaknesses 
whi l e maintaining a bala:1ce between c autl-on iii:10 actio..,. WC--::2 
r.ot on::'y the :nost successtul but t he most l ike ly to sl:Yvive. 
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LEADERSH I P & COMMAND A..'ID CONTROL 
I NTRODUCT ION 
a:-_d Dr'-1~al ec:viror.me :".C: al cons:: ralnts i ~posed 
the res i tic:ance mov<>mer_:s of occLpi e d 2 urope by ~ he ::Je r ":')a:c 
seCl.:r i ty :orces r e quir e d the ;.:r'.de rgrOl.:nd to add r e ss :h<> tOplCS 
.~: both ~ ';' ilCiers h ip and command and con t :::- o l i O: 5uer,; i r: u n i que 
and adaptive mLlr.ners. Th i s ~hapter wi ll eX3.rr.i :-.e how· the 
u nderg round m_'1r_age d the d i f ficult ies of ope ra t i ng L:-.dergrou n d 
The :irst 5e e':: l on wll l exp l o r e the e nvironme nt l:-. 
undergro ur: d leade ro;hip fUnctloned, tr.e 1mfJortance of 
l e adership , t he role o f Lhe l e a der, v.:ho were the u,l(jerg r<lund 
l eaders, thei r bas15 for legiti :r.a c y , and their provisions fer 
The second seetio!1 ",' ill examine unde r ground 
corr, rna:1U and contro l concerns, speclf i c ally, the ti e:::u/:1 t_y 
dic t ated ce ll ularizaLioll of underground forces , 1n1tla:ive 
verst;S ce r_tra lized control., Lhe cO:':1mand impl i ca:iOllS 
g8ver r.r.e nt o:- i n -exi l e a nd underground c o rnmunications 
UNDERGROUND LEADERSHIP 
Under"round leadersh i p me thods va r j.ed cons1derably f rom 
orgd!llz3.t i on t o org anizat ions and, on occasion, \'Ji tl1in t he 
same orgarllzat1on over tl'l1e. It i s not the purpose of this 
cha:?ter t o p rovide a ll:1i versa l l y app l icable desc riptio n o f 
c:.n d<>:::-ground leadershi~ a nd a dap tations IL 1S 
1. Background 
:he t:cad~tiona'-- lec.der2hip of 2:urope ~l~!" 
Special Condi tions 
Lhe 
'-:nporta:1ce po:ential impact :he indiqeLou5, -::;re 
_e2Liership CG.l=-d have '-r. ::::::ganizing, l1ana,:oing ar:d _ead'-r.g tr.e 
r",s'.R:-. an"~,,, ~.(l :he'.r .... a:c- mi- itary, F:::l'-t~ca'--, 
edu·::;ational, social and iLd.!str~cd 
capa8ilit'i lead, c:Jrr.r:\arrded ,:;'eqree of respect, 
as o:yr,bols 
Bec<3.use of tl:ese a .. :;tr~bute2, they 'were 
tr_c prinary thre3~. lc :.Le co".sol. ,d,", ccr. of 
o:-ltLcr'-t:y by t:,",e cccc:.py~ng powers. rhey 'de:no! LIle 
qU3li£ied to trdl:;;form tLe gen!"ra" c:iscor_te:1r. 
3ased l argely :lpcn the potential the s e 
~ep:::e 5 e!'. ~. ed to tile o cc'..:pie rs, :~ey bec ame t:1e targ et at 
e x t -::e ::.= scru : ·. y ane. , 
co u nt~y ' s leade~sr, i9 suf:"e:::-e d g.:::eate~ 
::ievas:at.i o:". ne:::-e ly 0ecause of t:-,e r(> s ~ s ta:-.ce t h::-e a t t: ley 
:::epresen ted :;,an di e t:-:e ?oles. Stetan K::orbo nsk i descr:"bes 
the ac: i ::ons taken Lhe occupy~ng arn~e s b 8 : h 80v:"e: a " ,j 
Gerr<1a n ~n an at temp: : 0 [o::-es : a~l the o t Pol h;h 
their cccupati.::m deca pi t ating 
o t '_he e r:t i rc country 
The same po l icy was H:1pl e me:1t.ed ?ol and 's eastern 
territcr i ea upon the Sovie t ::occ upa tion, durl. ng which; 
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losses due to thls 
c ::' ose to 10'J,OOe'" 
In Non"ay, simi l a:: fears of che ~8te:1t':"oil 
tbe lndige'1Ous leade::ship represented to f oreigr:. occ~pat .l o[, 
t ~: e Ge:::mans to identify the l ",ade.::s 0 : No::way's 
society ane: develop conLicJ~ncy pla:lS for t he l r 
tJlagr.e Skodven describes: 
The ioe:ltificdtlon and, ",alane::' s 
eliml nalion, of the l e ading elemen ts o f the lndigenous society 
by U le occupying pO'.oIers' security torces hae:: a profound e f :ect 
o n the abil i ty of the pre~war leadership to assume positior: s 
in t he unoergr.o(;.r.d. Those suspect<"d of. any pat rioti c 
sen timents not eliminated, were o:ten identified DY tr,c Ge r ma:) 
security :orces, and thus easi l y recog:1izahle and genera l ly 
:-{ept u nder close scrut l ny - all qualitles ' ... ' h lC h i r..pinge UpOTl 
effective participa t ion clandestine, underground 
organi za t ions. Oespi te the German preempt i ve ac t iO:1s. the 
the 15, 000 army 
the backbone 0: 
J.'<Skodven, Interview with the author 
BL;t German aClio:-1s 
c.eterre:lt and frequently forced t ~ _'_ resistar.ce to 
':0 ot;"_0r, le ss v~sible, persons to 
,:) : .e c.; nde rground organlzClt l o r.s 
b. Centralized v.s. Non -Centrali z ed 
underground indY ass -":-,e greater f e'wer 
cha acter i st~cs of ceLtralizat~on but tend to l ess 
hier2.rchia l structures w:-_.ich place fe wer oper<3,t~enal dem,:mds 
'.lpon the organization. Cer.tra.lized e:::'':OanizatiOIlS are 
characLerized by a s t rong re l~ance on a. strictly eSl2.Dlis hed 
crCl i n-of - c ommand, few allowances fer CiSC'~lSOl i o:1 a.nd 
cammor_ ccn3ent. Orders are received from superiors in the 
cr.ain - of-co:T1mCi:1d Clnd e xecuted · .... i th:;;ut quest~cn Leadersh ~p in 
a hierarchial system is restricted to imp lemen t .Lng orders ~n 
the di 'rec':ed trom above. Lpss hierarch i al 
orgar:i zations, , .... hether lhrough des i gn or externally impos ed 
cor_straints, al l ow much greater indiv idua :' l atitude and 
reg:onal a '~lenomy Leadership in the non - r.iera .::-::::hial system 
is a democr3tlc process, requiring t h e consent <:iloci of .Lt s 
p3rticlpants before any 3ction may be as!o;umed . 
Tl-.e externa l cons trai r.ts imposed by the German 
secu t"i ty forces greatly inhib ited t.r.e potential t::Jrmulation o f 
a hie:::'archial sy!o;tem by the undergr:ound orga n iza tions i:1 
occupied Europe. The primary requ~rement of a cen t ralized 
be constanr.l y rro:li ~o!"ed il.:ld 
::-, i s SlTC,;<!_y ,,,'iLS :-lot- ava.ilable tc reSi3lance gro\:ps cper3.'::: ng 
c:'d C\j~s:'...:";e l y ~;~a i n'3t the efficH: r. t a nd v:C':ll :' an::: 
Sccur-'...:::y tor-ces The unavoida tl le reo:u l t ' ''a~ the estab:'i~hmeClt 
of underground u n i ts w:ct h signl[icant r egional l nde :)2nclence , 
tes t c',;ing a _ i beral degree o f opera tional free dom uFon :he 
local l e ader-sh l p. 
T:-te '~nder9rOl:nd move me nts of occ upied Europe 
implemen t ed varying degrees of :::ent ralizat ion into thei r 
comma::d st- r'.lc t '~n> whi ch impacted sig:1ificdnt l y u; c n the 
respcnsi8ilities a::n ro l es of ol ande st l ne :'eadershiF . 3l:l, 
t he tradi t icnal Dilitary d:cctates o f centy.all z at-ion were 
fcrced to be aband oned i n the repressiVe and ene my control :' ed 
underground environment. T:'1e dist rl butlon o f author i ty and 
decisicn-making to t-he periphera l units imposed increased 
resp : msibilities and duties UpO:l t he local leaders. 
2 • Role o f the Leader 
The inhere nt ly precar i ous wor l d ol the under"ground, 
wi t !! l tS potentially hOr"rifi:; repercussions. its d ef:'cifCnt 
communicat l on systems, i ts i ndistinct c:)l7lmand and concr"ol 
structure and canst-ant nece:-; sity to :;omoa':: the interminab l e 
threats to its security. required a leader who cOl:ld m"nage 
these adversi t les and still conc.uct offensive opera~_ ions. 
Thi s section wil l discuss the imt:Jortance of l eadershit:J '~r.de~-
these and ~_he ro le t ~lat the l ead".::- ?'-ayed 1:1 r.h e 
of I!ncergrol lnd operati ons 
Importance of the Leader 
unde rground leadership ope.::-ated 
rc umst:ances sig n i fi cant l y di ff eren t fro m ",jove - grOllnd 
organ l zat l ~:ms The lea.de:cs, es?ecia.lly aL the extremit i es 
\lndf"rgro und o:cganlzat_ion, lac~ed Lhe ?rf"reqlllslte 
co~ - "uca '~ ,ona wlth h is chain-of -command, if he even possessed 
a chai:1 - cf-comma nd , to receive detalled orders. clarity 
instructions and prov i de operat i ona l gu i da nc e The l eadershi.? 
of pach e lement, hO',..reve.::- smal l , ',~as torced to make policy, 
tilctica l operal: io n a l declslons, 
responsibillr.ie s norma l l y .::-ese,::-vf"d f ox- senio::: leadersh.l? 
elements of an organization . David Howa rth describes 
i mportdnce and scope at underground l eadersh i p; 
The underground leade r- ship, be c ause of the 
eXl raor-di n ary respons i bi li ties and the expdnslve scope of the 
dut i es assoc i ated wlth ii l icit organl z ations, ',/as t he crucial 
cOl1lponen'~ i n determining t he s uc c ess of :'is unit. Th,::, 
indi v i d u al unit l ""ader:- I'/as norr.-.al l y suppl i ed only with broad 
" ' Howarth, '.-.I e Dj e Alan"" , p. 10. 
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strateg '--~ oc= =clives by 
c:;lmmand and t )-;~n l 2: t plan a:1c. condu:::t spec~f:..c ac ;; i .:: : -. ~ 
accord~n':l to r.i s own Jl:.c.gernent. ='Ie had Lo ma ke 
dete r r:HI: at C:1 w:'1ethf"r n"g ~ ona l operat ~ ons, 
Sl:.pport of the ovcra. l l strate g .l c plan, merited the local 
r e percussicns sure to f olluw. E~s decisions had ~:..f(> 
death i r,?lica~_ ions not on -_y r:Jr t he l ~embers o f hH; unit 
for me mbers of hi~ comml:.n~ty t hat ',":ould ~:--,evitaDly s u ffe.:::" t l:e 
\';rath of Ge r man r e tal i at ions. 
b . Dut ie s o f the Unde rgro und Le a der 
The dut i es of an undergTO"cmd leader we ::e 
5 i gn ,l.ficLintly d i f f e::ent, p:o:::ed'-.:.ra l ly, from the func t.l ons o f 
l eadershiEJ in conventional circumstances . The underg'::"o\:nd 
l e ader, ' .... hile ultimate ly respons i b l e :or specif~c miS3icn 
s e l ection, plann i ng , intel l ige nc e gather i ng a nd conduct of th e 
action, re ~led on a distinct and ur. i que leadership s~_ y l e to 
accomp l l sh his tasks . The l eadf:'J:: :::-arely dictated commands to 
his subordinates , but instead acted as a:1 the pr i rr,ar-y 
crCjan i zer and chief m~,dia~_ or Ee prov ided tn2 i. n spiratior., 
rat i onal e and r;)otivation to h is follcwers which faci l itated 
and encoura ged underground ac c iv lt y :-1e was the l ead~ng 
democrat in a sys::em ' .... hos e basis o f author ity was leadersh i p 
by popu la:::- a;J~:::-ova l . 
Tcre Gj elsvik, d participant in tr,e Norweg i a:1 
undcrg:::-cund foy t he ciuration o f t::'e waJ::, who eve ntually rose 
a position 0: se nior leadershl.p, descriD0s r.be ~"""de~C"C""' 
leadersrllp as based upon common COllser.t cather than a s t r :>~~ 
~,:et-archial systf><:l. " E'lerytning was cequested, d iscussed a :: J 
everyone ,")l:.; :_::. eerGd fo t" eve-,;-y indiv i dua l :n :' ssion Jorger. 
Kee l er, a me<:lber of the Danish undergr8und and cesis t Clr1c e 
l eilder, re ite raL e s Gjelsvik' s st"terne:1 L. say i ng, " 'The leacer 
could not issue orders the idea of an order did not 
He organl.zed ope:::-a t i ons and asked for vo l u nteers. ' Dick 
Rubens tein, a me~ber of ~_he cTedbuTg:-. Teams';; in OCcu p l ec 
Fra.nce w'!1ic h operated close l y wit_n the local uncergrounds 
5ayS; "i.eacershi p was rarel y c:ictated in stricr.. 
convct"sat lona l terr:-,s but Wd5 general l y a democrat i c process 
d:s:;ussion was a l lowed. The obligat ions and d'.lLleS 
aSSOciated with cO<:lr>and i n the underground requl.red 
l"Gj elsvik, I nterviw", with the author. 
" Keeler. Interv l ew with the author . 
''"RubensLein, :e nt_ervie',,- ... ·ith t he aut'!1or. 
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~" 3.ders n8t only to fact> respo:1s i oi: i t:!.2s a nd consequences Idr 
exceec:.~ng :eadership pcs~::.ions i:l standar"d organ i zations bu t 
poc t' ly defi:1ed Se:1Se of aut ho r ~ ty 
cohorts to act lon, organize unde rg round operalions \~i.thin the 
seve re conf~nt>s impused by the Germo.n security fo r ces ,1 nd to 
.~"diat.:! dif ference s Detween h is subordi n ates. Unier such 
ci rcu'"'\stances, it is eas y to lmderstand Doth tile ilT.portanc2 of 
selecting a cmitaDle leader and t he cha l lenges a nd dC !T.a nds 
inevitably associilted "'nth underground l eadersh ip . 
Who Were the Underground Leaders? 
To adequately o.ddress the question of · .... ho we re the 
underground leaders, a di stinction must be made bet '",een the 
l ocal u nit commanders and the senior, niltio n c:. l l eadership 
Leildership ilt the more senior l e ve l s of the undergro und cha i n-
of-command wer e much more likely to consist of the rre -'",a r 
elites than · .... as the case al the local leve l s . Te.e l ocal, un i t 
c omma:lde!:"5 ',,-'ere much more d iverse, consisting of elenlents from 
all wa l ks of: li fe , seeming l y unbiased by profession or class. 
Senior Leadership 
As previously disc u ssed, the p!:"e-war l eadershir 
f reque:1tly constrilined by tile pr eempt i ve efforts of t he 
Cermiln secl.:.r i ty forces from ilssuming lead ing pos i tions , .... lt h in 
the unc.ergroulld. De spite Germa n eEfo::ts, many 
leildershi~ posi t ions were filled by lead ing rr,embers of the 
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Xa:;i o n a.~ \~o rker s ' ?a r t y . - T 1"'.e n ucleus of t he Fol::' s(' 
Arrr.y 's Genera. l Staff compose d 0: lS Po l ish Anr.y 
of :icers The seniur leadership of the underground ':" ;0 
Z\ 8r101ay also cOcl s isted l arg ely of pre ' .... ar leaders, CiS Clav 
Rlste and Be r i t Nok l eby con f irm; 
T he pre-',v;:n leacf' r sh i p, jusr. as WCi3 f eared by the 
German f o rces , was l h e exclusive o;lement. poss e ssi!1g 
the repl:-tation, p .:.-oven competence and credibi l it y 
the s e n i or If'adership pos i tions of the underground This was 
""Korbo:1skl , p . 39. 
'''Korbon ski , p. 1 6. 
Olav Cl :, d N"oK l eby , p. 38. 
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pa: : icul:n: l y evic.ent in t\-.,e fo:::mative s t ag e s 
before :lew leader's establis[ ::.g 
cr'o"j e nt i a l s as th e resu l t of underground perf8rmance c ouLl 
":,:;'e posed by the assumptio n of leaders h ip roles 
by t :1 e !,Jre ',,'ar el i te ',~as c;imply eITI unavoi dable razard . 
b. Local Leadership 
Local. leade::ship incorporated il nore dlverse 
sect i on of the indl genous pop'.l l at i on. Leace::,;h l p at t:'le 
_oeal leve l did not req\., i r e t l~R crede ntials or :::eput at~on 
!"lo tlTlally nec e ssary for L '.e cent::: .. l leaders~ i p po:sitiolls. 
Perhaps, because 0: the per~ona l olJserva t ~ons and f am~ li a:: i ty 
betv./ee n local follolo.·e:::s and leaders, suitability was mu ch more 
cont i ngent u90" prove n comgetence [_han pre - '<nr ccualifica t ions 
1\s Jorgen Keeler describes, before the war u:lde~'grou!ld leaders 
',.,rere not n e c e ssarily t hose ~" pos ~ tions of authority in t he 
c:nde rground but gained tre i r pos i tions based upon respe ct, 
con f. i dence, performance, strength of personality, kno''''ledge of 
operating p~ocedures and ~xpe~~ ence, ", J oh :1 Or am ':'homas 
r-elates the over r idir,g i mportance o[ the conf.idence a ~eader 
cO'.Jld l:1sp~re and t he insignificance of his soc i a l 
credentii'll~, demonstrating that the nornal foundations of 
l eadership s'.Jch as seniori'_y, e d ucation and s8cia:_ class gave 
way l ess tang i ble f actors . 
"'Zeele;:-, I!lterv~ew 'I'I i th the author 
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y::e - ~lar c.::-ganizations trade c;.oions, sports 
sC8..;~i ll g organ i z<:!t:'o:lS and polit i ca'-- part ies, ',,:e :-:e :reqCle nL '-- y 
a '-- ienatcd by the rep::essive anci Tanip u L'L ive act::'onOi of : h e 
occupatio:"": goveln[(",ent, i:npi nged upon chei.::- t :-:ad ,iL ional 
: reedo:ns" In the se cases, the p::e-es:aDl i ~ h leade:-:sh :" p 
often re ma ine d unchanged, 'with g ~'oupS ' 
'--eade rship transitiufling : '::-0[(", .'--eg al c:o i '-- '--ega '--, c;.nderground 
leadersh i p roles " Rathe:: tha n selec :: ing a new a:1d unp :- o v~r: 
leader , these alie::ated g:-OL:PS could :::eqc:entl"! rely c r. 
e SLab .'--i shec. leac.ers, a v oiding a dis.::-up t ive and laLo.::-i c us 
restrc:c:c::-:ing of the organ :c zdtic ll Oi hie:-:archy 
4" Basis for Legitima.cy 
r>!ax ',oJobe :- prese:1::s ::h-::-ee Ddses fer the legitimat .l- on 0: 
ac;.;:hor i ~y: 
" 'Thomas, The ,ian;: Killer s , p 198 
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c,:e u~de::::-ground mcve:ne!1ts' l e gi t l macy '.;Ias deri v e j 
largely £::::-o:n Weber" s first and th:crci bases :or t:-. e 
l egitima t1. o~' of authori~.y Again, a distir.ctio:) exists 
net',.,'een loca l leade rs::lip dnd t~e senior, national leadership 
The legitHnacy 0:' the senior l eadersh :c p was g ener'a:'ly based, 
par t i c u l ar. l y l :-, the :. noipi.ent stages of the under"rounci's 
formation, upon 'tJeber's "rational grounds, " whi le the 100a1 
l eaders~'lip was much more ::-eliant on "charis:natic g rounds, " 
Wcb e ~: s rationa l grounds of l e git imacy res ts " on a 
celi.ef in t he' l cgal :c ty' of n o::::-mative ::::-ules and t:'1e rigl~t. of 
those e l evated to authority under such rules to 
co:n:na:1ds , " NeiLher t he direc t Gecman acim i n i slration of t h e 
occupied nor thei r fo::::-c ibly i ns t alled p\;ppe t 
gove-::-nme:1ts viewed as t.he legal and therefore, 
l egitimate , aUlhocities by t he vast majority o f t:'lG i ndigeno J s 
popula t ior.s, The ousted pre - war leade::::-ship, in::: l'Jdi n9 not 
only the governments - in-exile a n d exi l ed royalty, but otr.8::::-
'''Max 
!Glencoe , 
me ·~ber s o f t he indigenou s el ite reLJ . ~e d leSit i '[1acye a -:'-:'.e::: 
a ccc r d :'.. r.g to t ::::; na t lol1 a~ ly representCl:: i. 'le, "- ga : st anc.ard s ::: 
the pre -·war, occupied country t·la ny cot lh"' se l e aders, 
pJ:e vlo,-~ s ly c.iscussed, became ~eade rshi [) of t.:-:e 
Des p it e the i nd iger:ous ~ eader's i;1 clusior_ in C!1E 
i.l n derg r O'-'nc., ·,,'!-Hc h was, 8y deti ni t io n of t::ose i l~ p o s i ti ::ns c : 
ac:.t h:::l riLy, an i:_ega1 organization , t!'ley r eta i ned Clnd usua ll y 
e nh o. nced rhe le g itimacy wh i c h t h ey had earned be :ore the 
inv as i on o f Lhe i ::- country. 
Leadership a t the local l ev", -_ ',,'as more cO 'lt :'..nger.t 
u pon Weber ' ::; " c hci risma ~ ic gro u nds." resting t o a gre at degree 
on the " ",xemplary charact_er of a n indiv idual perso:-." rather 
::hall on pre-war leac.ershi[) qual it ies. =-ead ership i,t the loca: 
level PYOC CSS 'n a tuJ:a l s e lect .lOll , " t'-les e 
de mo n strating the mos t p r of i Cle n cy and apt it ude assumed Ule 
l eadin.g p05i tlonS. To re Gje l c;vik co nveys :: h e mo t iVCi:ion 0: 
me mbers of the underground to fc 1 10w theiy lead er as b ased 
u,-:on a [)ersonal attra :: t i on . "On e had to have confiden.c e i n 
their leader before t hey wo u l d follo \>" h im . . " " D1C k Rube;)stei n 
::-eit erates the im[)ort .• n c e of the "exemplary cha::-actey" o f the 
10c,, 1 leacier, say i ng membe r s of t he underground fo l lol'.ed thei r 
L'"Gje lsv i k , Interv i ew · .... ith Lhe author 
of his for:.:e 0: ;8ersanal i : ilcil.l-~Y:o 
con f.l cence. ,, -
Nei: :he local :-.or senl.or leadership 
:::onfined to I~ he categorizatioI1 :is t ed above 
at :.ile ::' <::-:::31 level, trie pre - war leading elements of sociel~y 
appe<:lred some' .... hat more l ikely t o assume POS.l-tlO:1S 
leadership Perh3ps :. he ir pre -we":::· qualifl.ca: i or,s added to 
t hei r ::::har l s:~a and incre ased thpir f ol l o,;,·er ' s fait h i. n t;"eir 
leadershlp ani l ity ;..t Lhe s p r.ior l e vels o[ leddersh1.p, in 
addir. i on to pre - ·",ar l eadership credenti<:lls, tho" e 
ex!'.':'h i t i ng "exemp l ary character" ',,:ere far like~y to 
assUine leadership !=,osiLions. j\;ncng di:::ferent ClTgan l zat.lOns, 
the degree of j mportance Clttac~'l.ed to "charismatic" and 
"rat l onal" legit imacy varied bet\o;een t he senior and loc<:ll 
leade r ship . 
5. Provisions f o r Succession 
Prov l s i ons for the succession o[ leade rship in the 
o[ the leaders death or ca!='ture, cuu l d mean Lhe 
difference between the surv .l- val and co l lapse at ar: t.;.ndergrcund 
organization . Kenn .. th Ma6:se y describes t he results o[ the 
l ack of established pr~visio:1s [or succession in l oca. l Sovipt 
res~st<:lnCe units , s t a t ing, "When Dosses ''''ere k i ll ed ·",hole 
:"Rubenst e in , Intervie · ..... with aut hor. 
142 
b a:-.c. s ii s i :1te,,!"ated The 
S -,-::C:,?5s : on sce~s t o hJve bee:1 addre5sed, 
r-;;; 8 ::: ,l:;8.erg ::-cu~d t..:n i ts T;-,e mo re hi e rarchial the o!"c<l:1 i za.t i 0 ; . 
l eade rs;1i r: succession 1:1 org<:>nizatio:--, s 
~ased l ess h l. e:::o.rchial strictures and mere 
0:= ~ "e indiv i dua.l lea.der, preparat ic::--.s 
le " rJers;;i ., succession were general l y le ss re::.nec.. 
In unde r sre:';'.d moveme n ts such as the Polish Army, 
'.-'Ilich was a more h l erarchl.a l Ol':"san l z at'.e:1, " r ev is ions fo::: 
successic:1 were confren t ed .1:. an orga:-.i7.ec. and disc ip l i ne d 
As Czeslaw Stank i ewicz, a re li sh undergrou: i le a d e::' 
\~hl.le the p rovis i ons for leadeyship succe ssion inherer.t i n the 
mere central i zed orgarnza.t i ons a5sured a. less destabi liz ing 
t ra:1s fe r of command , it was count er - balancec. by t .he n e g",tive 
qc:a li. :ie" aS50cialed '.dt~ such systems. :' he more cent ::- alized 
organizClt.ions orter. l ack e d t he op e ra tional freedom aVdilabl<" 
;;'11acksey , p. 77. 
:b Stankiewi cz, Ir.cerview wit h the aut hor . 
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exce:::-t l. se arld :oe rsona ~ ;l i c: ia t :-ve 
in op",rational paral YS l.S if t', e o r ga:1:' z atl.crl was 
to a' .... ai':: directl.on, the c~ :or i. ciou s a nd 
;;,urde:130me underground ccm:nunicatiorl rle t work, f rom t r.e l. :!:-
superior s i n tr.e chaH'. - of- co:nmand. 
t h,:> e xp licit p:::-ovisions for successions inherent in t he more 
hl.et"~rchi. a::' org a n i zat i on:;:. Lle succession cf ~ eadership ....,·as 
;;,ased upon :ncre abstract prirlcip::'es. Dick Rubenste i n 
des c ribes seme of the :ncthods emp:"eyed by 'clnderg r oCl nd 
:Jrganizatio:1s to address the t opic of succession; "--::'he leacer 
usua l l y :"e t i t he knu .... n whc his chol.ce of succes sor ....,· a s in the 
case cf his death. Discussio:1 was held beforeharld The 
c hoic e frequent l y apparent ;;,ased u [)on [)rl. cr 
perfermance . Des[)ite t he apparen t l ac k: o f pre-orda i n e d 
succession procedures in the ::'ess c entrdll.zeu organizations. 
there appears t o have ;;,ee n fc·.... incidents ''''here greups 
co l ~apsed as the result cf the removal of thei r :'eadcr T he 
l eader's stated choice fer success ion, the iilssu:nption Dy an 
individuiill of d second - i n - com:nand :::-o :'e. priey discussion and 
genera l apt it ude for leadership appears ;: 0 have serv8 d muc h 0: 
' ~)RuDenstein. In t e ::-v i ew with ::he au thor. 
UNDERGROUND COMMAND AND CONTROL 
o f CliH1Ge S Line organizations' 
00:1tro1 structures 1S la rge l y respcns i ble for d e l 1neat ~3 t_he 
fo ·.;ndations of the underg round's interna l se cut" lty [Jotcmt ia l 
a ;-:d operat i onal effio:'e:1c y '."h i le under3t"ou nd s ec u r 1ty is r.::o : 
exc l usively CO:ltinsent its a:1G cont rol 
ocmpcsit i on, t he structure o f t. he o rgan i zal i on is the s ingle 
si.gni =: ::.cant and enc:npassing deter'll i nant of t h e 
ge ::era l security. Command and contro l po l ic ies ef:" e ;.;t ;cot:. 
just:. the security of i ts i r.d1 ·v idua l agen t. s but the safety of 
enr_ire uni ts and t h e as a who le. I n addit ion to i lo 
profound s ecurir_y i mplications, the method in ",.r. ic h t:"1e 
moveme nt i s sr_ruc t ured is decisive in defin .!. ng t he 0.1:::::.1 i t '1' of 
t he org"ni zation to operate in the inherently host.!.le and 
p' ri lou$ underground world. ':'("; e capa c lt y of c l ande s ti ne units 
t o address the di f f i c u lt ie s Clssocjated wit h undcr:gro und 
c ommunioat i ons. t he unremit t ing need for secrecy and nebulous 
cha.!.n o:-commands a l l innate characterl.stic o f the 
llndergrcun d envi .::onmen t i; re the primv.ry delerminant ot 
o;::;eraliona l ef fi ciency. 
Underground corr. mand and contro l f urn i shes t h e operat .!.orcal 
blue~]rin t for the s tr uc tu re of t he o r g Cl n .!.zCl t:. on. It provides 
fe r t il e cellularizaticm o f its sepa rate components, balances 
tr_e needs of local initia t :..ve vers~s centralized 
2cmst ructs a chain - of-cc :nmand a:1d stri'/~s t o 
deq:::-e<:> cf cor.solieation of effort of the differer t un:l.erc;:::-cu:1d 
T~is section wil l examine the undergro und 
addressed these consideratiuns , cons t~ n t: l y ada;.JC~ ng and 
:ceconfigur- i ng the devo> l opment of its comr:land and cont.::-o l 
confront the changing t hrec.ts of tr.e 
world r t will also exam i ne t:le fundalfenta l pre r equis i te, 
u pon v·:hjch the c o mm.:J.nd and control of all orga:lizat i c:1s 
above-ground and u nde-::gro und .:J.like are dependa!1t 
commun i c at ion s 
1 . Ce l l ulari z a t ion 
Fa2ed with the innumerable threats fr.om both 
indig e:1o us col l .:J.bo:::-ato:::-s ane the cven.;helming l y powerfc:. l 
o ccupation forces, the u nderground was compelled to dev e lop a 
unique and adap t ive comma n d and control structure. 
command and cont!'o l secu:::- l ty meaS'jre employed by Lhe 
underground to prov i de f er the secur i ty of the organ12:ation 
CO:Tl[:Jilrt me nta l ize its var io\ls components, pre vE::1t i ng the 
com9romise of one element to cnd.:J.ngcr others ':"he princi,-, le 
of ce llulariz atio n applied no t only ',,'ith i :1 i ndi'.'idual 
circuits'" and fro:n one circuit the nexr. but also both up 
unit s with i n the 
3 -; merr..oe!'s 
and "squad , " 
ur:.ie~g::-C""; :1d :'e adersh ':'~ 
was des::.g:'".e.d to Ii ".':; ~::.s operatives ar.d elf"meL t3 aL ii. singl e 
p oi:1t, m J..~':' r- ':'Zl. r,g :::he posed by t he arr e s t , ::: oreure a:d 
a;.;e.:::: . an ii.']ent doesn ' L kEo ..... r. e "L. te ll. 
pc .en cla·.it y o f t:le expos u re of large n unbers 0 ::: w1-:!.c:!:'g rou :!d 
~embers, it ofte n served as an opera ti onal ~ mped.i.meEt; L :-Je 
secrecy surround i ng the iden t ~:::y of under g r ound par t icl p ant s 
hinde n,c. the c i me:'y c isse nunat l on of lnformat~on a:1c I'iarn~ngs, 
resu l c'.. 'lg in missed opportunities d:1d pot.entia l :'y avoidab l e 
IE the s~ng l e li n :< be::: ..... ee n dif. : ercn"L. :' e ve ls of e:,e 
cnJin-of. - comma nd was severec., attempting to re - escJb! i shing 
the li nK ::;ould De boch danger'ous and trouble30me. 
I n t he idea l cellularized sys t em indiv iduCl ls , e ven 
..... i ~ :'i n ~.he same cit-cuie , , ... ·ou :..d know as l it. t':'e identifyin g 
inf.ormation abuu t their c:ompar:: r ~ot" as was poss i b 2. e T he wary 
o pe ra tive , .... ould use only r. is c2.andest i ne code '1a me , 
di vulge the address of his re sidence , the n ame 0 : frie nds, 
?::'ace of e mp':' oymenr:: or any ot h er c l ues to h is true ident i ty . 
John Oram Thomas descr i bes t t:e imp::.emencatiun of :hese 
1.47 
s::ar.dards by ehe Dar. i sh res i sta~c2 org an l za:::iof'., 
The ten<"ts of ce1 1ularization beca m<" ",ore crucla :' 
applied tc l i nks beyond t he i ndividua l circ ll i t T,,' ithi :- the 
ac!here the precepts cf 
conpartment alizat ion, wc u ld, result the 
identification and captuce 0: all mer:1bers of the sect l en 
while tragic, t h e elJ.r:1inat .i o:1 of <I single circu it need net 
ha ve debil i ta[ing re perC1EJ5ions to [ h e underground r'ovel:',ent 
Converse l y, fai L :re obse rve t he p ri n c iple;; 0: 
ce l 1u l <1rizatio~ ln reg<lcd to l inks up the chain - o f -corr,mand 
ccu ld have devastatlng consec,:uences . The a r rest of a sing le 
ir. jivi dual, even ae the lc .... 'es t l eve ls o[ the organi zaticn's 
h :;,.~ r archy, could provide a [rail t hat could dism<lntl e the 
e nt i. r e orga n ization. Jan :<ars'd . ca ll. s th 's the princ i p l e of 
"no contact l.:p' .... <lrds" <lnd e xpla i ns it <l.S; 
'O"':'homas, p. 17 4 
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Coordination v ersus Securi ty 
':'he undilu ted ': ene ts 0: cellu l a::~ z aL~cn, ';,'it !": t:-:e 
se c u:::-i Ly o f the movement as ~ts pr ll'nary motivator, arg<.: e 
aga i nst any form of cO:ltact bet -,,-een different undet-g'::O Cl~d 
o r ganizations. The e stabli.shmen t of L Lnks b e t_ ',,'ee n sepilra~e, 
orgClnizations rna.{ e botr· susceptib:' e to t he c::Jmpromise 0: 
eiLhe:::- Yet, coord~nat .l cn and ccmmun i cation bet-,,-ee n diffe,e:- ~ 
unde :::-ground o.:r:gani z at~on '3, co:nbating a corTlmon e"e;ny, cculd 
e nhance th e o v er-a l l efficiency of all partic'--po.nts . 
In te 11 i gence concerning ide n tity 0: collahorators and 
coun t er lnsurgency techniques could be shared, 
optimj zat~on of sacoLage activi t ies could t e arranged and t he 
uni nten l iona l endange rment as the r C! su l t of independen~_ 
actiuns avoide d. 
~los t ana l y", t s of unde ::ground movemer'.ts recog:-'.~ze 
t r.e c:::- itical se l-uri ty benefits derived from the Olbso l ut e 
seg~egation of the dif fer~nt cla:-ldestine organizaticol'.s 
lame:--,t. the general lack cof u.ndergrOLlnd cor.es~on and 
Jorgen ic:acstrup pondcrs t:.:--.e advant:.ages 0: 
gL8o.t e r :.l::1de'!::groll nd coord~nat i c,. a nd int:.egrat:.o,., "ay~ng; 
Lack of cuordinac.ior. between different undRrgrour.d 
.invar ~ ab l y :::csulted dupl icat ~ on of effort, imperfect 
L. til l zation of assets and the endangerrr.en t of valL.able iil:1d 
wel l rehearsed operatlons and t:le ir personnel by wel l - mean~r.g 
but large l y insign:'ficant:. <lctions em t:.:--,e parl of other 
elemen t s. Jozef Garlinski provides an il l ustration of t!12 
hazards of ~.he lack of ":.ateral communications on underg:::-O' .. !nd 
c::Jerations in Poland. 1:1 an attempt to infiltrat~ d 
member- into Fawi ak p:::-iso!'.! to r-eestabU s~ the 
communic21tion link to the ou tside, Garlinski, arriilnged to hav~ 
r.i8 agent, 0.:1 engineer, arres t ed and taker. [ 0 Pawiak. 
well conceived scheme, howe ver, was ruined by the :o; i mu l taneous 
"'HaestrL.p, "Expose," pp 160 - l6 1. 
l SC 
ar.d CQv ious':"y :.J. !'.r:oorr:i:'nated act:'on5 of a 5;;p"' ;::ate ..i~dc ;::g :::c; ·..;r.d 
He describes th·." ever:t. s'"y:'ng; 
\I'h i l e i>lcreasej integ -::-at;::m a:lc coord i na tion bet ',,' een overt 
or~ani lations seeking to acco:np l ish ili~n tic a l ob j ect i ves !-s 
:.J.nquest~onably advantageous in t :--:c above - grU1J:1C ·~or ld. t b.e 
secur.ity threats :nhere nt to the undergrounc negate 
benefits associated .... ·it r. ~nc::eased clandestinf> coopera t :'on 
r ecogniz lng t he dest r uct i ve :r;oten t ial o f inter -
underground coord.Lnation. says. 
Interr.al security '"dS the unequivoca l prerequisi t e for 
underground survival. Conve rsei.y. undetground coord~nat ion, 
wr.ile f ac ~l itating the e ff icierlcy of c 'l andestine operat~ons, 
action was o n e o f the res':'stcmce coups o f 
in v..'a rsa'll, on 26 """reh 194, Twenty -
Get f r ee . 
:·;Gari.Hlski, Tr . .., Sllrvival of Love : Memojrs O F a R~sist; .. 2J~ 
Cf f lce~, ~. 52 . 
l~' i'oot, ~i."t . anr.f', p. 99 . 
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~udi~lectary corrl]:: o ~.ent c f surviva l , 
::;ct2:ltials cost" fa!" 
b. Secrecy versus Efficiency 
Sec:::-~c.y and efh.ciency, D8th at_tributes h ig:·.::' y 
desirable in any o~ga:1lzatic n, had an adversarla l relatio~. sh i p 
underground J _ BO<:lyer 3.:-11 capr.cn:-cs the esse:lce of 
:he secrecy, the greater t he ineE:icJ..ency of the orga:1izatlc~L 
cr operaLicn; arsolute assur e s absolute chaos. The 
obvious benef it s to :he efficiency cf t he underground accr ued 
by keeplng its ccpstitue:lcy i:lfcrmed about the goals, mcthocs 
and identities of fe llow· :::la:1c.est i ne ?OI~ ~. iclpar_t s had to be 
scrupulcusly ',,'eighec. against the l:1CreaSec. eX90sure and 
detrimer.ta l impact on interncil security. 
':';'1e benefits of compartmentalization, d:-scretion 
a nd the adherence t o st :c ,- ngent security considerar,ions has 
been discl.:ssed in d,~tail i n prev io".ls chapters and wil l no: be 
reiterated he!"e. "O·Wever, the maintenance 0: :hese high 
1evc:' s of secrecy necessary to the sU1:"'1ival of ::he 
organizaticn" extracted a sign:'-ficant cost. Secrecy 
in:initely compol.:nded the effort rleCe3sary to ccmplete even 
the simolest t as ks . t>leet i ngs had to held in neutral, sec\.:re 
locat:-ons, llSlrlg the sa[';l.e site as in:req'-18ntly as possible 
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Gdr :"i nski descr .' ::es cr_e efforts taken to arrange c:r;de.::-gr=: .... r . .:;i 
:-r-etLlgs; 
Si nce true i::le::tities addresses were closel y 
secrets, i t · .... as diffi c ul t a:1yone w>_e n c r.e ne e d 
~ncergroU:1d ob J ect~ves and ? lil ns · .... ere cisse:-:-.:'r:aLed 
grudging l y, reveal~ng as little as pcssibl e to as f ew 
Foss~ble. r' ;:.turally tino; res c;l:::ec ir: a '.lrC'ilt deal of 
a mb i ql< : ty. m isun::lersta nd~n:;s a:-:d :"ocal Lactical acc':"c .. ,s 
conflic ting \,,~t r. na:::iona1 stra:::egic objectives 
J ozef Garli!1ski ciescr ~ bes the l im~tations secrecy 
im;:;osed u ):::on t!-_e effic~ellcy of Pol~sh underground operations 
say~ng; 
Gilt"linsici i ll usL ra t e s th i s po;nt by relating a case v:her E' a 
Gestapo age:1t. code name Colonel Baczewsk i or "vnc l e", posed 
as <l co:"onel sent c y the A:" liF' c governmen t in London. Tr_e 
~"Gar:" in sk i . ~S~a- o f Love: ~r~QL3 ,,-esis t acce 
Qti~, D. 24 . 
The S1lrvivc. l of Love: The Memoirs of a Res i o;tance 
p. 32. 
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"?rovoca:eur" set up h i s 
~!'.fi l trate ot~e::- unde rg :c'oun d ..:. niC:s and 
t :-: ~ Gestapo. :'~is case de n·,o ns trates the potent'..J.l 
c·",n",:its ar. d de :ne::-its 0 : sccye cy. !f.'h i le s e crecy prevented t !--:e 
' c o lor.e l " from ur.dergoing a t:'1 Tough vectlr.g and authenticat ion 
process ·~Ihi:::h '_:ould have y"vea l ed hi Oi false cyed e :,t i als, i t 
.l.'..::-,itcd tr.e a :nount of darr,aqe ar.c extent of pe:1etrat i o" he 
cou ld ac h ieve 
2. Initiative versus Centrali z e d Control 
T:"12 underground organizatio:1 is forced choose f~:1d a 
functional ba l anc e tct·~lee:1 the and control extremes o f 
ri g ~d c e ntralized COI'.t. r.o l versus the absolute c.utonOr:1Y o f 
~ocal sub - u n'. r.s. Be l l sums up [ h i s con t rad i::: tioll, say~ng; 
OEJt:ing to grant cons iderable aut:"1ority to individua l 
units to pursue t he objectives o f t he organizat ions a llo · .... s t he 
sub-u:1it.s the periphery 
i nitiat ive, take advantage of t.heir regional expert.isf' Jnd 
e xp l oit ta-::-gets of opportun it y in a time~y r:1 a nneJ::. This 
course of a::t ion leaves much of the decision mak ~ng ~ n the 
'-'Ga r l inski, The Surviva l cf Love, Me:noirs o f a Res lstance 
Officer, p. :;2 
Dynamics , The I n:"12rent Ineffic i encies 
r.a ~~ds of t :-,~ pe-::iphery, ~-,-"linqt.:ish :. ng authori:y to ;::;~'2 :,x::.). _ 
of action ·d r. : . :~ C O:1t ~adl.ct or 
i~,:ce ~ i l t he overall st:::ateglc o~jectiveil of the Centra::' 
--::- r.e alte~native course of action is to' dlc;::ate 
a bso :!.u: ely the actions to be Fu.::sued by the peY,-phe r a l '.lni ts 
':' I-.e cenLer is thon of adr.erence to its di ctated 
strategies belt l usses t he advall t dges o f UoiLiative, regi.onal 
expert. i se and eXOJ loitat i o n of targets uf o tJpurtunity 
F\~ rther:no re. c landest ine o.::ganizations lnvariab l y lack tr.e 
COIT,T,unication :nechanislT,s neccssar:y to sUPFort a ri", i dly 
c e nt .::alized c haln - of-co:nlT,a nd. The lTore centrdl i zed a c a r ",and 
<:lod control structure , t ;'1e greater .l ts need foy a secc!l-e, 
uninterrupted flO',·; of c um:lIuni cation, carefully pre scribing and 
cont l nually revising its com:nands to p e ripheral un.l,ts. 
previous l y i l lustratf>d, the unde rground' s syste:r, c: 
cUT:lmunioat i on i" inheren t ly incom?a tible with suc:~ demands. 
Goverrunenta-in Exile 
Governments - in - exi 1e, a recurrent t heme in the 
occupied countries of World \\'ar II, had varying degrees 0: 
impact up on the unde rground rr,overnen t s. rhe govern~nen t s - i. n ­
e x i l e, g e n e Y-ill l y, retal.ned their legitimacy as the ultimate 
author':'ty o f the occu~ied country. Thus. all u nder'ground 
o.::ganizations der i ving their legi timCloy frem clai:-r,s 0: serving 
the lntere sts of their country and the real national l eaders 
',.Jere ;' :ltrir.sicly obl i gated (0 ::~e d, t o a g!:"23.te!:" Qr :' -'> 3",: ::-
deg r ee, t he inst.ruc t.ions f :!:cm the ll: gove rnment - in - exi l e , :,,: 0; 
ex t. e:-lde c. a;".d ofler. confused chilin-o[ - cc~::-,and offeree 
-=- r.e s i ngle greates t va l ue of orer;:; ting under 
ausp i ces of a governl1el'. t- in exi l e ,,",'dS t he relatively gre a c e r 
secur i ty prov l. ded t o t he t c;) leade r sh ip elemer~ t s c : ::r.e 
Th i s secur l t:y benefit extended not only to t ~; e 
l eade r sbip it. se l f bu t to thf" i r documen t s. C011mun i catiu n 
net\~ork s and ot.her admi nl.strat.ive componen t s, allow i ng 
l eadershl.p to concent r ate its efforts mor e ful l y 
operatlonal l ssues. J an Karski lis t s the advanta~es derived 
: r o m operating ur.de r a government,s - i n - e x il e, sayl.ng, 
AttemptinS! to d i rec t underoround ac t ivities from 
another cou:ltry , sepat:at c d by thousands of mi l es, O[Jera ting 
under severe comm'cln ica tion res trict i ons and a l ack of " re a l 
time" inte l ligence posed considerable di:f i c u lt l es. These 
[act8rs contributed t8 the sentiment t r.al the qovernmcnt-in -
exil e was "out of touch" , .... i t h current events and lacked an 
"
J !(ar5Ki, p. 1 33. 
ap?~ec ~ a t. ic :1 L)r :h"" real ~ty of t hei~' s ltuat io n St e ::", :,: 
X::::::-bc n s ki re~ a tes ::':" 3 
c'-,ai,, - o: -c8!"[r,and, e xtended thousands of m i ~es , 
GClve:: r,me n t s - in - exi e cou ld p r8v ide ir.v a ~ uab l e serv i ::€! 
to their lndigenous unde r ground movements i : lhey r e cognl z .?cc 
t helr l im it at ions and e x p loited t he i.r bene fits ~lost eXl !ec. 
gove rnme:<t, ,:-e cogr.ized ::. r.ei;,; in::e l ligence and ccmmunica:: ion 
l im l.:: ations ar.d d id no:: a::teDpt to int erfere at a n ope ra t ior.al 
~ evel . ::'he y, i ns::ead, p rcvided ,b!"oad DollCY direct ion , 
mater i a l and mora l s uppo~·t a nd l e nt thc i.r leg i. tl.mac y to the lr 
c cn"t ituen t.s bat.~l l ng Eor th e freedom 8f thei r country. 
4. Underground Co=unication 
::'r.e c8rnmand anc con::'ro l any organizat l cn 
~. r.orc ughl y dependant upon it s abi l ity t c communicate 
I nstru ctions , c cm:nands and intel l igen ce must b e re l Clyed up and 
dOW:1 the ci!ain'Qf-comrr,and to e ns ure tr.e ", ffic i ent ope r a ::ion 
and e nhance ~he decisior: making precess of ::he organlza::.ion. 
'''Korbcnski , p. 23. 
T'1e gr-eater. the or-ga" iz at i on's aC l..lity to co~~un~ r:3Le, 
mor e e ff ect.l 'l e ~y the cente :: and d~r- ec:: 
c: [)er : p he::y 7 he undecgrcClnd ..... ·.l t h :e ts t e:' uous 
always l ::~ache::ous c ha nnels o f commu:,icat i en. suffers i nnate 
::' 1;jutati o:1S to .llS comma nd and c ont rol capab i ll tles. Th"" 
t n r.ea t s to the security o f the undergcound o:::qanizat iors 
emanating frem tr.e demands t o c oec·" "c"tc . · ... ·hieh are d i se\.; ", ,,, ,:;j 
i n detai l in c r.apt e :: thr ee , pose a tremendous obs tacle t::J 
clandes ti n e cper ,1tions Tr,e bu rden of hos t il e censo r ship and 
t h e monitoyinc; of all co mmun icaLions, , ... ·her.he:::- pos tal , 
telephonic or rad ie yequ i r.ed undergroun d o r c;an i zat ic :'l S t o 
impleme n t dras t_ i.c adaptive measures . J . BOI,'ye r 3e~ 1 a p t l y 
de sc-:ri bes t r,e di f f i c ultie s 0: undergr.Olmd commu:u_cat .lOnS, 
The under-ground, r.ecognizir.g the both t he requ i re ment s 
and associa':: ed t_hyeats, ad::h;-essed the necessity u!: 
commllnicat i on i!1 a v<l riet y of dj f~er-ent m<lnner-s. The most 
essentia l c.daptat ion i rr;plemented by the unde :::-grOllnd to corr,bat 
t h "O threClts 
decent r. ,, ] i za t ion of its a n d cc:-:t r o l system S ta:-:=-s ~a ' ... : 
KOr:'. c r' o·,,· sk~ excellent descr i pt':.O,. of 
dif:i :: u l : ,l,es and requiremcn t s assuc i ated \ .... it h u.:lc.ergrcu:-. :::. 
cC :'1mu nicat~ons and pro'/::'cies e Solutlcn Hnplerrenled t h e 
Po ':" i sh underg r o u:-:d , stat ,,-nJ; 
\.,rh i le decent ralization served to :l1 l. ni:nize the needs 
fo r unde r gyou nd :;um:nunications, it could not e l im::.nate t ne 
req'.1ir-ement altogether. Communicat~oi1s, cven al a 
level, were an i.nd i spensable part: of unde:::-ground operations 
.!orgen Haestrup explains; 
The u:-:rlerg round mel this requi!:€Te:lt in a variety of i:lg-enious 
a'.d prilclica':" ',;ays . :--laestrup illusl!:'ates the diversity ar.d 
: '"Komorow"k i, p . 
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cOTTO?lexity of t~".e method s of underg r ound 
e'Tlp l oyei by the underg rou nd , st3 t ing ; 
':'ne pxa c t ba l ance cet '-.'e en t he va lue ilccrued 
i lli c i t CO'1',[".vn.l cations and t he i nnu :1",er-abl e halards posed 
the inter n al secur-ity o f the u nder-g:::-ound ' .... as a d i ff i cu l t 
de f~ne and constantl y cr.anging point . Fre rr, a secur- i cy 
stancroint. the c omp lete absence o f cO:TiT,unica,t =- cns ' .... as the 
safes t o;::tio n available to the u n deJ:"ground . Based ;::ur-el y upen 
cem::-.and and cont:::-o l requirements. regular and plent i f ul 
communi ca t ion was the most desirdble option . Bel l e rr,p has l zes 
the contl lct betweer. t he ideal sec u t"i t y standards a nd th~ 
operationa l r equi r e me nts of the underground, say.l ng; 
A minimum leve l 0: commun ication Do t h u p aiid dO'wn t he 
undergrc u nd chain -of-comma nd and on occasion horizonta lly, 
'"' ':{aest t"l lp, ""uyopean Resis r_Cl:1CQ Movements , pp. 357 - 3 5 3 
" ' Bell, ""-ev o lut i onary Dynamics ," p . 203 . 
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<1 :1 2lo 3 0 1t.: t e necess it y t~ ~.he f \;:1c ti o:-: i tl9 of Clny o:!:ganiz 3. :: ~:; :"_ s 
Cc :".sequent i r.lll y. the u nc.e rg:!:c..::"_d was l eft to d e vise i.ts 
met-hod s to manage the n u;ne :::-ous secu rity t r.reats int r ins i c to 
u::d e :::-g r => u:1d COIT.lT'unications Ihe methods 'dhich t h""y err.p':'o yed 
to address ::nese secur l ty th;:f'ats are di scuo;se d 1. 1'. detail 11'. 
chapter three and ',ii ':'l net be reiterat e d The 'J.ndergr::)Un d 
o~·ga:: i zations t ha t '-;-Ie::e aDle to master the i nheren t con E':' l::: ts 
;:)E'~t'-"een securiLy and c ommCln i cations, b aliJ. n c ing cO::1mand and 
control re qui ::-ements ago. " nst security t hreat s, s lg n if lcdl:tly 
e nhal'.ced not only their operational efLic i ency bu e: t heir 
l ikelihood ot s u r vival 
CONCLUSIONS 
Whi l e the identif icatior_ 2 r_c el l minat i on o f the l ead lng 
elements ef the indHJe nou5 50ciet.ies o f t~e ::Jccupied c::Jur.trie s 
by GerlT.an s e curity fo rc F's had a profound e ffect on the .;J.':li l ity 
of t.he pn,,-war leadersh .i p Lo assume leadershlp positions in 
t he u t' d e rgroll:ld , t hey were the only o n es p::Jssessing the 
;-:r e dentia l s and ul'.iversal respect nece ssary t o aSS UlT, e t h e 
3e:1io.::- leadership ro l es. De spite German scrut. ~ ny a nd 
preemptlve actions, the pre -',.,ar leade r ship defied these 
add i tional deterrents alld f i lled many of the v i ta l und er.ground 
l eadership ro l es. 
T he l eadership ::Jf the unde:::-grOl-,nd d:'..ffered sign i fic o. ctly 
In its consti tuer.cy f:::-o m the senior level to the leca l level . 
The senior l eadersh i F WClS far more l ike l y to cen s ~ st of 
".ar lead~ rs . dra ''/n tcom t;'.e milita.::y . pc li tl "":'l. ::' 
an d socia::' e' :..le of t he country 7 ".e ::' ocal :' eader~; • .... ere 0: a 
a l l ';Ja l:z s o f l ife - contlnge nl u~o~, thei:r pe '!: sona l leCidershlp 
q ua::' i t. l cS. rather than pre-< .. !a:r leaders hi p ro le s Th= case s of 
leglt l macy of the u nde r g.::ound l eaders 0. 1,,0 diffe.::eci 
sig [n ticantly bet ',·;een the senior and l:)Cal l e aders h l p [he 
senior l eade r sb i p derived muc h of lt s legiti r.,acy fro[:', legal 
precept s e stab li shed cefore the occupat i on of t he ir country. 
The local leaders ' legitimacy was fo umied upor. his "exemplary 
character." what \'Iebe.:: class i fies as " c hari,->Tnatic grounds" of 
legi t i macy 
The need f or establ i s hing p.::ovision s t or l eaders h ip 
SUC Cf"ss '..or. 'Nas general ::' y recognlzed <:JY the under;r:Jund, th e 
a rr angerr,ents f or implementa tion , howeve.::. dif fe red dependant 
upon the organ'..zations d e gree of "non-hierarehia l ness. " The 
nc.::e hierarchia. l organizatior.s re lied UpO:1 an e stablisr,ed 
chain-of-ccmmand and orders f!'om above tc direcL leadersh ip 
The less hlerarchi al o:::ganizatl::>ns re lied on less 
definite me t.hods, such as t. he leader's st.a.t e d choice [er 
success i on, the ass um9t ion by an individual of a s econd 
commar.d role. priOr disc us s i on a:1d gei1eral aptitude for 
leCl de rship The di f fe:::e:1t unde rgrounds appear to have 
addressed the ques t ion of success ion satisfactorily the 
el i mi nat:,c!"l ': _ l eaders was not ye.t t :le d :" sso Lu :. ic~ of 
gro :.:ps hecause of c onflic ts I>:as u nus u al 
The \.l :'lc.ergrounc. l eadership I'.'o.s .imbued w.ith extro.::>rc':::':1aLy 
of au t. ies. 
dec:: i s .!.o!"lS :'1cd l i fe and d E' .:lt:1 cc n sequ ences nct orlly f or 
me T bers 0: his U:l'..t but for members of h i s 
s '..:. :fered t :'1e wrath cf Germclrl reLal.iaticns. He was re spc ~si. ble 
for crganizing and ccordina t inq cperat i cns, ins!=nring a nd 
motivating ;-,is f cllowers, w:.th ;:'ene::.t of :1nly min.lmal 
gui,r"lance a:lQ d.lLection frcm abcve. T::e 
successfu l ly ada pted i t.s o:oeratio:1al methods t. c address th e se 
seemingly cverwhel m.l:1g detF'rre nt s, developing a i n ncva::ive a~.c. 
unique a l ternative tc trad.lt i o:1al methcds of l eade:"shi.p. 
'I' ::e unde:"grcund coml1and and cont:"o l struct\lre was largely 
defined by t~e balance ac::ieved tetween ::he i nnate l y 
ccn f lictual d e mands of ccmm\ jn.lca.t lcnS 
ULderground crgani7.atlcnS wi thcu t: both 
met.iculou~ consideratio:1s for internal secu!" ·. t. y and som2 leve l 
of communica.t i ons between its different e l ements. 
crganizations · ... i th aspiraticns f:::Jr even limited::oherence and 
:::ongru.lty must malnta l n pe:: iod ic commu"icatlc n s from :.ts 
center t.c the lJeriphery of t he movement. Striltegies, t argets, 
lnforr:"tat i on and riirecticn" must be disseminated down the 
c::a.ln - of - command, and inquires , requests, i:1telligen:::e and 
responses must be passed up the c::ain - cf - c o mmand. \'; .I t: :·lOut a 
of the org ani Zd ticn ceases :::8 
co::ere r_t Icyce and ::E' s r esses u:to its corr,pone:lt pa r ~3. 
";li ~ e C'Jm<:)un icat l o ll i s an ess~ nt ici l p a:ct of. mainta irn :1g 
organizat ion's cungruity it 3 l" ::;.ose3 
se-:::-1y~tv ~- ~_ s ks. Public commu :1 ~cation ne t wc yks a r c constar.t=-y 
moni to rEd by hcst i le security fc:cces Couriers r:",U3t brave 
l'laze o f enemy che c >;points, st.reet pat yols ar:d r a odo;! a rr~3~_ S 
Radio transmissicn3 are 5usce9tible to both ir. ter ceptiCJ]"i. dnd 
location OI the t:cansmlOision ,Qint. T:'1e very l i ke l y 
of the i.nterceptio:1 and revelat i cn of the CO:-lte:1 ts of 
c L:mdest i ne messages CQuld have treme:1dous ly destructive 
cons<"quecnces Pla:-ls cculc. be :cevealec., age:-lts and l eaders 
ide r.t ified, codes c oul d be broke:1 and age nts t urned , a l lo'tJ i ng 
the hostl:"e in f llt :::aticn of the organ i zatlCJn. The only 
recourse Clva i la b:"e to the underground .... as to l i mit i ':.'3 
commun ications t he bare minimum, d e v i sing u r. i que a nd 
adaptive melhcds to sustain the rema in i ng communicat ioo 
requi:cement . 
ThO' unc.erground cOl1'mand and control structure, because of 
the unremit ting threats t o their security, imp:"emeclted several 
orga:1iza t ional safeguards , unde c g cound 
" cellu l arized." minimizir.g t he cent acts wi til in individua l 
units and up a:1d down t he c hain-ef- comma:1d. To rO'duce the 
corrrcu nlcation requireme:lts, the ucldergr8U:ld g ranL e d. a generous 




? or the lJu r p oses of th :L S p a per , undergrour.d organiza t:Lor_s 
".av ""- genera l ly bee:1 Jjdressed as gen er:LC e ntlties. TJ-:e 
disparlties ::,et \~een the undergrounds of d i::Eere r,t cc --< -:tr ies 
ar.d , ... ·.:. tJ-nn t r.e same organizatio:l.s o ver tl:ne have b ee n 
i n te Cltiona l ly ~rllnim:.zed. W~ i l e t~e d ::_E:e r en t unde r gr::c..; :-.d 
Tlove -ner'. t s should be v:'..w .... ed as d:"stir.c t s t ructures, each 
possess:'..ng i ts unique t :~.reats , Gpe.::-aclonal enVlror.:ner.t ar'.d 
opposi~_ i on, the.:::e are ur.l versal concerns ar.d d:"ctates t;cat 
app l y , to a grea t e r or l e sser de s;ree , a l l unde :::-gro ,-,nd 
o:::-ga n izat ions The competency le v el of all underground 
o??o ne nts, the v ita1 1. ty and capabi li.tie s o[ the unde:::-g round 
organlzat i on a nd, especial l y , the ba l ance of strength bet-",eer: 
t he u nde rground and i ts e n e:ny, e ff ect s unde rgr o und :nanage:ne n t , 
but 0:11y per i phera l l y. The underground . ::,y definition, all-lays 
re:Jains l ess "powerE1l1" than i t s adversa ry . Cesplte this 
tn,mendous dlEferen t.i a l , t he underground must continue to 
conduct t he o?erationa l dnd admin l st:::-ativ e :unctlO!lS In:::r l nsi c 
tc any organization Th i s p aper has addrF'ssed how t he 
underg:::-ound movemenLs of '/i'orld War II managed the onerOllS ;:.ask 
0: recruitment. i n te rnal securlty, leade rship and commOlnd and 
conero l ::." the peril i ou s wo::ld o ( the underground. 't.'hile ehe 
underground res is tance moveme nt s of ";'/orld War :1 WF're used to 
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yr::>vloe ·--.lOst:.:-_ .:::e for thlS paper, the sa me prinCir:l'Os, 
re o:ui r", r~nts and i:i.ctates apply equally:. :::> ccntemporarv 
"-: -.;.;! r-rill a" and :::-evolu'.:ionary underground organi za tions. 
,::, '-,.:: c;;-:jerg::::ound reslstance move'l'.en ts of Wor-ld I,ar-
cie!O?i':", Cl[>o:rl--:j.. 9 lrl a h l ghly r e pcessive envi r-onment , fac ed 
wi~ L- al l disadvantages inherent 
0::::3a:', i zat ions, cant i ~uousl y prov ided invaluable serv ices ::0 
both the Allied war effort and their o wn struggle fo r freedom. 
They provided the Allies 'wit h invaluabie, real - time 
in te ll igence, ass i sted in the escape 0: do'wned Allied airmen, 
conducted subvers ive act lons against German mater i al and 
personne l targets , diverted immense n U'Tlber of Axis tro;)ps f rc~ 
their point of maln effort and conducted indlspensable special 
tasks at the behest of the Allies . Collective l y, these 
underground act i viti e s had a profound effect upon the war--
f ight ing capabllit i es of bo t h t r,e Allies and the Axis 
Operating in an ur.derground environment o :fered the 
clandest i r: e organization both advan::ages and disac.v<:l:ltages. 
The underground's ability to str ike unexpectedly , from the 
very midst of its enemy' s camp, to diss i pate back into the 
i nd i genous populat ion between actions and t he re l ative ease 
.... ·ith which Lt could infiltrate the German infrastructures were 
prec i ous too l s to the grossl y misrr-at ched force s of the 
unc.ergroll nd. The inord i nale arr.ount of time and effort 
exper.ded by the undergrou nd [l'.erely to insure i ts s urviva l and 
t.:'1e ceaseless de:nar.d for secrecy, O-~3.ced severe restrict'..o:1s 
0 :1 clandest i ne operatior.s ;:'!1e s-.:ccessful organizat.:":l r. v.las 
tr.e ,:me that was ab le to rap~dly identi:y ::hese advantages and 
dis3.:1van::ages and ada?t ;.ts management acccrd:t:1g 1y . 
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